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West Africa has an estimated eight million illicit small arms in circulation. The 
uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) fuelled codicts in 
West Africa, galvanizing member states of the Economic Cornunity sf West african 
States (ECOWAS) to adopt measures to bring sanity to bear on the security situation in 
West Africa. 
Any discussion of the dynamics of conflict should accordingly look at the snlall 
arms factor in the many conflicts that plagued the subregion. The research examines all 
the initiatives that ECOWAS deployed to combat SALW in West Africa - the 
Moratorium Declaration, arms embargoes, and arms collection and destruction. 
ECOWAS anti-proliferation efforts began in 1998 with the signing of the Moratorium 
Declaration in 1998 in Abujq Nigeria. 
This research delves into the facilitating role SALW plays in conflict, factors that 
motivate people to acquire SALW and some of the sources of supply of weapons to West 
Afiica. It also traces the history and evolution of ECOWAS, especially its conflict 
resolution mechanism. 
The research uses both primary and secondary data. The secondary data were 
gathered from books, journals, magazines and newspaper articles. Information was also 
gathered from publications and websites of reputable organizations working on SALW 
such as the Economic Community of West African States, Norwegian Initiative on Small 
Arms Transfers (NISAT), International Action on Small Arms (IANSA), the United 
Nations, Small Arms Survey, Oxfam and Human Rights Watch. 
Primary data were collected by unstructured interviews with small arms experts, 
civil society organizations working on SALW and disarmament and officials of the 
police, military, defense intelligence and foreign affairs. 
The research analyzes the progress and gains ECOWAS made in containing 
SALW between 1998 and 2005. It was found that some states undermined the ECOWAS 
initiatives by being suppliers of arms to factions in conflict or destabilizing sitting 
governments. Some provisions of the Moratorium such as the harmonization of laws and 
the development of an arms register for ECOWAS were not achieved. Gains were made 
in adhering to the application for exemptions for SALW imports, thus building 
confidence between states. ECOWAS and governments increasingly see civil society as a 
major partner in fighting SALW proliferation, giving rise to hopes of realizing the goal of 
ridding the subregion of' illicit SALW. 
THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) AND 
THE CONTROL OF ILLICIT PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT 
WEAPONS IN WEST AFRICA (1998-2005) 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF CLARK ATLANTA UNIVERSITY IN 
PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
BY 
MBA ATINGA 





All Rights Reserved 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Art Hansen, chair of my 
dissertation committee, for his guidance and suggestions that have made this dissertation 
reach this stage. Dr. Hansen was meticulous in his comments and provided some useful 
additional references. He imparted to me during this period of research his immense 
experience in scholarly research. Dr. Kwaku Danso,-Boafo has always been a mentor, a 
friend and great teacher. I am a beneficiary of his academic rigor and incisive comments. 
I also thank Dr. Hashim Gibrill for agreeing to serve on my committee and availing me of 
his deep insights on politics in West Africa. 
For my wife, Agnes Hawa Ayebo, and our children, Michael, Sandino and Jude, 
this stage of my academic career would have been impossible without them. They 
endured my several years of' absence and were a source of encouragement. I will forever 
remain appreciative of their patience, unflinching moral support and their belief that it 
was all for the good ofthe family. 
I am extremely grateful to Afi Yakubu, Executive Director of FOSDA for hosting 
me during the field research and making available her office facilities, expertise and 
contacts. Napoleon Abdulai was equally generous with his expertise and deep knowledge 
of' small arms issues. 
I also express my gratitude to Badaru Ibrahim Taimako and his wife Cynthia 
Okumi fbr their support during my stay in Atlanta, Georgia. Dr. Virginia Davis Floyd 
was very supportive and inspirational and I acknowledge her gratefully. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. . ......................................................................................... ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 11 
...................................................................................................... LIST OF TABLES vi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................... .............................................................. vii 
Chapter Page 
1 . INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the problem ............................................................................... 7 
Purpose ...................................................................................................... 9
Significance of the study ................................................................................ 9 
.................................................................................................. Methodology 9 
Limitations .................................................................................................... 9 
.................................................................................. Organization of the study 10 
.................................................................................. 2 . LITERATURE REVIEW 12 
........................................................................................ Sources of Conflict 12 
....................................................................... Quality of Governance 14 
.......................... Manipulation of Ethnicity : ...................................... 16 
............................................................................... Natural Resources 19 
Influence of' SALW on Conflict ...................................................................... 21 
SALW and their Impact ................................................................................. 23 
Regional Organizations and SALW Control ................................................... 27 
African Regional Organizations and SALW Control .................................... 32 
Research Questions ................................................................................... 42 
3 . METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................... 43 
Itinerary ............................................................................................................ 45 
4 . ECOWAS: HISTORY. STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION ........................... 47 
The Liberian Civil war and the Consolidation of ECOWAS Conflict 
Resolution Mechanism ..................................................................................... 54 
ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia ................................................................. 56 
The Revised ECOWAS Treaty of 1993 ......................................................... 57 
Competing Intergovernmental Organizations ................................................ 59 
Organizational Structure of ECOWAS ......................................................... 60 
The Executive Commission .............................................................................. 62 
Security Mechanism of' the Revised Treaty ..................................................... 64 
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security ..................... , .................................... 6 5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
5 . SMALL ARMS TRADE AND TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA ................. 
........................................................................................... Demand fbr S ALW 
Crime and Banditry .............................................................................. 
Insecurity and the Privatization of' Security ....................................... 
.................................................................... Inter-group Competition 
................................................ Politicians and the Contest for Power 
..................................................... Non-State Actors (Armed Groups) 
Culture ................................................................................................ 
Factors Facilitating Illegal SALW Proliferation in West Africa ................... 
........................................................................ Weak Regulatory Framework 
6 . SOURCES OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 
SUPPLY IN WEST AFRICA ........................................................................... 92 
.......................................... The State as a Major Source of Weapons Supply 93 
................................................................ External Support to Rebel Factions 95 
............................................................................... Arms Brokers and Dealers 99 
............................................................................................. Victor Bout 102 
..................................................................................... Leonid Minin 103 
.............................................................................. Guus Kouwenhoven 105 
................................................................................... Sanjivan Ruprah 106 
Local Craft Industries ..................................................................................... 107 
Recycled Weapons .......................................................................................... 110 
Refugees ........................................................................................................... 110 
7 . ECOWAS INITIATIVES IN COMBATING SMALL ARMS 
.................................................................................. AND LIGHT WEAPONS 113 
The 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation. Exportation and 
..................................................................... Manufacture of Light Weapons 114 
......................................... Chronology of' Events Leading to the Moratorium 115 
...................................................................................... National Commissions 119 
...................................................................................................... Exemptions 120 
.................................................................... Arms Collection and Destruction 122 
............................................................................................. Arms Embargoes 124 
..................................................................................................... Liberia 125 
Sierra Leone .................. , .................................................................... 127 
.................................................................................................... Togo 129 
........................................................................................ Ivory Coast . ,  130 
........... ............................................................. .........................  Disarmament , , 131 
.............................. 8 . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................... 135 
........ ............................................ General Assessment ............................. . 136 
Conclusions ................. , ............................................................................... 138 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
.............................................................  ~at ional-  Commissions 138 
Arms Register ............................................................................... 140 
Harmonization of legislative and administrative measures ............ 140 
Collection and Destruction of' Surplus Weapons ., ........................... 141 
..................................................................................... Exemptions 142 
.............................................................................. Arms Embargoes 142 
APPENDIX 1 Human Development Ranking of' ECOWAS Members ..................... 144 
APPENDIX 2 Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations ............................................ 145 
APPENDIX 3 Production of Major Modern Automatic Rifles ................................. 146 
...................................................... APPENDIX 4 Request by Nigeria for Exemption 147 
...................................................................................... APPENDIX 5 Consent Form 148 
........................................................................................................ BIBLIOGRAPHY 149 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1 . Armed groups in West Africa .................................................................................. 84 
2 . Exemptions granted by ECOWAS under the Moratorium .................................... 121 
3 . Ceremonial arms destruction in West Africa .......................................................... 123 
.................................................................... 4 . Ceremonial arms destruction in Niger 124 
5 . Arms embargoes on ECOWAS member states ................................................... 124 




















Armed Forces Ruling Council 
Authority of Heads of State and Government 
All Peoples Congress 
Association of' Southeast Asian Nations 
African Union 
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Re-integration 
Department for International Development 
Defence and Security Commission 
ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group 
Economic Community of West Africa States 
European Union 
Foundation for Security and Development in Africa 
International Action Network on Small Arms 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
Inter-Parliamentary Union 
Liberians United fbr Reconciliation and Development 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance 
vii 




















Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
Mediation and Security Councii 
News Agency of Nigeria 
National Commissions 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical weapons 
Norwegian Institute on Small Arms Transfers 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
Organization of American States 
Organisation of African Unity 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
Program for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development in 
Africa 
Pacific Islands Forum 
Provisional National Defence Council 
Revolutionary United Front 
Southern African Development Community 
Small Arms and Light Weapons 
Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation 
Union Economique de Monetaire Ouest Africaine 
United Kingdom 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
UN United Nations 
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
LJNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
UNPoA Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 
USA United States of America 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The control of the weapons of' violence had always been an issue of' importance 
throughout history. It had always been deemed important to contain their spread, whether 
for reasons of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the state or to assure the security of 
citizens, or both. During the Cold War, the focus of' concern for pacifists, statesmen and 
peace activists was the stockpile of'n~lclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBCW) 
and the real danger that they could be deployed in any major confrontation between the 
two superpowers - the USA and the Soviet Union. Humanity heaved a sigh of relief' after 
the Cold War ended. Gone then was the threat of confrontation between two heavily 
armed camps. But there was still concern about those weapons of mass destruction 
because of the fear that the stockpile in the arsenal of the former Soviet Union could fall 
into the hands of terrorists. 
Third World countries in the post-Cold War period were confronted by a new and 
equally threatening menace - small arms and light weapons (SALW). Unfortunately, 
even though small arms were such a threat, not enough attention was paid to them. The 
concern was more on NBCW, and by 1990, when the Cold war came to an end, "well- 
defined agendas, structures and institutions" had been negotiated for their control.' 
Global emphasis on NCBW reflected the concerns of the largest Western states; Third 
' Andre Stemmet, "Regulating Small Arms and Light Weapons: The African Experience," Ajrlcan 
Security Review 10, no 3 (2001) http.//www.iss io.ta/!)i1bdi!SRIIONo3/Stcn1met.htrnl (accessed 
September 2, 2006) 
1 
World countries had different priorities. With fragile institutions and at rather very 
delicate stages in nation building, these countries were sitting on a powder keg of SALW. 
In 2002, it was estimated that about seven million small arms were in circulation 
in the West African regioq2 this figure was even widely regarded as conservative. In 
West Africa, these guns were a mix of imported and locally manufactured guns. SAWL 
had progressed over the years from menace to scourge. Apart from their implication in 
violent crime, SAWL threatened the stability of states and, in some instances, compelled 
the international community to recognize brutal and criminal elements disguised as 
leaders of rebel movements. 
Globally, there were 49 major conflicts that started between 1990 and 2005. 
Major wars were defined as those with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. 
SALW were the only arms used in 46 of those conflicts. Only one conflict (the 1991 Gulf 
War) was dominated by heavy weapons.3 
The causes of those conflicts were many and diverse; no two conflicts were the 
same. In West Africa, the major cause of the conflicts was bad governance. Independence 
brought with it hopes of accelerated development and the participation of the citizenry in 
governance. Unfortunately those hopes were dashed soon after independence. In most 
countries, political power soon became the exclusive preserve of "big men" who 
patronized the ordinary people. Power became the monopoly of cliques from a political 
party, ethnic group or clan. The majority remained voiceless and excluded from decisions 
affecting them. Corruption found fertile ground to thrive. Politics was not an expression 
Abdel-Fatau Musah, "Small Arms: A Time Bomb Under West Africa's Democratization 
Process," Brown Journal of World Affairs I X ,  no 1 (Spring 2002): 240 
3 Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: Conaolling the Real 
Instruments of War," (AugustlSeptember 1998) htt~:liwww.arn~scontrol.org/act/l998~08-09/mkas98.asp 
(accessed Sept 16,2006) 
of altruism but a competition to see who got to share the national cake in the most unfair 
manner. Elections became a farce. The results of some elections were even known before 
they were conducted, in some cases yielding 90 percent of votes in favor of unpopular 
incumbents. 
The Samuel Doe regime in Liberia epitomized all that was typical about bad 
regimes. His Krahn ethnic group dominated the Liberian army and, as Adebajo puts it, 
"He effectively turned a national institution into a Krahn-dominated instrument of 
oppression."4 Doe purged the army of the Gio and Mano ethnic groups and Americo- 
Liberians. His regime was brutal and bloodthirsty. 
Other causes of conflict included the manipulation of ethnicity by politicians; that 
meant, playing ethnic groups against each other to shore up a politician's power. The 
economic decline of the 1980s created very difficult living conditions and contributed to 
conflict. Many regimes had no clue as to how to revive their struggling economies and 
bowed to dictates from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The 
prescriptions of these multilateral agencies worsened the situation. Poverty became 
entrenched, and living standards fell. There was little to go around, and the little that was 
available was shared among select groups or interests. Marginalized ethnic or interest 
groups rose up against the perpetrators of their marginalization. No West African nation 
was immune from the illegal infiltration of small arms and light weapons. 
To control the proliferation of SALW in West Africa, a variety of options were 
available - national, bilateral, regional and international. The national option involved a 
nation relying on requisite internal measures such as national arms control legislation and 
on border security to control the inflow and outflow of SALW. Bilateral options meant 
4 Adekeye Adebajo, Buildrng Peace in West Afrzca, Llberia, Sierra Leone and Gurnea-Bissau 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 45 
that two countries would conclude agreements to stem the flow of arms between their 
countries With the regional option, countries belonging to a regional organization such 
as ECOWAS arrived at a mutually acceptable framework to control arms flow through 
negotiations and agreed to enforce the provisions of those frameworks. The international 
option was the situation where countries subscribed to agreements reached at 
international fora such as the African Union or the United Nations. 
National and bilateral solutions were not viable, principally because of the 
transnational character of SALW trade and trafficking. Many countries shared borders 
with several other countries, and the common thread was the porousness of the borders 
Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone had borders with two other countries. Liberia, Togo and 
Ghana each shared borders with three other countries. Benin, Nigeria and Mauritania 
each shared borders with four other countries. Senegal, Guinea and Ivory Coast each 
shared borders with five other countries. Mali and Burkina Faso shared borders with six 
other countries, and Niger had borders with eight other countries. The only exceptions to 
multiple borders in West Africa were the archipelago of Cape Verde and the Gambia, 
which was nearly surrounded by Senegal. In addition to shared borders, there were other 
factors related to arms trafficking that could not be controlled by one nation alone, for 
example, the presence of multinational criminal organizations, armed conflict in 
neighboring countries, poorly manned borders and lax regulation of  firearm^.^ 
The reality of geopolitics and the political economy of arms exports made a 
global approach to controlling small arms and light weapons very difficult, though 
desirable. According to Control Arms (a campaign coalition of Amnesty International, 
5 Sarah Meek, "Combating Arms Trafficking: Progress and Prospects," in Runnlng Guns The 
Global Market in Small Arms, ed Lora Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 2000), 188 
International Action Network on Small Arms and Oxfam), the arms industry was unlike 
any other because it operated without regulation and suffered from widespread corruption 
and bribes. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council - the USA, UK, 
France, Russia, and China - were responsible for eighty-eight per cent (88%) of reported 
conventional arms exports. Control Arms asserted that, contrary to their responsibilities 
and legal obligations, the G8 countries (USA, UK, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Japan 
and Canada) supplied weapons to irresponsible end users. For example, France and 
Germany exported arms to three countries - Myanmar (Burma), Sudan and China ,- that 
were subject to European Union embargoesS6 With such politically, economically and 
militarily powerhl countries deriving so much revenue and political leverage from arms 
sales, a global control regime was difficult to attain. 
The AK-47 assault rifle was "the world's favorite killing machine.." There were 
up to 70 million in circulation. They were found in the state arsenals of at least 82 
countries and were produced in at least 14 countries across four continents. While the 
research for this dissertation was being conducted, Venezuela signed a deal for the local 
assembly of the weapons, the first of its kind in the Americas. In Africa at that time the 
AK-47 rifle could be bought for as little as $30." 
Regional approaches appeared to offer the best option. The Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), which was founded in 1975, consisted of the states 
of Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, CBte dlIvoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea- 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Of 
Control Arms, "The G8: Global Arms Exporters; Failing to Control Ir~esponsible Arms 
Transfers " June 2005 ~ l l w w w . c o n t r o l a r i n s . o r e J d o w n l o a d s l ~ e r s . p d f ' ( a c c e s s e d  
September 20, 2006). 
Oxfam UK, "AK-47 is World's Worst Regulated Weapon According to New Report " June 26, 
2006, http:ilwww.oxfam.orr.uk1p1esslreleaseslca ak47 260606.htm (accessed September 20, 2006) 
the 16 countries in the region, nine were Francophone, five Anglophone, and two 
Lusophone. Mauritania, one of the sixteen, withdrew from ECOWAS in 2000. ECOWAS 
was originally founded to promote economic integration and development in West 
Africa. The conflicts in the sub-region and the grave humanitarian crises they sparked 
compelled ECOWAS to modify its original objectives to include conflict management. 
ECOWAS' initiative was the first such attempt by a regional body to get a grip on 
the problem of illegal SALW trade and trafficking. The ECOWAS example encouraged 
East and Southern Africa to establish regional mechanisms to deal with SALW. The 
African Union itself was inspired by ECOWAS to put the issue of SALW at center-stage 
in its attempt to deal with conflicts and terrorism in Africa. In 2000, as part of their 
preparation for the UN conference on SALW, African countries issued the Bamako 
Declaration urging African states to put in place measures to coordinate and harmonize 
efforts to address the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and 
light weapons. 
In March 2000, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda, 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Tanzania (of the Great Lakes 
Region) signed The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa to 
address the illicit proliferation of small arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes 
Region. Similarly, they acknowledged that for SALW proliferation to be tackled 
effectively, it had to be done regionally. 
The conclusion of colonial or liberation wars and the anti-apartheid struggle had 
left millions of weapons in private and undesirable hands in Southern Africa. In August 
2001, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) adopted the Protocol on 
the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the SADC Region 
to also address on a regional basis the widespread availability of SALW. 
Other regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the European Union (EU), the 
Pacific Islands Forum, and the Andean Community also launched regional measures to 
confront SALW proliferation. 
Statement of the Problem 
Owing to the numerous civil wars and coups d'etat, West Africa was described as 
one of the world's most unstable regions.8 Between 1989 and 2005, civil wars raged in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. 
The conflicts varied in causes and duration, but not in the weapons of choice - SALW. 
Violent inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts were recorded in nearly all the West 
African countries, with small arms featuring prominently as a catalyst. The interest in 
illicit SAWL therefore arose from the danger they posed to human security, rising levels 
of crime and banditry, the deaths and destruction, and the stability of states in the West 
African region. 
SALW also affected the onset, duration and lethality of conflict. Easy availability 
of SALW encouraged aggrieved persons to prefer quick and violent endings to disputes 
instead of prolonged negotiations and compromises. In the Liberian civil war, 
negotiations for peace accords or agreements were broken as soon as they were signed. 
Thirteen peace accords were agreed to and broken. The factions had vast stockpiles of 
SALW and challenged the authority of ECOWAS peacekeepers, sometimes attacking 
Adekeye Adebajo, Budding Peace rn West Africa L~berla, Slerra Leone and Guinea-Blssau 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 24 
them and in the process kiiling some and stealing their weapons. This made the 
intervention of ECOWAS-to stop the carnage in Liberia very costly in terms of human 
lives and materials. In many of the troop-contributing countries, especially in Nigeria and 
Ghana, the problems led to loud calls for their troops to be pulled out. 
SALW also helped fuel human rights abuses, especially when law and order had 
broken down and there was no mechanism to bring abusers to justice. The easy 
availability of SALW and their possession by rogue elements undermined democracy 
since such elements could flout authority at will and impose their dangerous choices on 
the majority who did not have access to SALW. 
Until 1989, West Africa did not have a significant illicit SALW problem. The war 
in Liberia flooded the subregion with SALW, thus making the curbing of SALW a 
priority. The Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture 
of Light Weapons in West Africa in October 1998 by ECOWAS Heads of State and 
Government at their twenty-first ordinary summit in Abuja, Nigeria was a recognition of 
the magnitude of the SALW proliferation crisis and the ECOWAS resolve to deal with it. 
Besides the Moratorium, ECOWAS and its member countries took a number of 
initiatives such as enforcing arms embargoes, disarmament after the signing of peace 
accords, confiscation of arms from unauthorized people, and arms destructions. 
Other protocols, such as the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for 
Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security and the 
Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy adopted in 200 1, were 
adopted to remove the root causes of conflict. These were undertaken in the pursuit of the 
overarching goal of ensuring peace and security. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research was to analyze the progress and gains ECOWAS 
made in containing SALW between 1998 and 2005. 
Significance of the Study 
Most studies had looked at ECOWAS' initiatives separately with the most 
attention being paid to the moratorium. This was the first in-depth study of ECOWAS as 
a regional organization that looked at all of its initiatives (the 1998 Moratorium, arms 
embargoes and disarmament) in an integrated way. The research covered a seven-year 
period: 1998-2005. 
Methodology 
The research used both primary and secondary data. The secondary data were 
gathered from books, journals, magazines and newspaper articles. Information was also 
gathered from publications and websites of reputable organizations working on SALW 
such as the Economic Community of West African States, Norwegian Initiative on Small 
Arms Transfers (NISAT), International Action on Small Arms (IANSA), the United 
Nations, Small Arms Survey, Oxfam and Human Rights Watch. 
Primary data were collected by semi-structured interviews with experts and civil 
society organizations working on SALW and disarmament. Some officials working with 
security agencies were also interviewed. 
Limitations 
This study covered the seven-year period of the Moratorium from 1998-2005 in 
West Africa. Insights gained from the study may be relevant only to that period and West 
Africa The research investigated only the demobilization and disarmament schemes and 
arms embargoes imposed by ECOWAS and not those undertaken by the United Nations 
in West Africa. The findings may not be generalizable for similar United Nations 
initiatives in West Africa. 
The researcher was unable to meet with and interview officials of the ECOWAS 
Commission in Abuja, Nigeria. However, access to other interviewees consisting of small 
arms experts and reputable civil society organizations largely filled the gap, and the 
inability to meet officials of the ECOWAS Commission did not vitiate the findings of this 
research. 
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction of 
this study and contains the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study and its 
significance. 
Chapter 2 is the literature review. It reviews the literature on sources of conflict, 
the impact of SALW and what instruments regional organizations had put in place to 
handle the scourge. Chapter 3 deals with the methodology. This was largely a qualitative 
study involving the examination of primary and secondary data. 
Chapter 4 is an in-depth study of ECOWAS - its history, structure and evolution 
from a body originally charged with economic integration to one that became largely 
defined by its conflict management role. 
Chapter 5 examines small arms trade and trafficking in West Africa. It delves into 
the motivations for the acquisition of small arms to West Africa and the factors that 
facilitated the proliferation of small arms in West Africa. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the sources of small arms supply in West Africa and the 
main actors involved. 
Chapter 7 focuses on ECOWAS and its initiatives in combating small arms, 
specifically the 1998 Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and 
Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa and its related instruments. This chapter 
also discusses arms embargoes, demobilization and disarmament. 
Chapter 8 contains the summary and conclusion. 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review examined three bodies of literature: the sources of conflict in 
general and in Africa, small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their impact, and 
regional organizations and SALW control. This chapter examines these topics one at a 
time in that same order. 
Sources of Conflict 
The discourse on the sources of violent conflict was dominated by the analysis of 
political and social arrangements, uneven development and even psychological motives 
Much of the literature on the causes and predictors of conflicts in Africa ignored or 
omitted the contributory influence of small arms. Small arms largely "escaped the radar." 
West Africa had not experienced any inter-,state wars, even though boundary 
tensions had been recorded between some states in the past. The wars in West Africa 
were internal or civil wars. The sources of these intra-state conflicts were diverse, but 
some common threads ran through them. Ali Mazrui postulated that, while the causes 
might have had something to do with the quality of governance, they generally included 
ethnic rivalry, economic deprivation, uncertain processes of political succession, the 
uncertain equilibrium in civil-military relations and political repression.' 
' Ali Mazrui, "Africa: In Search of Self-Pacification," Ajircan Affaarrs 93, no 370 (January 1994): 
33-42 
Another perspective offered to explain the history of war in Africa related to state 
formation in Africa - artificial borders, quasi-states, weak governing institutions with 
minimal capacity and a statist model of political and economic development. Combining 
these factors with patrimonial politics where "office holders expropriated state resources 
to reward their networks of clients and their power bases," the stage was set for conflict. 
In a similar vein, Catherine Newbury's analysis of several studies acknowledged the 
"weakness of states that fail to behave like developed states of the ~ e s t . " ~  According to 
her, in some parts of Africa, there were "shadow or criminal" states where leaders, in 
order to maintain their hold on power, "inforrnalized" the state by creating structures 
parallel to that of the formal state and engaged in predatory behavior, often using 
violence and war. 
In his analysis of why the state disintegrated in Sierra Leone, Gibrill (2007) 
identified four broad political and economic trends that eventually led to the war. The 
trends were applicable to the causes of the several conflicts in West Africa generally. 
These were: 
1. The sharply contested and uncertain character of political succession that 
involved increasing authoritarianism and militarization of the political 
process. 
2. The venal misappropriation and looting of national resources, increasing 
mass hardship and steep declines in economic fortunes. 
3. The reassertion of the significance of historic loyalties and political 
Stephen John Stedman and Ter~ence Lyons, "Conflict in Africa," in Democratic Refirm i~ 
Africa, ed E Gyimah-Boadi ( Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 146 
3 Catherine Newbury, "States at War: Confronting Conflict in Afiica," African Studres Review, 45, 
no. 1 (April 2002): 6-8 
traditions and the violent quest by marginalized groups for a political role 
and, 
4. Political interference and contagious violence from withouta4 
Quality of Governance 
The instability in West Africa was in reality a crisis of good governance. Until the 
mid-1 990s, most governments in West Africa were either one-party or military regimes. 
Democracy revolving around free and fair elections, respect for human rights, free 
speech, freedom of association, respect for minorities and the independence of the 
judiciary had convulsive or brief life spans. Change of governments through the ballot 
box was rare. In the view of Gyimah-Boadi (2004) politics was typified by 
"brinkmanship and machismo" where even elected leaders appointed party stalwarts to 
plum offices as a reward for loyalty and sycophancy. This resulted in "crude 
majoritarianism, winner-takes-all and neglect of minority interests instead of moderation, 
reciprocity and give-and-take."5 
In Sierra Leone, the civil war had historical causes starting with the personalized 
and monolithic rule of the ruling party, the All Peoples Congress (APC). The APC 
created a predatory or shadow state, which led to the destruction of civil society and 
democratic accountability. The tools of destruction were thuggery, intimidation, 
patronage and v io~ence .~  Richard Sandbrooks defined a predatory state as "one in which 
office-holders and their clients prey upon society by extracting wealth, through legal and 
Hashim Gibrill, "The Disintegration and Restoration of State Authority in Sierra Leone," in 
Beyond State Farlure and Collapse Makrng the State Relevant rn Africa, ed. George Klay Kieh (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 18 l 
5 E Gyimah-Boadi, "Africa: The Quality of'Political Reform," in Democratrc Reform w Africa, 
ed Gyimah-Boadi (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 1 1  
6 Alfred B Zack-Williams, "Siena Leone: The Political Economy of Civil War, 1991-98," Thrrd 
World Quarterly 20, no 1 ,  ( 1  999): 145 
illegal means without offering any useful  service^."^ By the 1980s, economic decline had 
set in causing widespread inflation, misery and unemployment. This led to widespread 
anger and discontent. The government of Joseph Momoh failed to resolve the crisis. As 
argued by Gibrill, "the venal misappropriation and exploitation of national resources, 
deepening economic crisis, growing hardship and dependence on external sources for 
national finance" led to national destitution and catalyzed political disintegrations8 
Furthermore, the political class abdicated its responsibilities and engaged in looting the 
resources of the state. This provided the perfect backdrop for the invasion - on false 
pretenses of saving the masses - in March 1991 by Foday Sankoh and his so-called 
Revolutionary United Front backed heavily by Liberia. 
The roots of the Liberian civil war lay in the attempts by factional or ethnic 
groups to monopolize the state and its resources to their exclusive benefit. In the process, 
heavy-handed methods were employed to cow other groups into submission. Prior to 
1980, organized conflict arose because of the marginalization of the indigenous peoples 
by the Americo-Liberian elite. This elite monopolized all the apparatuses of state. The 
coup of 1980 by Samuel Doe only changed the ethnicity of the oppressor. His Krahn 
ethnic then assumed control of the Liberian state, and the Americo-Liberian elite, the Gio 
and Mano ethnic groups became targets of repression. The absence of a tradition of 
democracy and accountability, combined with the patron-client structure of political, 
economic and social relationships, and corruption, led Liberia down into the abyss of 
' Richard Sandbrooks, Closing the Circle, Democratization and Development in Afrrca (London: 
Zed Books, 2000), 53 
8 Hashim Gibrill, "The Disintegration and Restoration of' State Authority in Sier~a Leone," in 
BeyondState Failure and Collapse Making the State Relevant in Africa, ed George Klay Kieh (Lanham, 
MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 187 
civil war.9 The invasion by Charles Taylor (an Americo-Liberian) in 1989 was a 
continuation of this familiar trend. 
In September 2002, about 800 soldiers mutinied against their planned 
demobilization in Ivory Coast. It was the sixth coup or attempted coup within three years. 
This was the spark that generated the civil war that effectively divided West Africa's 
once most peaceful country into north and south - the north controlled by rebel soldiers 
of the New Forces and the south controlled by the government. The mutiny was just a 
manifestation of the larger identity issue of who was considered an Ivorian Unable to 
manage a severe economic crisis and faced with a rise in the popularity of the main 
opposition party in the mid-1 990s, the government of Henri Konan Bedie launched a 
xenophobic campaign around the concept of Ivoirite, tagging the party of former prime 
minister Alassane Ouattara, the Rassemblement des Republicains, as a foreigners' party. 
Alassane Ouattara, the former prime minister, hailed from northern Ivory Coast. The 
politics of exclusion of other groups was now institutionalized, and this gave birth to a 
rebellion by marginalized northern elements to reclaim their identity as Ivorians. 
Manipulation of Ethnicity 
Ethnicity or ethnic diversity per se did not constitute a problem. It was the 
manipulation of ethnicity for partisan gain by vested interest groups that created the 
problem. All West African states were multi-ethnic and multi-religious. Peaceful co- 
existence between these ethnic groups had been problematic in some cases since 
independence, The British exploited ethnic differences in furtherance of their infamous 
"divide and rule" approach to managing multi-ethnic entities. In the then British West 
Africa, the colonial authorities had their own characteristics of the various ethnic groups. 
9 Quentin Outram, "Liberia: Roots and Fruits of the Emergency" Third World Quarterly 20, no 1 
(1999): 165-166 
Some were considered wariike and so formed the bulk of recruits into the colonial army 
that was used to suppress nationalist agitations and to pacify the colonies. The colonial 
army, according toyoung, was often constituted by people from different regional and 
social milieus than the nationalist leadership. However, he argued that while ethnic 
consciousness did figure in the dynamics of conflict influencing patterns of participation 
and responses to violence, ethnicity by itself did not drive conflicts or define their 
origins. 'O  
In the opinion of Ricardo Laremont, the standard academic response to the 
question of why violence occurred had been that violence and war occurred because of 
irreconcilable ethnic differences. Laremont was convinced that: 
Despite much postmodernist philosophical and sociological critiques of the 
artificiality of race and ethnicity as ontologically real categories of analysis, on a 
political level the changin contours of ethnicity and race still remain real factors 
in the provocation of war. Fl 
Nearly all countries in West Africa continued to experience violent ethnic 
conflicts. While these conflicts may have had their roots in the colonial legacy, 
succeeding governments had done little to forge a sense of common nationhood. The 
differences between ethnic groups had rather been exploited to enable cliques to hang on 
to power, as president Samuel Doe disastrously did in Liberia. This observation accorded 
with the view that unequal access by ethnic groups to state power, public goods and/or 
economic opportunities sharpened ethnic h~sti l i t ies. '~ A recipe for ethnic tensions to 
10 Crawford Young, "Pluralism, Ethnicity and Militarization," in The Causes o j  War and the 
Consequences ojPeacekeeprng in Afrrca, ed Ricardo Laremont (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann), 46 
" Ricardo Laremont, "The Causes of War and the Implications of Peacekeeping in Africa," in The 
Causes o j  War and the Consequences ojPeacekeeping in Africa, ed Ricardo Laremont (Portsmouth, NH: 
I-Ieinemann), 4. 
Richard Sandbrooks, Closing the Circle, Democratization and Development In Afrlca (London: 
Zed Books, 2000), 53 
escalate into armed conflicr was created when a state was unable to guarantee law and 
order or basic services or exploited ethnic differences. This created fertile grounds for 
civil wars to develop because regionallethnic movements that were emboldened by the 
state decay challenged the central authorities or a perceived ethnic enemy.I3 
Arguably, the issue of ethnicity was a difficult one to manage, largely because 
"ethnicity taps cultural and symbolic issues - basic notions of identity and the self, of 
individual and group worth and entitlement - the conflict it generates are intrinsically less 
amenable to compromise than those revolving around material  issue^."'^ This explained 
why seemingly innocuous disputes between individuals belonging to different ethnic 
groups sometimes degenerated into full-scale ethnic conflict. In 1994 in Ghana, a dispute 
between a Konkomba man and a Nanumba man about the cost of a guinea-fowl quickly 
degenerated into a full scale ethnic conflict.15 However, the real reason for that conflict 
was a struggle over land rights and traditional authority jurisdiction. Ethnic differences 
became more volatile "when competing notions of morality - of the sacred and the 
profane - are i n ~ o k e d . " ' ~  
The Nigerian civil war (1 967- 1970) had complex causes. The crux of the problem 
related to problems of state formation and state building. Nigeria was cobbled together 
out of several ethnic groups into the modern state in 19 14. The largest country in West 
Africa with a population of about 130 million, Nigeria had more than 200 ethnic groups 
speaking over 250 languages. However, suspicions and distrust among the three major 
l 3  Ibid 
14 Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, "Introduction," in Nutronalism, Ethnic ConJllct, and 
Democracy ed Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press) xviii 
I S  The Konkomba and the Nanumba are ethnic groups in northern Ghana 
16 Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, Ibid 
ethnic groups - the Hausa-Fulani in the north, the Yoruba in the west and the Igbo in the 
south-west - fuelled the coups and counter-coups that led to the attempted secession by 
the Igbo and the resulting carnage of the civil war. By the end of the civil war, millions 
had died. 
Both the British colonial authorities and post-independence governments did not 
resolve the issue of how once independent and proud kingdoms could co-exist in the new 
state with their pride intact. According to Mazrui, postcolonial wars erupted partly 
because of the "sociological and political mess that "white" colonialism created in 
Africa." Colonialism, he posits, destroyed traditional conflict resolution mechanisms 
without replacing them with effective substitutes.17 
Natural Resources 
In many of the major conflict zones in West Africa, and generally worldwide, the 
control of natural resources was a factor in the motivation for conflict. Rebel groups 
usually set up shop first in the resource-rich areas. This led to the greed versus grievance 
thesis to explain the motives of rebel groups. The foremost proponent of this perspective, 
Paul Collier, argued that rebel movements were not protest movements but the 
manifestation of organized crime. Ultimately, for Collier, greed was the dominant issue 
in conflict onset and intensity. He wrote: 
Economic characteristics - dependence on primary commodity exports, low 
average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas - are all significant and 
powerful predictors of civil war. Rebellions either have the objective of natural 
resource predation, or are critically dependent upon natural resource predation in 
order to pursue other objectives. These, rather than objective grievances, are the 
risk factors which conflict prevention must reduce if it is to be successful.'8 
1 7  Ali Mazrui, "Conflict in Africa: An Overview," in Armed Conflrct in Africa, ed Caroline 
Pumphrey and Rye Schwartz-Barcott (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 22 
18 Paul Collier Economic Causes ojCivil Conflict and Their Implicat~ons for Policy. 2000 
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He postulated that countries that had a substantial part of their gross domestic product 
coming from the export of primary commodities were more radically at risk of conflict. 
In his opinion, primary commodity exports were the most lootable of all economic 
activities. For that matter, any economy that was dependent upon primary commodity 
export offered plenty of opportunities for predatory rebellion. Collier asserted that rebel 
movements were most intransigent when they had resources to finance their wars. 
In 2001, about a quarter of the roughly 50 active wars and armed conflicts had a 
strong resource dimension. Legal or illegal resource exploitation had helped trigger or 
exacerbate violent conflict or financed its continuation. l 9  Indeed, some of those civil wars 
were referred to as resource wars because the abundance or scarcity of natural resources 
was a motivator for launching a conflict. In Africa, war quickly became complicated 
when material resources such as diamonds and oil became available to combatants as 
alternate sources of financing their wars. In the 1990s, resource exploitation yielded 
between 100 and 187 million dollars per year for Charles Taylor and between 25 and 125 
million dollars per year for the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra ~ e o n e . ~ '  The natural 
resource explanation for conflict informed Lansana Gberie's opinion that the Sierra 
Leonean civil war was masterminded by "criminal economic  interest^."^' 
Evidently the sources of Africa's conflicts were legion. Monocausal explanations 
obfuscated rather than illuminated the discourse. In the same manner, the assumption that 
conflict stemmed from the inability of states to behave like the developed states of the 
l 9  Michael Renner, "The Anatomy of Resource Wars," Worldwatch Paper 162 (October 2002), 7 
20 Ibid 
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September 29,2006) 

violence and not negotiation as a way of resolving grievances. The abundance of arms 
had also contributed to the severity, duration and geographic scope of recent wars, 
making small arms proliferation a very significant factor in the dynamics of 
contemporary ~onfl ict .~ '  On these premises, Klare made several significant observations. 
First, there was a close and symbiotic relationship between light weapons trafficking and 
contemporary forms of violence. Second, the outbreak of ethnic and internal conflict in 
weak and divided societies often produced an "internal arms race" that further drove the 
acquisition of small arms and light weapons. Third, the emergence of internal arms races 
and the outbreak of conflict in weak and divided societies were fostered by an immense 
worldwide abundance of small arms and light weapons. Fourth, even relatively small 
quantities of light weapons could prove highly destabilizing in vulnerable and fractured 
societies. Finally, light weapons flowed to existing and potential belligerents through a 
wide array of channels, public and private, licit and 
The apparently ceaseless flow of small arms and light weapons to governments, 
militias and other actors contributed to slaughter, the undermining of democratic 
governance and serious human rights violations in the Great Lakes Region of Africa as 
indicated by Kathi Austin. Any effort to reduce the violence had to confront the "high 
degree of internal militarization resulting from unimpeded flows of weapons." 27 
25 Michael Klare, "An Overview of the Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons," in Small 
Arms Control Old Weapons, New Issues ed Jayantha Dhanapaia et al (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 
1999), 9 
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Klare (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999), 13-21 
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Small arms were a factor in the opportunity for ethnic groups and governments to 
use violence as a form of political expression, and in their willingness to do so. Arms 
acquisitions were associated with increased conflict or bellicose behavior, while, 
occasionally, arms embargoes were associated with declining violence. Additionally, 
widespread availability of arms to intransigent and entrenched fighters or government 
forces could also raise the potential costs of intervention - humanitarian or military.28 
The heavy cost of ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia in terms of casualties and resources 
vindicated those generalizations. 
SALW and their Impact 
The importance of SALW relative to security, governance and development had 
become part of the public agenda largely because of the work of humanitarian agencies 
and non-governmental organizations such as the International Action Network on Small 
Arms (IANSA), Small Arms Survey (a project of the Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Geneva), Oxfam, Control Arms, International Alert, Human Rights Watch, the 
World Health Organization (WHO), and the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms 
Transfers (NISAT). The United Nations (UN) and specifically the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) was a major advocate for the control of small arms and 
played a significant role in international efforts to curb small arms proliferation 
The UNDP estimated that there were about 550 million small arms in circulation. 
It contended that the sheer quantity available could support violent solutions over 
peaceful ones - particularly in the absence of legitimate authority and the rule of law. 
Small arms in the view of the UNDP had both direct impacts and indirect impacts on 
human development. Small arms were responsible for about 500,000 deaths each year, 
28 John Sislin and Frederick Pearson, Arms andhthnic Conjlict (Lanham, MD: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 63-122 
rising criminal violence, coilapse of health and education services, declining economic 
activity and damage to the 'social structure among others.29 
The United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in 2002 lamented that: 
The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems, and in 
most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well 
be described as 'weapons of mass destruction'. Yet there is still no global non- 
proliferation regime to limit their spread, as there is for chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons j0 
This chilling recognition of the impact of small arms followed the conclusions of the 
1997 Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms set up by the United 
Nations. The report determined that "the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and 
transfer of small arms and light weapons is closely related to the increased incidence of 
internal conflicts and high levels of crime and violence," thereby making it an issue of 
legitimate concern by the international c~mmuni ty .~ '  NISAT was emphatic that "there 
will be little progress in settling or avoiding wars and humanitarian emergencies if there 
is not a concerted effort to control and limit production and transfer of small arms"32 
A sense of desperation and urgency was observed in the reports of humanitarian 
agencies when they discussed small arms. Control Arms stated that the international trade 
in arms was "dangerously out of control" and proceeded to insist that controlling arms 
29 United Nations Development Programme. "Development Held Hostage: Assessing the Effects 
of Small Arms on Human Development " April 2002. 
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32 Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, "The Problem of Small Arms " (no date) 
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transfers was in the fundamental interest of all states. They argued that "irresponsible 
arms transfers fuel human rights abuses and are a proven catalyst for conflict, prolonging 
wars once they break out, increasing their lethality and adding to the human cost." 33 The 
perspective of Human Rights Watch was that "the uncontrolled proliferation and 
widespread misuse of small arms represented a global human rights and humanitarian 
crisis" 34 because small arms facilitated countless human rights abuses and violations of 
international humanitarian law. 
Illicit trafficking in small arms had not escaped the attention of the G8, the 
world's leading industrial nations -- Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America (USA). It first appeared on the agenda 
of the G8 (then the G7) during the 1995 Economic Summit in Halifax, and by the time of 
their 1997 Denver summit it had become a priority, "with the leaders promising to 
combat illegal firearms trafficking through a new international instrument and to press for 
standard systems of firearms identification and a stronger regime for import and export 
licensing of firearms."35 Ironically, six of the eight members of the G8 (USA, UK, 
France, Russia, Germany and Italy) were among the top ten largest global arms exporters, 
and all of the eight exported large amounts of major conventional weapons or small 
3 6 arms.' 
33 Control Arms, "Towards an Arms Trade Treaty," Control Arms Briefing Paper, (June 2005), 5 
34 Human Rights Watch, "Small Arms and Human Rights: The Need for Global Action " Human 
Rlghts Watch Briefing Paper, June 7th 2003 htt~://www.hrw.or~~'back~.rounder/arm~/small-arms- 
070703.htm (accessed September 19,2006) 
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The US government, on its part, wanted tighter controls on the proliferation of 
illicit small arms and light weapons because, in regions of the world suffering from 
political instability and violent conflict, those weapons had "proven a major obstacle to 
peace, economic development, and efforts to rebuild war-tom s~cieties."~' This was in 
spite of the fact that the USA was the world's largest exporter of small arms and light 
weapons and ammunition, exporting $74 1 million worth of small arms and light weapons 
in 2 0 0 1 . ~ ~  
Regional Organizations and SALW Control 
Regional organizations (also referred to as intergovernmental organizations) were 
organizations where "full membership is officially solely open to states and the decision- 
making authority lies with representatives from governments."39 Membership of an 
intergovernmental organization involved the ceding of some amount or form of 
sovereignty by the participating states or, threats to the independence and power of the 
national elites who created them.40 How much sovereignty states were willing to cede, 
and how often, sometimes led to tensions within intergovernmental organizations and 
often to paralysis - temporary or permanent. 
States formed regional organizations to confront threats to their collective 
existence. Political threats to the collective existence of states, especially those in a 
37 United States Department of State The U S  Approach to Combating the Spread ojSmall Arms 
Background paper June 200 1 http:llwww.state.govitipm/r lslfsi200 113766,litm (accessed September 26, 
2006) 
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contiguous area, were a significant push factor for the formation of regional organizations 
in Africa. Some regional organizations like ECOWAS started off as purely economic 
arrangements and eventually took on more overt political postures,. Besides states, 
regional organizations had the legal authority to create and enforce laws, coordinate and 
wage warfare, and enforce symbolic or economic sanctions on "deviant" states. They 
served as channels of communication among nations in an attempt to foster cooperation 
and reduce conflict and helped maintain order by establishing normative guidelines and 
creating rules. Regional organizations had acquired legitimacy by maintaining or 
securing peace among warring factions. Because of their shared membership, they 
had been found to reduce the likelihood of armed conflict among member  state^.^' 
Indeed, Article 52 of the United Nations Charter encouraged regional 
organizations to play a role in maintaining regional security. It stated: 
Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements 
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided 
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United ~ a t i o n s . ~ ~  
On the issue of SALW, the United Nations played a proactive role, and many of 
the regional frameworks that emerged, especially after 2000, were a result of the UN's 
work. Since the mid-1 990s the United Nations had placed the issue of small arms and 
light weapons firmly on the international political agenda. It promoted awareness of the 
problems posed by these weapons and established a number of expert groups, notably the 
Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in 1997 and the Group of Experts on the 
Problem of Ammunition and Explosives in 1999. Those expert groups were established 
41 James Hawdon, Emerglng Organizational Forms (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 2 
42 United Nations, Unzted Nations Charter, Article 52 
to study the nature and causes of such accumulations and transfers of small arms and 
light weapons and to recommend ways and means to prevent and reduce them. 
In December 1999, the United Nations General Assembly therefore decided to 
convene a Conference on the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its 
Aspects in July 2001. The purpose of the conference was to decide on steps nations 
should take to prevent the illicit trade in small arms. The result of the 2001 conference 
was the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA). The UNPoA required UN member 
nations to make illicit gun production and or possession a criminal offence. States were 
required to establish a national coordination agency on small arms, identify and destroy 
stocks of surplus weapons and keep track of officially-held guns. In addition, states were 
to mark guns at point of manufacture for identification and tracing, and maintain records 
of gun manufacture. On arms exports, states were obliged to issue end-user certificates 
for exportsltransit and notify the original supplier nation of re-export. 
Other obligations involved the disarmament, demobilization and re-integration 
(DDR) of ex,-combatants and the collection and destruction of their weapons. States were 
also urged to support regional agreements and encourage moratoria. States were 
encouraged to engage in more information exchange, ensure better enforcement of arms 
embargoes, and include civil society organizations in efforts to prevent small arms 
proliferation.43 
Some regional organizations, however, had launched their own SALW anti- 
proliferation measures before the global initiative of the UN. In 1997, the Organization 
43 United Nations, Programme ofAction to Prevent, Combat and Eradrcate the Illic~t Trade m 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, UN Document AICONF 19211 5 (July 200 l) ,  Sections 11- 
111 
of American States (OAS), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the 
European Union (EU) launched their regional measures. 
The OAS signed in 1997 the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit 
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other 
Related Materials (CIFTA or the OAS Convention). It was the first international legally 
binding agreement on small arms and light weapons. Though its definitions of firearms 
and explosives are broad it only targeted commercial transfers and not government 
transfers. 
ASEAN signed in 1997 the Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime. 
Though not exactly an agreement on small arms, it recognized small arms and light 
weapons as an important root of transnational crimes. Unfortunately, according to the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), "given its particular nature as an organization based on 
the principles of 'soft diplomacy' and non-interference and also in the light of the non- 
binding character of this Plan of Action, the measures adopted over the last few years 
have never had a truly regional 
Also in 1997, the European Union (EU) signed the Programme for Preventing and 
Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms. The program provided a coherent 
framework for tackling illicit weapons trafficking but made no provisions for reviewing, 
reforming or harmonizing regulations among EU member states. In 1998 the EU also 
adopted the non-legally binding Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The adoption of the 
code enjoined EU governments to consult each other when considering granting export 
44 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, "The Role of Parliaments in Strengthening the Control of' 
Trafficking In Small Arms and Light Weapons and their Ammunition " C-I/I14/R-pre (January 13, 2006) 
Draft Report, 1 1 
licenses, especially to counrries that had been denied them by other member states.45 
In 2002, the Code of Conduct was replaced by the Joint Action on Small Arms. 
The joint action referred to the control and registration of exports, transparency and 
evaluation of potential importers. The objectives of this project were to combat, and 
contribute to ending, the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms, the 
reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons and their ammunition to levels 
consistent with countries' legitimate security needs, and to help solve the problems 
caused by such accumulations.46 As a joint action, it was legally binding, but it was 
implemented through national laws and procedures. 
In November 2000, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), recognizing that the "excessive and destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled 
spread of small arms are problems that have contributed to the intensity and duration of 
the majority of conflicts," adopted the politically binding OSCE Document on Small 
Arms and Light The participating states committed themselves to combat 
illicit trafficking of small arms in all its forms through the adoption and implementation 
of national controls, contribute to the reduction and prevention of the excessive and 
destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms, and exercise due 
restraint to ensure that small arms were produced, held and transferred only in accordance 
with legitimate defense and security needs. 
45 Integrated Regional Information Networks, Guns Out of Control The Continuing Threat of 
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The Brasilia Declaration by Latin American and Caribbean States in November 
2000, preparatory to the meeting of the first UN small arms conference in 2001, 
emphasized states' rights to self-defense and thus arms procurement and measures taken 
on a national level. 
In 2000, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), comprising Australia, Kiribati, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu, and Fiji, issued the Nadi Framework. Initially a preparatory document for the 
UN conference on small arms, it developed into a Weapons Control Bill in 2003 seeking 
a common approach to weapons control in the Pacific and proposing model legislation 
for PIF members. Gary Mauser criticized the Nadi Framework as being 'based on non- 
scientific advocacy that is currently enjoying unwarranted favor in the international arena 
where greater control is justifiably sought over SALW'. Mauser argued that there was no 
scientific validity in associating civilian possession of guns with the upsurge in violent 
crime in the ~ a c i f i c . ~ '  
The Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela) 
issued in 2003 the Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects. It recommended the criminalization of the 
possession and use of all small arms and light weapons.49 
48 Gary Mauser, "Trouble in Paradise: Small Arms in the Pacific: A Brief Critique " 
http://www.sfu.ca/-mauser~papers/pn~/PNG.~d~search=%22Nadi%2OFramework%20%22 (accessed 
October, 8,2006) 
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African Regional Organizations and SALW Control 
Africa's intractable'conflicts assured that the regional organization, the African 
Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity), and the sub-regional organizations 
devoted considerable time and resources in managing conflict. Theoretically these 
regional organizations had several advantages - physical proximity to the conflicts, 
greater motivation to resolve them and sometimes more legitimacy. The proximity at the 
same time could be a disadvantage as they might have been tainted by the dynamics of a 
situation. 
Hussein Solomon argued that the proliferation of transnational security threats 
like small arms proliferation in addition to the perceived limitations of national or 
bilateral options in dealing with them led to increased focus on regional responses. 
Another factor in the development of regional responses according to him was the post- 
Cold War environment in which Africa no longer posed any geostrategic value for the 
world powers50 and therefore was left on its own. 
Indeed, concern about the negative impact of uncontrolled flow of weapons in 
Africa had been longstanding. A League of Nations document prepared as a background 
for the 1925 Geneva Conference for the Control of the International Trade in Arms, 
Munitions and Implements of War stated that one of the purposes of the St. Germain 
Convention of 191 9 was to prevent the importation of arms, except under the strictest 
possible control, to certain defined areas, including parts of Africa. According to this 
document: 
The task of preventing bloodshed in great parts of Africa and in the countries 
which border the Red Sea is rendered far more difficult if the inhabitants have 
50 Hussein Solomon, "Controlling Light Weapons in Southern Africa," in Light Weapons and Civil 
Conflict Controllrng the Tools of Violence, eds Jeffrey Boutwell and Michael Klare (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc , 1999), 150 
access to unlimited quantities of arms and munitions. It was felt to be especially 
desirable to bring this part of the Treaty quickly into effect in order to prevent 
dissemination to these parts of the world of the surplus stocks left over from the 
war. 5 1 
It was safe to argue that the major reason behind this concern at that time was preempting 
African challenges to imperialist domination of Africa. 
No concrete measures were taken until 1998 when the OAU adopted its first ever 
decision on the proliferation of SALW in Africa at an OAU Heads of State and 
Government meeting in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. This decision reiterated the 
urgency and need for inter-African cooperation in the search for solutions to the problems 
posed by the proliferation of SALW. The OAU tasked itself with the primary role of 
coordinating the anti-proliferation effort. At the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government held in Algiers, Algeria (1 2- 14 July 1999), the Summit endorsed the holding 
of a Continental Conference of African Experts on Small Arms in 2000.'~ 
In December 2000, member states of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
met in Bamako, Mali to develop an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, 
Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons. This ministerial 
conference was in preparation for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, scheduled for New York, from 9'" to 
20'" July 200 1. Member states consequently issued the Bamako Declaration on an 
African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of 
Small Arms and Light Weapons. This declaration was not legally binding.. It however 
5 1 Bennie Lombard, "Small Arms and Light Weapons: A Neglected Issue, A Renewed Focus," 
Disarmament Diplomacy no 49 (August 2000) http:/lwww.acron~m.org.uk/dd/dd49/49sn1all.htn~ 
(accessed October 10, 2006) 
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recognized that problem of small arms should be addressed at several different levels - 
local, national, regional, continental and in ternat i~nal .~~ 
The African regional organizations that were reviewed here were those that had 
specific frameworks or policies in place to deal with SALW proliferation. They included 
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Great Lakes Region, the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS). Those regional bodies - ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD 
- had become the frontline in the fight against the proliferation of small arms. Regional 
organizations that were of a purely economic character were therefore not reviewed. 
The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) comprised the East 
African states of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. 
According to Article 18 (A) of the Agreement establishing IGAD, member countries 
undertook to act collectively to preserve peace, security and stability, which were 
essential prerequisites for economic development and social progress.54 In the mid- 1990s, 
the founders of IGAD decided to revitalize the organization into a fully-fledged regional 
political, economic, development, trade and security entity similar to SADC and 
ECOWAS. The IGAD Heads of State and Government meeting at the 9th Summit in 
Khartoum in January 2002 signed a Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early 
Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).'~ CEWARN also tracked the 
53 Organisation of African Unity, Bamako Declaration on an African Common Posltion on the 
llliclt Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking oJSmall Arms and Light Weapons, (2000), Section 2 (viii) 
54 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, Agreement Establlshlng the Inter- 
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), IGADISUM-96lAGRE-Doc, Nairobi, (21 March 1996), 
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55 Institute for. Security Studies, [GAD Profile, (2006) 
http:l/www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity to union/igadvlof:htn~ (accessed October I 1,2006) 
proliferation of small arms as these exacerbated the violence and intensity of pastoral 
conflict. 
In March 2000, IGAD members together with Burundi, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Rwanda, and Tanzania (of the Great Lakes Region) signed The Nairobi 
Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons 
in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa to address the illicit proliferation of 
small arms in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region -- two regions devastated 
by conflict. They pledged to ''join efforts to address the problem, recognising the need for 
information sharing and co-operation in all matters relating to illicit small arms and light 
weapons including the promotion or research and data collection in the region and 
encouraging co-operation among governments and civil society."56 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) - the southern Africa 
regional organization - was made up of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The 
Southern Africa Region had been an area of concentration of illegal arms. In August 
1999, in Maputo, the SADC Council approved the establishment of a regional policy for 
the control of small arms and light weapons. SADC further indicated that the Southern 
African Regional Police Chiefs Coordinating Organisation (SARPCCO) would be 
appointed as the implementation agency of a SADC policy on small arms and cross- 
border crime prevention. 
The SADC adopted in August 2001 the Protocol on the Control of Firearms, 
Ammunition and Other Related Materials in the SADC Region. The SADC Protocol 
56 Lynne Griffiths-Fulton, "Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Horn of Africa," Ploughshares 
Monitor, 23 no 2 (Summer 2002) http:llwww.ploughshares.ca/librarieslmonitorlnoniO2b.html (accessed 
October 14,2006) 
focused mostly on supply-side interventions but also acknowledged the key relationship 
between limiting the availability of weapons and maintaining stable peace processes and 
post-conflict  situation^.^^ The IPU observed that it was a: 
Legally binding commitment that governs the most important aspects of 
controlling the trafficking in and proliferation of small arms in the region: 
traceability, cooperation between States and the control of cross-border 
trafficking, protection and proper management of stocks belonging to States, 
destruction of surplus and confiscated weapons, weapons collection programs, 
sensitization, and the possession of arms by civilians.58 
The IPU further opined that, while the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of 
Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the 
Horn of Africa (March 2000) and its plan of action represented a statement of firm intent 
with a comprehensive program of action, its implementation had been far from perfect. 
The Nairobi Protocol incorporated practically eighty per cent of the content of the SADC 
Protocol. Both the Nairobi and SADC Protocols were harmonized. Because of this 
uniformity, a comparable and coherent level of legislation in much of sub-Saharan Africa 
could be achieved. 
From the above, the African regional organizations were compelled by their 
collective reality to focus their attention on the maintenance of security and conflict 
management. Amitav Acharya advocated the use of realistic criteria in judging the 
performance of Third World regional organizations because they might have been 
inhibited in performing collective security functions because of the military weakness of 
their members. However, they could: 
- 
5 7  Taya Weiss, "A Demand-Side Approach to Fighting Small Arms Proliferation," African 
Security Review 12 no 2 (2003), 9 
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Develop norms, principles and habits of cooperation and reduce sources of 
tension through functional interaction. Thus while regional security arrangements 
in the Third World may fall short of a full-fledged collective security apparatus 
with enforcement capacity, they can complement the preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking, and peacebuilding roles of the LJN.j9 
The development of norms, principles and habits of cooperation, particularly 
against SALW, was complicated by the web of relationships - relations between states, 
between states and non-state actors (rebel groups, warlords, private companies, arms 
traffickers and brokers), between states and ECOWAS, between ECOWAS and non-state 
actors and finally between nowstate actors. A crosscutting issue in all was the struggle 
for power and influence. 
The decision of ECOWAS to intervene in Liberia in 1990 to halt further carnage 
illustrated the complexity of these relationships. Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Nigeria and 
Sierra Leone supported intervention on humanitarian grounds. Burkina Faso and Ivory 
Coast opposed intervention in Liberia in spite of the unspeakable suffering and slaughter 
that was taking place. According to Comfort Ero, Blaise Compaore, Head of State of 
Burkina Faso, was widely suspected of providing the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) with a strategic planning ground and acted as a major source of arms supply for 
Charles Taylor, while Libya was a training ground for the NPFL. Both Compaore and 
President Houphouet-,Boigny of Ciite d'Ivoire were alleged to have taken those positions 
because of personal relationships. Togo refrained from intervening. The opposition to the 
deployment of ECOMOG raised fears that the age-old rivalry between the Anglo and 
Francophone countries would be rekindledS6O Nigeria's motives for supporting 
59 Amitav Acharya, "Beyond Anarchy: Third World Instability and International Order After the 
Cold War," in International Relations Theory and the Third World,  ed Stephanie Neuman (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998), 183 
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intervention were the subject of several speculations. Possible motives included a desire 
for a hegemonic role in West Africa, humanitarianism, and personal relations between the 
Nigerian head of state, General Ibrahim Babangida, and the Liberian leader, General 
Samuel Doe. 
In West Africa, the sixteen heads of state of member countries of ECOWAS 
signed on October 3 1, 1998, the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and 
Manufacture of Light Weapons in ECOWAS member states in recognition of the 
immense security threat posed by the proliferation of SALW. In the preamble to the 
Moratorium, they acknowledged that 'the proliferation of light weapons constitutes a 
destabilizing factor for ECOWAS Member States and a threat to the peace and security of 
our peoples.'61 The Moratorium was the first by a regional group in the world to deal 
with the proliferation of SALW. 
To ensure a collective and transparent effort in the implementation of the 
Moratorium, the Heads of State signed a Code of Conduct on December 10, 1999. 
Member states agreed to abide by the Code of Conduct and reiterated that the 
Moratorium was to apply to the import, export and manufacture of light weapons. Import, 
export and manufacture of components and ammunition were also to be subject to strict 
control in line with the spirit of the Moratorium. Article 4 of the Code of Conduct called 
for the establishment of national commissions to ensure coordination of concrete 
measures for effective implementation of the Moratorium at national levels. Member 
states were enjoined by Article 7 to harmonize and adopt regulatory and administrative 
measures necessary for exercising control of cross-border transactions, while Article 8 
called for the development of an ECOWAS arms register and database. 
6 1 Economic Community of West African States, Declaration O j A  Moratorium On Importatron, 
Exportation And Manufacture Of Lzght Weapons In West Afrrca, (30-3 1 October 1998) Abuja, Nigeria 
Apart from their own initiatives, West African countries were signatories to 
several declarations that sought to curb small arms proliferation. These included the 2004 
African Union Protocol to the OAIJ Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism, the Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit 
Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and the 
United Nations' Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade 
in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects of 2001. Besides the Moratorium, 
ECOWAS had undertaken some ad hoc initiatives to control small arms in the 
negotiations to end the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone. These included arms 
embargoes, weapons buy-back programs, disarming of regular and irregular combatants 
and dem~bi l iza t ion.~~ 
When the Heads of State signed the Moratorium in 1998, they directed the 
Executive Secretary of ECOWAS in collaboration with the Program for Coordination and 
Assistance for Security and Development in Africa (PCASED) .. a regional project of the 
UNDP - to assess and evaluate the Moratorium after the initial three-year period. To 
confirm the ever-present threat posed by SALW and its proliferation, ECOWAS renewed 
the Moratorium for another three years in July 2001 and again in October 2004. 
The Moratorium declaration was described as an unprecedented move by a 
subregional organization and a significant step in addressing the problem of illicit sinall 
arms proliferation and general disarmament in the sub-region. It was lauded as laying the 
foundation for the development of a region-wide strategy on alms proliferation in 
62 Emmanuel K Aning, "Eliciting Compliance from Warlords: The ECOWAS Experience in 
Liberia, 1990- 1997," Revrew ofAfrican Polltzcal Economy 26, no 8 1 (September 1999), 335-348 
particular, and disai-rnamenr in general.h3 Similarly, Rachel Stohl and Rhea Myerscough 
described West Africa as having made "the most dramatic strides toward curbing the 
illicit trade in small arms, with its unprecedented moratorium "64 o n  the contrary, 
Comfort Ero and Angela Nidinga-Muvumba argued that at its adoption the Moratorium 
was seen as "groundbreaking and visionary", but the enthusiasm waned as difficulties 
and doubts developed.65 Another less enthusiastic view of the West African effort was 
that, instead of providing a framework for response to armed crime, violence and conflict 
that remained a reality in West Africa, the Moratorium remained an expression of 
intent.('' 
On June 14,2006, based on a recommendation from the ECOWAS Executive 
Secretary, Heads of State and Government signed the ECOWAS Convention on Small 
Arms, Light Weapons, their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. This consequently 
transformed the Moratorium from a voluntary, renewable non-binding document to a 
legally binding permanent convention. The ECOWAS Executive Secretary was 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of the Convention. 
According to the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government, the Convention, 
built on the progress achieved in the implementation of the Moratorium and consolidated 
its gains. By the Convention, each Member State, among other obligations, undertook to 
63 Alhaji M S Bah, "Micro-Disarmament In West Africa: The ECOWAS Moratorium on Small 
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66 Zebulon Takwa, "Small Arms Proliferation Poses Challenges in West Afiica," Focus on Small 
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control the manufacture of SALW within its territory and to regulate the activities of 
local SALW manufacturers. The Convention prohibited the possession, use and sale of 
light weapons by individuals and also requested member states to regulate the possession, 
use and sale of small arms by civilians. Unlike the Moratorium, sanctions would be 
applied to states that flouted their obligations to the c ~ n v e n t i o n . ~ ~  The Convention lay 
outside the scope of this work that examined ECOWAS actions only through 2005. 
The history of conflict in West Africa clearly showed the destructive impact of 
SALW. The conflicts led to millions of deaths and destruction of vital economic 
infrastructure, undermined democracy and gave birth to generations who knew nothing 
but war and were scarred by it. Liberia went through nearly a decade of civil war while 
the one in Sierra Leone lasted eight years. When this research ended, Ivory Coast, which 
had been in violent conflict since 2002, was effectively partitioned in two, with rebel 
groups controlling the north while government forces controlled the south Several 
attempts at mediation by ECOWAS, the AU and the UN had not succeeded in 
permanently silencing the guns in the Ivory Coast. 
Conflicts arose out of a mix of factors - ethnicity and its manipulation, social 
exclusion or marginalization, poverty, abundance or scarcity of resources, repression, and 
irresponsible leadership. However, as the literature review had shown, even though 
SALW per se did not cause war, they were very important in the motivation, onset 
duration, and lethality of conflict. When SALW were easily accessible to combatants, 
belligerents were more likely to choose violence and not negotiation as a method of 
resolving conflict. Easy availability could encourage intransigence and provide 
opportunities for disgruntled elements to choose violence as a means of political 
67 Economic Community of' West African States, ECO WAS Convention on Small Arms, Light 
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expression. The ongoing armed conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta region was an 
illustration of this. In a conflict area awash in SALW, the costs of intervention were 
potentially very high in terms of resources and casualties to peacekeepers and 
combatants. 
Regional organizations like ECOWAS were therefore justified in giving priority 
to curbing the proliferation of SALW and, by implication, attempting to contain conflict. 
This might have involved modifying their original goals but it was worthwhile since no 
development could take place in the presence of widespread human insecurity. It was 
hoped that the results of this research might contribute to strengthening the efforts of 
ECOWAS in ridding West Africa of illicit SALW, 
Research questions 
The purpose of this research as stated earlier was to analyze the progress and 
gains ECOWAS made in containing SALW between 1998 and 2005. To achieve this 
purpose the research addressed the following specific questions: 
1.  How effective had the 1998 ECOWAS Moratorium on Importation, 
Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa been in 
controlling SALW? 
2. How effective had been arms embargoes in combating SALW proliferation in 
West Africa? 
3. How effective had been disarmament programs in combating SALW 
proliferation in West Africa? 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The period covered by this study was the seven-year period from 1998 through 
2005. 1998 was chosen as the starting date because that was the year in which the 
Moratorium was signed. The signing of the Moratorium brought SALW into the public 
consciousness and for the first time committed governments, albeit voluntarily, to 
curbing SALW proliferation. The period ended in 2005, a year after the moratorium was 
renewed for a second time; the moratorium had therefore been operational for seven 
years. As of 2005, only one hot spot remained in West Africa - Ivory Coast. The 
moratorium was converted in June 2006 into a permanent legally binding convention. 
The conversion occurred after the period covered by this research, so the scope of this 
research did not include the implementation and impact of the conversion. 
This study analyzed the basis of the decision to declare the Moratorium, the 
security environment at the time, the progress made by ECOWAS in the implementation 
of the Moratorium, as well as the impact of other initiatives employed by ECOWAS to 
control SALW, such as arms embargoes and disarmament schemes. 
The research used both primary and secondary data. The secondary data were 
gathered from books, journals, magazines and newspaper articles. Information was also 
gathered from publications and websites of reputable organizations working on SALW 
such as the ECOWAS, Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT), 
International Action on Small Arms (IANSA), the United Nations, Small Arms Survey, 
Oxfam and Human Rights Watch. 
Primary data were collected by semi-structured interviews with experts and civil 
society organizations working on SALW and disarmament. Some officials working with 
security agencies were also interviewed. The following list of questions guided the 
interviews: 
1. Did any member states seek exemptions from the Moratorium in order to meet 
their 'legitimate national security needs or international peacekeeping 
operation requirements'? If yes, how many? 
2. Were any applications rejected? If yes, how many, and why? 
3. Under the Code of Conduct for the implementation of the Moratorium, 
member states were enjoined to provide the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS 
with annual reports on the ordering or procurement of weapons. How many 
states complied, and to what extent? 
4 Was a regional arms database established? 
5. What structures and procedures were established within the ECOWAS 
Secretariat to assist member states in the implementation of the Moratorium? 
6. How significant a problem were artisanal blacksmithing industries in SALW 
proliferation? 
7. Many states passed laws to implement the Moratorium. What problems were 
encountered? If the states passed laws, what steps were taken to harmonize the 
legislation? 
8. Were all states enthusiastic about implementing the Code of Conduct? 
9. What was the role of civil society in raising awareness about SALW? 
10. What were the current estimates of the number of illicit SALW in circulation? 
1 1 What were the causes of demand for SALW? 
12. What were the sources of illicit arms in West Africa? 
13. Did all participating states establish national commissions? What was their 
composition? 
14. On the whole, what has been the performance of these national commissions? 
15. Have any arms (surplus to national security requirements or illegally 
possessed) been confiscated and destroyed? If so, how many, and what 
category? 
16. Was there any inter-state collaboration among customs officers and law and 
order agencies to advance the purpose of the Moratorium? If there was any 
collaboration, what were the problems and effects? 
17. How effective was the 1998 ECOWAS Declaration of a Moratorium on 
Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa 
in controlling SALW? 
18. How effective were arms embargoes and disarmament programs in combating 
SAI,W proliferation in the experience of ECOWAS? 
19. Apart from the Moratorium and disarmament programs, in what other ways 
has ECOWAS attempted to control SALW? 
Itinerary 
The researcher spent three months March 16-May 15, 2007 in Ghana gathering data and 
interviewing a number of experts and civil society activists working to check small arms 
uroliferation in West Africa. The months of March and April were largely used in 
interviews and collection of secondary data. The month of May was spent in analyzing 
the data and making follow-ups. The interviews and data collection were done in Accra. 
Trips were also made to Kumasi and Tamale to collect information and observe local 
artisans engaged in local gun manufacturing. In Accra, the following offices were visited: 
1. Foundation for Security and Development in Africa 
2. The Ghana Police Service 
3. National Firearms Bureau 
4. Ghana Army Headquarters 
5. Defense Intelligence of the Ghana Army 
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
7. Africa Security and Dialogue Research 
8. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center 
9. University of Ghana Balme Library 
10. West African Action Network on Small Arms 
The researcher also had a telephone interview with an official of the United Nations 
Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa. 
CHAPTER 4 
ECOWAS: HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION 
In the 1970s, West Africa was as politically unstable as it was in 2005. Those 
were the heydays of one-party regimes and military rulers sitting atop unaccountable and 
undemocratic regimes. Coups and counter-coups were the norm. Civil society was 
naturally shut out of the political and development discourse. As noted by Adebajo, 
"Thirty-seven out of seventy-two successful military coups d'etat in Africa (about 50 
percent) between 1960 and 1990 occurred in West Africa, a subregion with less than a 
third of the OAU's (Organisation of African Unity) members," putting West Africa in the 
league of the world's most unstable subregions.' The only exceptions to the general intra,- 
state instability were Senegal and The Gambia that were ruled by elected governments. 
The Gambia witnessed an abortive coup in 198 1. 
The sixteen states that formed ECOWAS in 1975 were divided by colonial 
legacies and linguistic heritage (Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone), by 
competing ideologies (capitalist and pro-West versus socialist and pro-East), by 
economic development models and by military alliances. Asante observed that: 
If Africa as a whole is badly fragmented, West Africa must be the most 
fragmented subregion on the continent. West Africa represents the most 
heterogeneous conglomeration of states in Africa, and has the largest number of 
I Adekeye Adebajo, Budding Peace in West Africa Llberra, Szerra Leone, and Guinea Bissau 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 24 
ministates, with populations too small in size to be viable markek2 
Ironically, in spite of this fragmentation, the subregion was also the most heavily 
populated of Africa's subregions.3 The combination of colonial legacy, fragmentation and 
remote control by outside forces engendered suspicion and distrust, creating a security 
dilemma amongst states. 
The formation of ECOWAS created anxiety in some external powers because of a 
fear of loss of influence. France was especially wary of the new ECOWAS project 
because of its historical political and economic ties to some of the countries in the 
subregion. France had been the colonial master of nine out of the 16 original members of 
ECOWAS. These ECOWAS members were tied to France through a variety of measures 
- defense and military pacts and currency linkage. Benin, Burkina, Ivory Coast, Guinea 
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, whose common central bank is the Central Bank 
of West African States (BCEAO), all used the CFA franc which was guaranteed in 
French francs by the French Treasury. 
These members also formed an influential part of the Francophone cultural family 
via use of the French language. France and Ivory Coast (the largest Francophone 
economy) were wary of Nigeria's role in the proposed community; Ivory Coast resented 
the prospects of Nigerian domination while France on the other hand envisaged a reduced 
role and influence if the ECOWAS project came to fruition. 
Nigeria dwarfed every other country in West Africa on account of the size of her 
economy, population and military capability. France tended to stoke and sustain this fear 
2 S.K B. Asante, "The Travails of Integration," in West Ajr~ca's Secur~ty Challenges Buildzng 
Peace zn a Troubled Region, ed Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2002), 53 
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of domination. Thus the formation of the Communaute Economique de 1'Afrique de 
l'Ouest in 1973 by Ivory Coast, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali and Mauritania, 
actively encouraged by France, was to counterbalance Nigerian influence within West 
~ f r i c a . ~  Furthermore, when negotiations for the revision ofthe ECOWAS Treaty in 
1992- 1993 were being undertaken, the Francophone states formed the Union 
Economique et Monetaire de l'Ouest Afrique (West African Economic and Monetary 
Union) externally guaranteed by France. This did not go unnoticed as yet another attempt 
to undermine ECOWAS by France. Several states in the subregion were critical of the 
dependency relations between France and its colonies and France's desire to sustain the 
dependency. That ECOWAS has survived to date represents a triumph of local actors 
over external actors in forging integration no matter the challenges. 
Prior to the birth of ECOWAS, Nigeria, which was Africa's most populous state 
and the economic powerhouse of West Africa, was recovering from a disastrous civil war 
(1967-1970). The Nigerian civil war itself was a source of' regional tension because Ivory 
Coast had recognized the secessionist state of Biafra in 1968,~ and Benin for a brief 
period in 1969 had permitted relief flights from its territory to the ~ecessionists.~ 
Nigeria's post-civil war recovery and survival as a unified nation was aided partly by the 
oil boom of 1974 that saw her awash in petrodollars and a spirit of benevolence towards 
her neighbors. 
It was in this challenging environment, or rather in spite of it, that ECOWAS was 
Daniel C Bach, "The Politics of West African Economic C-operation: C E A 0 and 
E C 0.W A S," Journal of Modern African Studies, 2 1, no 4 (Dec , 1983), 606 
Olatunde J B. Ojo, "Nigeria and the fbrmation of ECOWAS," International Organbation, 34, 
no. 4. (Autumn, 1980): 57 1-604. Olatunde claims that Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast also 
pressurized France to recognize secessionist Biafra. 
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established by the Treaty of Lagos on May 28, 1975 and became operational in March 
1977. The delay in coming to-force was due to on-going discussions on five protocols 
relating to its implementation.' ECOWAS owed its birth largely to the vision of Nigeria 
and the diplomatic skills of its then leader, General Yakubu Gowon, who found a willing 
partner in General Eyadema, President of Francophone Togo. 
The objective of ECOWAS, according to Article 2 (1) of the 1975 ECOWAS 
Treaty, was to: 
Promote economic cooperation and development in all fields of economic 
activity, particularly in the fields of industry, transport, communications, energy, 
agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in 
social and cultural matteis for the purpose of raising the living standards of its 
people, of' increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer 
relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development 
of the African continent.$ 
According to Article 2 (2) of the treaty, ECOWAS was to ensure in stages the following: 
1. Elimination of customs duties and other charges of equivalent effect in 
respect of the importation and exportation of goods between Member 
States. 
2. Abolition of quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade. 
3. Establishment of a common customs tariff and a common commercial 
policy towards third countries. 
4. Abolition of obstacles to the free movement of persons, services and 
capital. 
5. Harmonization of'the agricultural policies and the promotion of 
7 Ibid Daniel C Bach, "The Politics of West African Economic C-operation: C E A 0 and 
E C . 0  W A S," Journal oj  Modern African Studies, 2 1, no 4 (Dec , 1983): 6 13 
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EMAC (accessed July 10,2007) 
common projects, notably in the fields of' marketing, research and afro- 
industrial enterprises. 
6. Implementation of schemes for the joint development of transport, 
communication, energy and the infra-structural facilities as well as the 
evolution of a common policy in these fields. 
7. Harmonization of the economic and industrial policies of the Member 
States and the elimination of disparities in the level of' development of 
Member States. 
8. Harmonization, of the monetary policies of the Member States. 
9. Establishment of' a Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and ~ e v e l o ~ m e n t , ~  
Under the Treaty, the principal governing institution of the Community was the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government (AHSG), whose decisions and directives 
were binding on all Community institutions. The Council of Ministers, consisting of two 
representatives of each Member State and subordinate only to the AHSG, was mandated 
with making recommendations to the AHSG on matters of policy aimed at the efficient 
and harmonious functioning and development of the Community. The Executive 
Secretariat, headed by the Executive Secretary, supervised the daily functioning of the 
Community. 
The Treaty of' Lagos was concerned solely with economic and monetary issues. It 
was modeled on the European Economic Community and shared similar philosophy. In 
spite of the volatile nature of the sub-region, no mention was made of security, defense or 
victor Essien, "Regional Trade Agreements in Africa: A Historical and Bibliographic Account 
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political issues. In view of the tension between the Anglophone and Francophone states 
and, particularly, wariness by the Francophone states that Nigeria nursed hegenionic 
ambitions, it was prudent to avoid such delicate issues. Additionally, the OAU principle 
of non-interference in other states' affairs may have informed their decision. However, as 
Abbas Bundu, the former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS observed, "the need to create 
an atmosphere of confidence and trust throughout the region as a precondition for 
regional integration was felt soon after the Community became operational," and this led 
to the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in 
Defence. l o  
By the terms of the Protocol on Non-Aggression, ECOWAS member states were 
to do the following: 
1. Refrain from the threat or use of force or aggression against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of other member states. 
2. Refrain from committing, encouraging or condoning acts of subversion. 
3. Refrain from hostility or aggression against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of other member states. 
4. Prevent resident or non-resident foreigners from committing acts of 
subversion against the sovereignty of other member states. 
5. Commit to the pacific settlement of disputes." 
Under the 198 1 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence, member states declared and 
accepted that "any armed threat or aggression directed against any Member States shall 
' O  Abbas Bundu, "ECOWAS and the Future of Regional Integration in West Africa," in Real 
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constitute a threat or aggression against the entire   om mu nit^."'^ Consequently, member 
states resolved to provide mutual aid and assistance for defense against any armed threat 
or aggression. However, the protocol was silent on what should be done if the armed 
threat to a member state originated from within the state. The protocol also called for the 
creation of' an Allied Armed Forces of the Community to be constituted by member states 
from specially earmarked units of national armies. It further stipulated in Article 16 that, 
when a member state was the target of' an external threat or aggression, the Head of State 
of that country should send a written request for assistance to the current chairman of the 
Authority of ECOWAS with copies to all members. 
The 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual 
Assistance in Defence marked a recognition by the signatories that West Afiica 
constituted a regional security complex, that is, "a group of' states whose primary security 
concerns link together sufficiently that their national securities cannot be considered apart 
from one another."13 
In apparent response to concerns that ECOWAS had shifted from its original 
economic integration agenda, Aning argued that, "The inclusion of' security related 
protocols was a necessary progression from the economic foundations underpinning the 
integration scheme. ECOWAS as a moving target is responding to the enduring security 
problems in West ~ f r i c a . " ' ~  Similarly, Ero insisted that the convergence between 
economic and political matters informed the signing of' the Protocol on Non-Aggression 
Economic Community of West African States, Protocol on M ~ l t ~ ~ a l  Assistance in Defence,. 
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and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on ~efence." 
The Liberian Civil War and the Consolidation of' ECOWAS' Conflict Resolution 
Mechanism 
The outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1989 tested the meaning, relevance and 
scope of these protocols. The Liberian civil war marked the point when ECOWAS 
became identified more with regional security than with regional economic integration. 
Eventually it also drove ECOWAS into searching for a security mechanism and a legal 
framework to enable members to become each brother's keeper. Obviously, no trade and 
development could take place when bullets were flying and the productive population 
was killing, avoiding being killed or actually being killed. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme, "The World Bank 
estimates that a civil war lasts seven years on average, with the growth rate of the 
economy reduced by 2.2% each year.. . One study puts the average cost of' a conflict as 
high as $54 billion for a low-income country, taking into account the increased risk of' 
future c~nfl ict ." '~ From the beginning of the Liberian civil war in 1989 to its formal 
conclusion in 1997, 200,000 died and 1.2 million were displaced out of'a pre-war 
population of only 2.5million. ' ' 
The Liberian civil war began on December 24, 1989, with the invasion of' Liberia 
from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire by Charles Taylor with his Libyan and Burkina-trained 
15 Comfort Ero, "ECOWAS and the Subregional Peacekeeping in Liberia," Journal o j  
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National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebels. The invasion was an attempt to 
overthrow the brutal regime of President Samuel Doe - a regime well known for its 
ethnic exclusion and gross abuse of human rights. By the middle of 1990 Liberia had 
become a "~lau~hterhouse"'~ and a theater for warlords outdoing each other in bestiality. 
In the face of inaction from the United Nations, the task of halting the carnage fell on 
ECOWAS. 
Some member states of ECOWAS had other reasons for intervening. Charles 
Taylor's NPFL fighters had killed some Nigerian citizens and held others hostage in the 
Nigerian embassy in Monrovia in early 1990. The Gambia was worried about Charles 
Taylor and the NPFL because a number of NPFL fighters were involved in an 
unsuccessful coup in the Gambia in 1991. This attempted coup was widely believed to 
have been sponsored by Libya's Colonel Gaddafi. Guinea and Sierra Leone, which 
shared borders with Liberia, felt the most direct impact of the war - Guinea was host to 
225,000 refugees and Sierra Leone 69,000. To add insult to injury, the NPFL contained in 
its ranks Sierra Leonean dissidents who tried to destabilize her.I9 The outbreak of the 
Sierra Leonean civil war in 1991 launched from Liberia vindicated Sierra Leonean 
concerns. 
The civil war in Liberia was also a study in the fusion of personal interests of 
leaders and national interests in the conduct of international relations. Burkina Faso's 
Head of State, Blaise Campaore, and President Houphouet-Boigny of Ciite dlIvoire had 
personal reasons for meddling in the tragic conflict. According to Ero, then President 
S Byron Tarr, "The ECOMOG Initiative in Liberia: A Liberian Perspective," Journal of 
Opin~on 2 1, no 1-2 ( 1993): 74-83 
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Samuel Doe of Liberia had killed former President Tolbert and arrested his eldest son, 
Adolphus Tolbert, (son-in-law of Houphouet-Boigny), who was subsequently murdered 
in jail.20 Burkina, whose president was a son-in-law of HouphouEt-Boigny, was also the 
conduit for arms to the NPFL from Libya, the serial meddler in West African affairs. 
Nigeria under General Ibrahim Babangida supplied arms to Doe at the beginning of the 
conflict. The Nigerian leader, President Ibrahim Babangida, was seen by some as Doe's 
sub-regional godfather. In gratitude, Doe named a Graduate School of International 
Relations and a major road in Monrovia after President Babangida. 
ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia 
At the 13th summit of the Heads of States of ECOWAS countries held in Banjul, 
Gambia on May 30, 1990, member states, under the chairmanship of Sir Dawda Jawara 
of Gambia, set up a five-member Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) - comprising 
Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Mali and Togo - to negotiate an end to the murderous conflict in 
Liberia. At another summit on July 6, 1990, in Banjul, Gambia, the five members of the 
SMC took the unprecedented step of sending a multinational peacekeeping force into 
Monrovia. 
On July 14, 1990, President Doe, who was beleaguered in the Executive Mansion 
and cut off from the rest of Liberia by the NPFL fighters, activated Article 16 of the 1981 
Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence by appealing to the ECOWAS chairman that, 
"it would seem most expedient at this time to introduce an ECOWAS Peace-keeping 
Force into Liberia to forestall increasing terror and tension and to assure a peaceful 
transitional en~ironment."~' 
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On August 24, 1990, ECOWAS deployed a multinational force of 3,000 troops in 
Monrovia, the Liberian capital. This force, named the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG), began its difficult task that oscillated between peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement for the next eight years. The legality or otherwise of' ECOMOG's 
intervention and the track record of' ECOMOG in peacekeeping are topics that lay outside 
the scope of this research. 
In 1991, the shockwaves of the collapse of the Berlin Wall reverberated ,all over 
the world and resulted in the collapse of many dictatorial and one-party regimes. With 
civil wars raging in Liberia and Sierra Leone, an ECOWAS Heads of' State meeting in 
Abuja, Nigeria on July 6 ,  1991, adopted the Declaration of Political Principles. While 
taking note of the changing international political and economic landscape, the Heads of 
State recommitted themselves to the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and reiterated that 
economic development could only flourish in an atmosphere of' peace and stability. They 
pledged respect for political pluralism, respect for fundamental human rights, and the 
inalienable right of the individual to "participate by free and democratic processes in the 
framing of' the society in which he lives."22 
The Revised ECOWAS Treatv of 1993 
Given the changed subregional environment, the changing international landscape 
and the realities of maintaining subregional security, the 1975 Treaty stood in need of an 
overhaul. The various protocols signed since 1978 attested to this. A Committee of 
Eminent Persons (CEP) under General Yakubu Gowon, the architect of'the original 
treaty, was mandated to make recommendations for a revised treaty.. 
" Economic Community of West African States, Declaration o j  Political Principles, 
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According to Kufuor, the Committee identified some inherent weaknesses. The 
powers of the Authority of Heads of State and Government were so ambiguous that the 
exact extent of its powers and functions were unknown. The Council of Ministers' 
powers were restricted with no original or delegated powers. Compliance to decisions by 
Member States was voluntary; not even the decisions of the AHSG were binding on the 
Member States. Additionally, the Committee observed that the Executive Secretariat had 
no real decision-making powers. 
The CEP recommended that ECOWAS transition from an inter-governmental 
organization to a supranational one.23 The revised treaty was submitted to the ECOWAS 
Summit of Heads of State held in Cotonou in July 1993 and adopted. The Revised Treaty 
(1993) endowed ECOWAS with supranationality as recommended by the CEP. Member 
States agreed to partial surrender of national sovereignty in order to make possible the 
creation of a regional economic identity.24 This was a qualitative shift in the mandate of 
ECOWAS. It had changed from an international organization where observance of 
agreements depended on voluntary cooperation to a supranational organization where 
compliance to agreements was obligatory. Article 77 of the Revised Treaty spelled out 
sanctions for non-fulfillment of obligations. 
The Revised Treaty aimed to: 
I. Promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an 
economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its 
peoples. 
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2. Maintain and enhance economic stability. 
3. Foster relations among Member States. 
4. Contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent 
(Article 3). 
Competing Intergovernmental Organizations 
In Article 2 of the Revised Treaty, the leaders, with history as a guide, decided 
that ECOWAS would ultimately be the & (emphasis by the author) economic 
community in the region for the purpose of economic integration and the realization of 
the objectives of the African Economic Community. 
Running parallel to ECOWAS and posing a threat to ECOWAS' integrationist 
goals was the Union Economique de Monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), a 
Francophone West Africa economic union. It was the successor to the Communaute 
Economique de I'Afrique de I'Ouest (CEAO) formed in 1974. UEMOA grouped together 
eight Francophone (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and 
Togo) and one Lusophone (Guinea-Bissau) countries out of the 15-member ECOWAS. 
Both ECOWAS and UEMOA shared the same objectives - free trade, free movement of 
persons as well as a common external tariff.25 There certainly were divided loyalties 
when it came to implementing decisions of both groups, especially if they conflicted. 
The multiplicity of intergovernmental organizations in West Africa and their drag on 
ECOWAS was noted by Bundu (1997), who described it as creating duplication and 
25 S K B Asante, "The Travails of Integration," in West Africa's Security Challenges Bulldlng 
Peace in a Troubled Region, ed Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2002), 53 
financial Kufuor (2006) stated that: 
A report noted that West African countries set up approximately 50 
intergovernmental organizations over a 25-year period with most of them being 
superfluous as their functions overlapped.. . Compounding the problem of 
overlapping membership of integration arrangements is the economic relationship 
between the ex-colonies in West Africa and their former colonial authorities. For 
instance most of French-speaking West Africa, i.e. co~~ntries in the West African 
Franc Zone are linked to France through a preferential monetary co-operation 
arrangement.. . Multiple intergovernmental organizations also led to divided 
loyalties because of competing treaty obligations.27 
Organizational Structure of ECOWAS 
The highest institution in ECOWAS was the AHSG of Member States. Its major 
functions were to determine general policy and major guidelines of'the Community and 
to harmonize and co-ordinate the economic, scientific, technical, cultural and social 
policies of member states. The Authority met at least once a year in ordinary session and 
its decisions were binding on members. The chair of the Authority was elected once a 
year. The other institutions were the: 
I .  Council of Ministers. 
2. Community Parliament. 
3. Economic and Social Council. 
4. Community Cour-t of Justice. 
5. Executive Secretariat (transformed into the Executive Commission in January 
6. Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development (transformed in 2001 
into the ECOWAS Bank fbr Investment and Development). 
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The Council of Ministers comprised the Minister in charge of ECOWAS Affairs and any 
other Minister of each ~ & n b e r  State. It approved the work programs and budgets of the 
Community and its institutions. The Council met at least twice a year in ordinary session 
with one of such sessions immediately preceding the ordinary session of the AHSG. 
The Community Parliament was mandated to consider issues concerning human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens. Other areas for consideration included any 
issues affecting the Community, especially as they related to the review ofthe ECOWAS 
Treaty, citizenship and social integration. On these issues, the Parliament could make 
recommendations to the appropriate institutions andlor organs of the Community. Seats 
were shared on the basis of population. Consequently, Nigeria had 35 seats, Ghana eight, 
Cote d'Ivoire seven, while Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Senegal had six seats 
each. Benin, Cape Verde, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Togo 
had five seats each. 
The Community Court of' Justice was made up of a president, chief registrar and 
seven judges. It was the principal judicial organ of ECOWAS. Generally, the Court 
examined any disputes arising out of the application and the interpretation of the Treaty, 
but might also be req~~ired to examine litigation arising out of human rights violations in 
the area covered by the Community. Its creation constituted a milestone in strengthening 
the institutional mechanisms for the protection of human rights and citizen rights in the 
sub-region. Since all members of' ECOWAS had acceded to the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights and other international human rights conventions and 
enshrined such rights provisions in their constitutions, this court was one avenue for 
holding governments accountable. 
The inaugural session of the Court admitted a suit challenging the Nigerian 
62 
Federal government's closure of the NigeriaIBenin border in August 2003. A Nigerian 
businessman, Mr. Olajide Afblabi, who alleged that the closure of the border between 
Aug. 9 and Aug. 15,2003, was unlawful, filed the suit. In his application, Afolabi said 
the closure was a violation of the right to his freedom of movement and goods as 
enshrined in Article 12 of the African Charter on Human and People's ~ i ~ h t s . ~ ~  
In June 2007, the Community Court also issued a hearing notice for a suit filed 
against the Republic of Gambia by the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) on 
behalf of a "disappeared" Gambian journalist, Chief Ebrima Manneh, a reporter of the 
pro-government Banjul-based Daily Observer newspaper. The application sought an 
order from the sub-regional court to compel the government of' President Yahya Jammeh 
to immediately release Chief Manneh and compensate him 
One of' the major aims of the ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development 
(formerly the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development) was to institute a 
compensation mechanism to offset losses by states that would have been adversely 
affected by the new regimes of tariffs brought about by the Treaty. It filnctioned 
principally as the development financing arm of ECOWAS. 
The Executive Commission 
At their January 19,2007, summit in Ouagadougou, ECOWAS heads of state and 
government endorsed the transformation of the Executive Secretariat into a Commission, 
as well as the restructuring of other ECOWAS institutions to make them more efficient 
and effective to play their roles in the integration and development processes of West 
'* Norwegian Council for Africa, "Nigeria: Government Appears in Court Over Closure of 
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Africa. The Executive Commission was composed of a President, Vice-President, and 
seven Commissioners At the time of this research, it was undergoing a restnucturing 
process to position it to better meet the challenges of promoting regional integration, 
good governance, sustainable development, peace and security in the region. In addition 
to the novelty of the commissioners, the Commission had powers to take decisions 
without necessary recourse to the ECOWAS chairman, thereby quickening the 
implementation of the body's decisions. The Commissioners were drawn from different 
countries and thus broadened member participation and representation on the 
Commission. Below was the top hierarchy of the Commission as of 2007: 
President - Ghana. 
e Vice President - Burkina Faso. 
Commissioner for Administration & Finance - Nigeria, 
e Commissioner for Trade, Customs, Industry and Free Movement of Persons - 
Sierra Leone. 
e Commissioner for Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources - Niger. 
e Commissioner for Infrastructure - Togo. 
Q Commissioner for Macro-economic Policy - Cote d'Ivoire. 
c Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security - Mali. 
c Commissioner for Human Development and Gender - Senegal. 
It should be borne in mind that, under Article 20 of the Revised Treaty, ECOWAS 
officials owed loyalty and were accountable only to the Community, and Member States 
were enjoined to respect the international character of the Community and undertake not 
to seek to influence the officials in the performance of their duties. 
Security Mechanism of the Revised Treaty 
The Revised Treaty incorporated the various protocols of conflict resolution 
(Protocol on Non-Aggression, Protocol on Assistance on Defence) and the Declaration of 
Political Principles. They were expressed in the following subsections of Article 4 
(Fundamental Principles): 
1. Non-aggression between Member States. 
2. Maintenance of regional peace and stability and security through the 
promotion and strengthening of good neighborliness. 
3. Peaceful settlement of disputes among member states, active co-operation 
between countries and promotion of a peaceful environment as a prerequisite 
for economic development. 
4. Recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights. 
5. Accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in 
development. 
Article 58 (Regional Security) of the Revised Treaty urged member states to 
cooperate with the community in establishing and maintaining appropriate mechanisms 
for the timely prevention and resolution of intra-State conflicts. To facilitate this, 
Member States, among other undertakings, would resort to good office, conciliation, 
mediation and other means to peacefully resolve disputes. Member states would establish 
a regional peace and security observation system and peacekeeping forces where 
appropriate. Additionally, where necessary and at the request of a member, ECOWAS 
would provide election observers. 
The Liberian, Sierra Leonean and Guinea-Bissau conflicts clearly articulated the 
need for a permanent security mechanism to deal with current and future conflicts. Ad- 
hoc measures had been used to deal with these crises, and these had threatened the fragile 
cohesion of ECOWAS. Thus on December 10, 1999, the ECOWAS Heads of State 
meeting in Lome, Togo, signed the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (hereinafter referred to 
as the Mechanism). The Mechanism effectively replaced the protocols on Non- 
Aggression, Mutual Assistance in Defence and Article 58 of the 1993 Revised   re at^.^' 
Given the overarching importance of this protocol, an in-depth discussion of its 
provisions is appropriate. 
The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security 
Among the core objectives of the mechanism were the following: 
1. Prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-state conflicts. 
2. Maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the 
Community. 
3. Constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore 
peace within the sub-region when the need arises. 
4. Strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, 
peacekeeping operations, the control of cross-border crimes, international 
terrorism and proliferation of small arms and anti-personnel mines. 
5. Formulate and implement policies on anti-conuption, money-laundering 
and illegal circulation of small arms. 
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The Mechanism avoided the ambiguities of the Protocol on Mutual Assistance in 
Defence by spelling out cases where ECOWAS could intervene. The Mechanism would 
be invoked in cases of' aggression or conflict in any member state, or conflict between 
two or more member states. If an internal conflict threatened to trigger a humanitarian 
disaster, pose a serious threat to peace and stability in the subregion, or spawn serious 
violations of human rights and the rule of law, the Mechanism would be applied. 
Additionally, there would be cause for intervention when a democratically elected 
government was threatened or actually overthrown. The authority to initiate an 
intervention rested on either a decision by the Authority of Heads of State, the MSC, a 
request from a member state, the Executive Secretary, the African Union or the United 
Nations. 
Realistically, the Mechanism could not be applied across the board. Like all other 
protocols or agreements, success depended on the good behavior of the hegemon, 
Nigeria, which accounted for 75 percent of West Africa's GNP, 66% of total exports, and 
more than half (55 percent) of the population of the subregion. With an army of 94,500 
troops, Nigeria dwarfed the combined total of the rest of ECOWAS member statese3' For 
example, if there was an internal conflict in Nigeria that met the criteria for intervention, 
ECOWAS might not be able to intervene. The combined armies of the rest of the member 
countries could not intervene in Nigeria. Secondly, they would not have the financial 
capacity to undertake any such enterprise. 
The Mechanism established a Mediation and Security Council (MSC) comprising 
nine Member States, seven of which were elected by the Authority. The other two 
members were the current chairman and the immediate past chairman of the Authority, 
3 1 Adekeye Adebajo, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. 
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 48-49. 
each of whom had an automatic right to membership. The elected members served for a 
renewable two-year term. Decisions of the MSC were taken by a two-thirds majority 
vote. Deliberations of the MSC were held at three levels - Heads of State, ministerial and 
Ambassadorial - and presided over by the current chairman of ECOWAS. 
The functions of the MSC, inter alia, were to decide on all matters relating to 
peace and security; decide and implement all policies for conflict prevention, 
management and resolution, peacekeeping and security; authorize all forms of 
intervention and decide particularly on the deployment of political and military missions. 
The following organs were established to support the Mechanism: the Defence 
and Security Commission (DSC), the Council of Elders and the ECOWAS Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The DSC assisted the MSC in formulating mandates of 
the peacekeeping force, defined the terms of reference for the Force, appointed the Force 
Commander and determined the composition of contingents. Basically, the DSC was a 
military planning body composed in the main by Chiefs of Defence Staff, officers 
responsible for Internal Affairs and Security and Experts of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. It met quarterly. 
The Council of Elders comprised eminent persons of diverse backgrounds in 
society. The list of qualified elders was compiled by the Executive Secretary and 
approved by the MSC. They were dispatched to douse the flames in conflict situations 
when the need arose. 
ECOMOG was composed of several stand-by units from member countries ready 
for immediate deployment. It was tasked with observation and monitoring, peacekeeping 
and restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention in situations of disasters, and 
enforcement of sanctions including embargoes. States that contributed contingents might 
be invited to bear the cost of operations during the first three months and would be 
reimbursed by ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ S w i t h i n  a maximum of six months. ECOWAS would then 
proceed to finance the operations. For each operation that was being undertaken by 
ECOMOG, the Executive Secretary appointed a Special Representative. This Special 
Representative was responsible for the political orientation of the mission and initiated 
negotiations between warring factions. The MSC appointed the Force Commander of' 
ECOMOG on the recommendation of the Executive Secretary. The Force Commander 
reported to the Executive Secretary through the Special Representative. 
Under the Mechanism, an Early Warning System was established - an 
Observation and Monitoring Center located at the ECOWAS Secretariat and four 
Observation and Monitoring Zones within the sub-region. Zone 1 comprised Cape Verde, 
The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal with the headquarters in Banjul, 
Gambia. Zone 2 comprised Burkina Faso (headquarters), Cote d' Ivoire, Mali, and Niger. 
Zone 3 was constituted by Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone with headquarters in 
Monrovia. Zone 4 had Nigeria, Togo and Benin hosting the headquarters. The Zonal 
bureaux collected data that impacted on the peace and security of' the zone and the sub- 
region on a state-by-state and day-to-day basis. 
The Mechanism was funded by provisions from the ECOWAS annual budget, as 
well as from requests for funds from the United Nations, other international agencies, and 
the African Union, and voluntary contributions and grants from bilateral and multilateral 
sources. 
Funding posed a major challenge in a subregion where donors funded most 
national budgets, and ECOWAS dues were perpet~~ally in arrears. ECOWAS 
acknowledged in 2006 that most member states owed huge arrears of contributions to the 
various budgets and funds of the Community Institutions. For example, in 2006 only five 
member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, C8te d'Ivoire, Mali and Nigeria) were up to date in 
the payment oftheir contributions to the Executive Secretariat budget. Total arrears 
outstanding amounted to US $38.4 million. The most substantial amounts were owed by 
Liberia, which had accumulated arrears for over 20 years; Mauritania (for 15 years); 
Sierra Leone and Gambia (each 11 years in arrears.); Cape Verde and Guinea-.Bissau 
(each for 10 years); Niger (for 8 years); Guinea and Senegal for 5 years); and Togo and 
Ghana (for 2 years).32 
Some member states were unable to prefinance their participation in ECOMOG 
operations before being reimbursed by ECOWAS. Nearly all the West African economies 
depended on primary commodity exports that faced severe challenges in the volatile 
global market. Senegal's participation in ECOMOG operations in Liberia was 
underwritten by the US. 
In December 2001, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government adopted the 
Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy. This protocol addressed 
the root causes of conflicts in the sub-region. The leaders observed that, fbr the 
Mechanism to become really effective, it needed to be complemented by a protocol that 
would address issues such as prevention of internal crises, democracy and good 
governance, and the rule of law and human rights. Some of the underlying principles of 
the supplementary protocol were separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, 
zero tolerance for coups and other unconstitutional means of obtaining power, freedom of 
the press and association, and popular par.ticipation of citizens in decision-making. 
ECOWAS in this protocol committed itself to providing assistance in the conduct of any 
32 Economic Community of West African States, Achievements, (January 2006) 
htt~://www.sec.ecowas.ir~t/sitect.deao/english/achievements-6 htm (accessed July 30, 2007) 
national election and to send a monitoring team. 
The Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy called for non-partisan armed 
forces and police and their subordination to civil authorities. It also stipulated that the 
culture of every group of people should be respected and developed, that marginalized 
groups like women and the youth should be integrated into political and economic 
processes, and respect fbr religious beliefs. This Protocol contained sanctions for 
breaches. If a democracy was abruptly terminated through extra-constitutional means or 
there was a massive violation of human rights in a member state, ECOWAS could apply 
the fbllowing sanctions: refusal to support candidates presented by the Member State for 
elective posts in international organizations; refusal to organize ECOWAS meetings in 
the member state concerned and suspension of the member state from all ECOWAS 
decision-making bodies. 
These sanctions per se could not deter coup makers, but the possibility that the 
international community would back ECOWAS' sanctions was what could hold coup 
makers in check. ECOWAS could count on some successes in this regard. For example, 
its opposition to the September 2003 coup d'etat in Guinea Bissau compelled the coup 
makers to set up an interim government of civilians and conduct elections in March 2004. 
After the death of Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo in 2005 after 38 years of dictatorial rule, 
ECOWAS led the effort to resist the attempt by the military to undemocratically install 
his son, Faure Eyadema, as president. Faure stood down, but later became president after 
manipulated elections two months later. In February 2007, ECOWAS also successfully 
brokered a peace deal between Guinea's President Lansana Conte and trade unions that 
had embarked on several weeks of violent protests to press home demands for better 
governance and living conditions. The protests left about a hundred dead and threatened 
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to degenerate into civil strife and endanger neighboring states. 
The evolution of ECOWAS was gradual and dictated by the difficult security 
challenges of the late 1980s and beyond. Rather than seeing this as a deviation from the 
original goals, it should be seen as the broadening of the mandate of ECOWAS. In its 
various treaties and protocols ECOWAS rightly drew the nexus between economic 
development and security or stability. No development could take place without security. 
With many of the crises (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Ivory Coast) 
that took a toll on ECOWAS resolved or dying down, it was clear that ECOWAS would 
begin to devote more attention to economic integration. That was what the transformation 
of the Executive Secretariat into a Commission would hopefully help accomplish. 
CHAPTER 5 
SMALL ARMS TRADE AND TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA 
This research adopted an integrated approach to SALW proliferation, that is, it 
analyzed both the reasons for demand for SALW and the sources of supply. The demand 
side of the equation would answer the question of what motivated people or groups to 
demand small arms, and the supply side would discuss how people came by these 
weapons. 
According to the United Nations, "small arms are weapons designed for personal 
use, while light weapons are those designed for use by several persons serving as a 
crew."' Small arms included revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub- 
machine guns, assault rifles and light machine-guns. Light weapons included heavy 
machine-guns, hand-held under-banel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti- 
aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank 
missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems and 
mortars of calibers of less than 100 mm. Ammunition and explosives included cartridges 
(rounds) for small arms, shells and missiles for light weapons, mobile containers with 
missiles or shells for single-action anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, anti-personnel and 
anti-tank hand grenades, landmines and explosives.2 Also categorized as small arms were 
hand grenades and commercial firearms such as hunting rifles. 
' United Nations, Report ojthe Panel oj  Governmental Experts on Small Arms, Al521298, 1997 
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Generally, SALW were small, easy to conceal, light and portable, durable, easy to 
maintain, required relatively less training to manipulate and were widely available. For 
example, the AK-47 (Avtomat Kalashnikov 47), the most popular and most iconic assault 
rifle, was described by the British Broadcasting Corporation as "durable, simple to use, 
and, with only nine parts, easy to dismantle and maintain. It can fire 600 rounds a minute, 
with each bullet still potentially lethal at distances of more than a kilometre (two-thirds of 
a mile)."3 
The AK-47 was the darling weapon of freedom fighters, rebels, bandits and 
terrorists. The aforementioned characteristics of SALW made them easy to recycle 
between hotspots, sometimes hundreds of miles apart. Additionally, their lightness had 
partly made possible the recruitment of child soldiers. Improvements in technology 
enabled SALW's acquisition of new characteristics: reductions in size and weight, 
improvements in target acquisition, increased rate of fire, improved ballistic and terminal 
effects of projectiles, enhanced durability, and reduced costs and maintenance 
requirements.4 As a result of the less complex design of SALW, artisans or blacksmiths 
in West Africa and elsewhere with little or no formal technical training were able to 
manufacture SALW in their foundries. 
Demand for SALW 
Several reasons motivated people to acquire SALW. These included: insecurity 
(personal or group), inter-group competition, politicians and the contest for power, non- 
state actors, crime and banditry, Culture or tradition was also a motivating factor for 
3 British Broadcasting Corporation, "AK-47: Iconic Weapon," (5 December 2005) 
http:/l1~ews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/euro~e/4380348.stn (accessed July 6, 2007) 
4 Andrew Latham, "Light Weapons and Human Security: A Conceptual Overview," in Small Arms 
Control Old Weapons, New Issues, ed Dhanapala, J et a1 (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1999), 12 
the acquisition of weapons among some ethnic groups in West Africa. 
Crime and banditry 
Criminals and bandits found in SALW the most effective means to scare their 
victims into compliance or to kill whoever stood in their way. There was a rising 
incidence of violent crime in the sub-region, and the security agencies were unable to 
stem it. This was particularly true in the urban areas and on the highways. The heinous 
crimes committed included armed robbery and murder. The police were sometimes 
overmatched by the firepower of the bandits. Acknowledging the ineffectiveness of the 
police and the justice system in combating crime, many communities resorted to instant 
mob justice, that is, lynching of suspects. 
Insecurity and the privatization of s e c u b  
An effective government should have provided at least two basic functions: 
security of its people and meeting their basic needs. The lack of either of these (especially 
security) deprived a government of legitimacy and credibility and invited citizens to 
resort to Hobbesian self-help. Guaranteeing security entailed a well-equipped and 
functioning police and military and, crucially, monopoly of the use of force. Other 
criteria were a functioning judicial system and predictable laws. 
For internal security the police were the most crucial organ. The police were by 
law expected to maintain law and order, enforce the law, and protect life and property 
and prevent crime. To be able to do this required that the police as an institution be well 
staffed, properly trained, well equipped, knowledgeable of the law and committed to 
upholding it. Unfortunately, in nearly all West African countries the police were 
understaffed, underpaid and poorly equipped in terms of communication gadgets and 
transport. In some cases, they did not have suitable office accommodation and, 
unsurprisingly, no banacks. 
The police as an institution had also borne the brunt of the difficulties facing West 
African economies. For nearly two decades, West Africa had suffered economic decline 
owing to falling prices for major exports - gold, diamonds, timber, cocoa, cotton, and 
groundnuts. The exception to falling revenues was Nigeria, the largest oil exporter in 
Africa. However, mismanagement and corruption had prevented her from reaping the full 
effects of windfalls. At the opposite end, West African countries were saddled with high 
import bills of manufactured goods and oil. Their budgets were largely donor funded. 
Often, basic equipment like computers, radios and transport for the police had to be 
procured through loans or gifts from donors. 
Additionally, nervous rulers or governments tended to pay more attention to the 
needs of the military than the police for reasons of regime security and projecting 
national pride. Disgruntled soldiers were a threat to regime security as Dr. Kofi Busia, 
Prime Minister of Ghana, found out in what was dubbed the "amenities coupw5 on 
January 13, 1972. The aggrieved soldiers complained that the government was insensitive 
to their welfare, stating that Dr. Busia took away even the few privileges or amenities 
they enjoyed under the Nkrumah government, which was itself overthrown in a 1966 
coup. President Joseph Momoh, himself a soldier, in Siena Leone also fell victim to the 
anger of disgruntled soldiers in 1992. This led governments to pay more attention to the 
welfare of' soldiers. After all, no policemen had staged a coup before. 
The poor capacity of the police to tackle crime, especially the rising incidence of 
Victol Le Vine, "Autopsy on a Regime: Ghana's Civilian Interregniim 1969- 1972," Journal oj 
Modern Ajrlcan Studies 25, no 4 (March 1987): 17 1 
armed robbery,6 encouraged people to defend themselves in any way they could by 
purchasing weapons, building walls topped with barbed wire around their houses, 
installing closed-circuit television or forming neighborhood vigilante groups. Chike 
Okafor captured the situation in Nigeria: 
In Nigeria, people do not ask the victim of armed robbery whether they had a 
description of the bandits, or if police showed up to investigate.. . The reason why 
an armed robbery victim in Nigeria cannot call the police is apparent. First, some 
rotten members of the police force is (sic) either involved in the planning, 
execution or protection of the armed men. Second, they are badly compensated to 
risk their lives in the line of duty. There is a lack of strong compensatory benefit 
package to the police force, something that would provide a safety net to their 
families should they die while in the line of duty for their country. Third, they 
suffer from poor training. Forth, (sic) they are ill equipped to fight twenty first 
century crime. Even their uniform speaks for itself, an outfit that dates back to 
colonial rule or thereafter.7 
In West Africa the police were concentrated and visible in the urban areas, but the rural 
areas hardly had a police presence. Even in the urban areas, a criticism of police work 
was that they tended to be subservient to the rich and powerful and largely patrolled 
government residential areas and the homes of indigenous and expatriate  elite^.^ Atuguba 
made a similar argument that the police in Ghana had failed in providing community 
policing, and that had encouraged the rise of private security organizations, vigilante 
groups and land guards for those who could pay for such policing  service^.^ 
Modernghana.com, "Robbers kill 6 in Kumasi," Modernghana corn, July 4,2007, 
http:llwww.moderngha~~a.comiGhanaHome/Neive/news detail~.asu?id=VFZSTk5FNTZRWG89& 
menu id=] (accessed on August 4 2007) 
' Chike Okafor, "Nigeria and Armed Bandits," Nigeriaworld corn, December 29, 2005, 
htt~://nigeriaworId.com/feat~1re/publication/okafor/l22905.html (accessed August 4 2007) 
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http://www.cleen.org/~olicing.%20driver%2002Ochane.~df (accessed August 8, 2007) 
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policing, and that had encouraged the rise of private security organizations, vigilante 
groups and land guards for those who could pay for such policing services.1° 
Personal security was an important driver for weapon acquisition in West Africa. 
One of the more preferred means that people utilized to defend themselves and their 
property was a personal weapon - a pistol or rifle. A locally manufactured pistol sold for 
five dollars ($3, and a single barrel gun sold for about sixty dollars ($60) in Ghana." 
These were often purchased clandestinely from either arms dealers or local gun 
manufacturers. More often, those who purchased these weapons clandestinely did not 
undergo any weapon training or handling and posed a risk to themselves and others, 
particularly in decisive moments. Besides, there were virtually no companies outside the 
police and military institutions that trained people on how to handle weapons, even for 
those who purchased guns legally. 
A kind of internal arms race existed between law-abiding citizens and criminals, 
the former to defend themselves and the latter to be more efficient or effective in their 
operations. For both groups that sought weapons, there was no shortage of supply from 
local blacksmiths and the illegal market. 
Inter-group competition 
Communal clashes were quite common in West Africa, especially between 
contiguous communities that had rival claims to land or water resources. In the Sahelian 
countries of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Northern Nigeria, violent conflicts 
broke out between farmers (pastoralists) and herders, though not on the scale and 
10 Samuel Ampah, "Police Must Learn From Landguards, Private Security: Atuguba," 
Ghanajournal corn http:llthenha11aianiournal.com/2007/05/3Olpo1i~e-must-learn-fiom-land~aurds-private- 
security-atugubal (accessed on August 4 2007). 
' I  Author's field research in Ghana April 2007 
intensity as in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. These conflicts often occurred in the 
rainy season, especially over. crop damage and grazing lands. 
Some clashes occurred because of contest for traditional offices like chieftaincy, 
for example between the Kusasi and Mampmsi ethnic groups of Bawku in Northern 
Ghana. There also were clashes between religious groups (inter or intra-religion) over 
doctrine. Kano and Kaduna in Northern Nigeria were hotspots of inter-religious violence. 
Weapons used in these clashes were usually SALW. The inability of the state to resolve 
these competing claims and punish those who were responsible for the outbreak of 
violence led to the harboring of feelings of vengeance. Thus, all over. West Africa there 
were communities that were in a perpetual state of tension and always arming themselves 
for the next round of hostilities. 
Latham argued that, where the state itself posed a threat to the security to 
individuals or communal groups, the situation encouraged people to acquire SALW to 
defend themselves. This was especially true with authoritarian states that had been 
captured by a specific communal group or interest. When this happened these groups 
turned to SALW as the principal instrument to secure themselves and their property 
against state-organized violence, predation and criminal violence. l 2  
Politicians and the Contest for Power 
Elections in West Africa generated cycles of violence. Politics was seen as a zero- 
sum game or a do-and-die affair. Partly because some electoral commissions did not 
generate enough credibility in the electoral process, or. because politicians desired power 
at all costs, politicians often resorted to all kinds of illegitimate methods to ensure that the 
12 Andrew Latham, "Light Weapons and Human Security - A Conceptual Overview," in Small 
Arms Control, Old Weapons, New Issues, ed Dhanapala, J et al ( Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1999), 17 
election results turned out iil their favor. Some politicians stockpiled weapons and armed 
thugs to intimidate both voiers and election officials. Nigeria's general election ~f April 
23,2007, was perhaps the worst example on record in West Africa. In the run-up to the 
elections, the Inspector-General of the Nigeria Police Force in a testimony to the Nigerian 
Senate lamented: 
Now coming down to the security situation in the country in relation to the 2007 
elections, I have to inform you that we have arms in large quantities in our 
society; proliferation of arms and ammunitions in our society.. . There is a big 
threat of proliferation of arms and ammunitions in this country. Some politicians 
do carry arms during rallies; students have been caught with arms and 
ammunitions on their way to conventions; armed robbers carry sophisticated arms 
more than ever before.13 
In Oyo State, politicians also cried out against the massive accumulation of arms in the 
preparations for the election, They contended that, unless the police command in the state 
took the weapons out of circulation, their sensitization efforts to stop politically 
motivated assassinations would fail. The former Oyo State Governor, Alhaji Lam 
Adeshina, admonished, "there is the need for the police to be non-partisan in the handling 
of political affairs in the state, to create a level playing ground for all parties to operate,. 
There are caches of ammunitions in the political environment. People go about with 
pump action guns, the likes the police should be using to combat crime."I4 
The April 2007 election was widely condemned by external election monitors and 
the international community as not meeting the most basic standards of conducting free 
and fair elections. The European Union, for example, said that its observers "witnessed 
examples of ballot box stuffing, alteration of official result forms, stealing of sensitive 
l 3  Sufuyan Ojeifo, "Ehindero: Politicians Carry Arms at Rallies," Thisdayonline com, July 9, 2006, 
htt~://www.thisdavon1ine.com/nview.ph~?id=57768 (accessed on August 6, 2007) 
14 Tunde Saani, "Oyo Politicians Allege Increase in Weapon Circulation," Thisdayonline,com, 
August 25,2006, http:/lwww.thisdavonline.cominview.php?id=56645 (accessed on August 6,2007). 
polling materials, vote buying and underage voting."15 A more detailed catalog of abuses 
is furnished below: 
The Electoral Commission's catalogue of illegalities included the flouting of court 
orders; illegal/unconstitutional disqualification of candidates; refusal to include 
the names and pictures of major opposition candidates for the gubernatorial 
elections in Anambra State in spite of subsisting court rulings; the late arrival or. 
non-arrival of voting materials in many places followed often by no voting, yet 
results were announced; in some states, the INEC headquarters announced a result 
when the Resident Electoral Commissioner in situ said there was no result; 
declaration of results while collation and counting of votes were still going on; 
and a month after the April polls ended, three INEC staff were caught thumb- 
printing ballot papers meant for the election at Igarra, Edo State, in a bid to 
manufacture supporting evidence for their already declared result. These can 
hardly be said to be the actions of a competent and fair arbiter in an electoral 
contest.I6 
When institutions of the state encouraged disrespect for the law and indicated that 
impunity was worthwhile, ordinary citizens followed the examples set. Ordinary citizens 
were also more likely to resort to violence as a means of articulating grievances. 
As an indication of the apparent high demand for SALW in Nigeria, the News 
Agency of Nigeria (NAN) reported that the price of machetes fell by half in parts of 
Nigeria after the end of the April 2007 general elections because demand from thugs 
sponsored by politicians had subsided. The NAN surveyed prices in the northeastern state 
of Gombe and found that a good quality machete was selling for 400 naira ($3) compared 
with 800 naira before the election, which was characterized by politically motivated 
violence in many states. l7  
15 British Broadcasting Corporation, "What Nigerian Election Observers Say " (April 23,2007) 
http:llnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/afiicd6582979.stn1 (accessed on August 6 ,  2007) 
16 Abdul Rauf' Mustapha, "Nigerian After the April 2007 Elections: What Next?" Pambazuka org, 
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l 7  Reuters, "Price of'Machetes Drop After Elections" (July 2, 2007) 
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Dissatisfaction witkl the modalities for conducting elections, especially around the 
key question of who qualified as an Ivorian, was one of the causes of the break-out of 
civil war in Ivory Coast in 2001. Togo's presidential election in April 2005 led to 
political violence, the flight of 16, 500 people to neighboring Benin and ~ h a n a ' ~  and 
sever a1 deaths. '' 
Non-state actors (armed groups) 
It was ironic that West Africa, a region that did not engage in armed struggle to 
achieve independence, became home to numerous armed groups that wreaked death and 
mayhem and threatened regional stability. The reason for their emergence was simply 
attributable to bad governance on the part of the ruling class. The access of these groups 
to SALW enabled them to challenge the state's monopoly of the instruments of violence 
and led to collapsed or failed states. 
Florquin and Berman (2005) identified 35 active armed groups operating in West 
Africa between 1998 and 2004 - nine in Cote d71voire, one in The Gambia, two in 
Guinea, one in Guinea-Bissau, three in Liberia, two in Niger, twelve in Nigeria, one in 
Senegal, and four in Sierra Leone. These were pro-state, rebel or anti-state, and vigilante 
groups contracted to safeguard various financial, religious, communal and ethnic 
 interest^.^' Most of these armed groups still existed at the time of this research. 
The weapons used by these armed groups varied. There were AK-47s, Czech 
SAs, light machine guns, Czech Model 26s, Sten MK 2s, Rocket Propelled Grenades 
18 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Refugee Numbers Fleeing Togo Climb 
Steadily to 16,500," Unhcr org, May 2, 2005, http://unhcr.org/newsR\JEWS/427626ef4.htn1 (accessed 
August 8,2007) 
19 Ghanaweb com, "Togo: Violence in Togo's Presidential Campaign Kills 7," Ghanaweb corn, 
April 17,2005, htt~://www.~hanaweb.com/GhanaHomePane/NewsA chive/artikel.php?ID=79483 
(accessed August 8,2007) 
(RPG), MAT-49s, MG 36s, Berettas, HK G3s, Belgian FN-FALs, US M-16s, G3s, 
locally manufactured guns, pump-action shot guns, and other sophisticated European- 
made assault rifles". 
After the publication of the list by Florquin and Berman, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) was formed in December 2005. It became the 
highest profile and most sophisticated armed group in Nigeria in terms of weaponry and 
attacks on oil installations. The MEND challenged the Nigerian state with impunity by 
taking hostages, kidnapping oil workers, blowing up oil pipelines and engaging in oil 
bunkering. The Niger Delta of Nigeria had the largest concentration of armed groups in 
West Africa. Some were sponsored or hired by politicians for political objectives. As von 
Kemedi put it, "In the Niger Delta, election is a violent activity. It is not something you 
prepare for by campaigning or producing manifestos. You prepare for it by assembling 
guns, drugs and thugs."'2 Besides the well--known ones like the MEND, the Niger Delta 
Volunteer Force, the Niger Delta Vigilante, the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force, 
there were over one hundred (100) so-called "cults." These were originally student 
fraternities formed in the 1990s that had morphed into criminal gangs with SALW as 
their instrument of' demanding compliance. These cults included the Icelanders, 
Greenlanders, KKK, Germans, Dey Gbam, Mafia Lords, Vultures and the Martyrs 
Brigade. 
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Gangs) in the Niger Delta ,"Niger Delta Etonotnies c?f Violence Working Papers no 10 (2006), 14 
The restoration of peace, though fragile, in Liberia and Sierra Leone led to the 
disbanding of the armed groups in these countries. Rebel groups and the government in 
Cote d'Ivoire signed a peace accord in 2007, and the various pro and anti-government 
militias ceased hostilities and were observing the truce brokered by Burkina Faso in 
February 2007. The peace that was taking hold in Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone 
in no way gave room for absolute comfort. Both governments and rebel groups were 
known to renege on signed peace agreements. Secondly, members of these armed groups 
were mostly recruited from the ranks of disaffected youth or the lumpen-proletariat and 
could easily sell their skills to the next bidder who came with an attractive agenda. 
ceasefire 
Front for the Security of the 2002 PG - observing 
Table 1. Armed Groups in West Africa (1998-2005) 
Country Armed gcoup Year Current Status 
formed 
- 
Center-West (FSCO) ceasef'ire 
Front for the Liberation of the 2002 PG - observing 
Cote d' Ivoire 
Great West (FLGO) ceasef'ire - 
Young Patriots 2000s PG - observing 
New Forces 2003 AG - observing 
ceasefire 
Group of Patriots for Peace 2002 AG - observing 
The Gambia 
ceasefire 
Green Boys (formerly called 22 1999 PG - active 
July Movement) 
Guinea 
I Reconciliation and Democracv 
Young Volunteers 2000 PG - disbanded 
Movement of the Democratic 1996 AG - disbanded 
- 
Liberia 
I Movement for Democracy in 2003 AG - demobilized 
Forces of Guinea (RFDG) - 
Liberians United for 2000 AG - demobilized 
Nigeria 
Niger 
Bakassi Boys 1999 V - active 
O'odua People's Congress (OPC) 1994 V - active 
Arewa People's Congress (APC) 1999 V - active 
Liberia (MODEL) 
Government of Liberia militias 1997 PG - demobilized 
Niger Movement for Justice 2007 AG - active 
Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA) 1998 V - active -- 
Niner Delta Volunteer Force 1998 V - active 
2000 V - active -- 
V - active 
Emancipation 2005 V - active 
I Forces of' Casamance (MFDC) 
Senegal 
Al-Sunna Wal-Jamma 2002 V - active 
Zamfara State Vigilante Service 1999 V - active 
Movement of the Democratic 1982 AG-active 
I 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front 199 1 AG-demobilized 
. 
Civil Defence Forces (CDF) 1996 PG - demobilized 
West Side Boys (WSB) 2000 AG - disbanded 
Source: Data adapted from Small Arms Survey, 2006 
Key:  AG - Anti-gove~nment; PG - Pro-government; V - Vigilante 
Culture 
In many West ~ f r i c a n  societies, guns were an important part of their culture. For 
example, guns (typically single or double-barreled guns) were fired at funerals of chiefs 
and other prominent personalities, as well as on the birth of male children to signify joy. 
Such societies also had gun,-making clans, for example among the Dagomba and Gonja of 
Northern Ghana and the Ashanti. Guns were also a status symbol indicating masculinity 
or the ascension to manhood in some West African communities. 
Amongst nearly all West African societies, guns were also used for hunting game 
or for scaring off wild beasts and birds. The local blacksmiths were the main suppliers of 
guns to such communities. However, as Ivor Fung observed rather ominously, traditional 
hunters were turning increasingly to sophisticated military-style weapons for the pursuit 
of traditional hunting a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~  
Factors Facilitating Illegal Proliferation of SALW 
The long, porous, undermanned and undersurveilled borders and coastlines of 
West African countries were a major boost to elements who wanted to traffic in arms in 
the subregion. Apart from the few approved entry points, the rest of the borders were 
available for anybody willing to purvey weapons. For example, Nigeria shared a 932- 
mile land border with Niger and Chad to the North, about 621 miles with Benin to the 
west, 1056 miles with Cameroon in the east and had about 435 miles of coastline. As 
noted earlier, many West African countries shared borders with at least two states. As a 
result of their weak resource base, and occasionally dealing with the fallout from poor 
governance, security officials were overwhelmed. Moreover in recent times, owing to 
23 Richard Ivor Fwng, "Arms Control in the Cultural Context: Chances and Risks," (April 19, 
2003). http://www.inwent.or~!/ef-texte/arms/fUn.htm (accessed August 16, 2007) 
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pressure from the United States and the United Kingdom, these states also had to divert a 
lot of personnel and resources into monitoring and combating the drug trade. 
Countries bordering conflict zones like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast 
were subject to cross-border infiltration of arms and mercenaries. Nigeria shared a border 
to the north with the chronically unstable republic of Chad and Niger. Chad had been 
intermittently at civil war since 1965. Remnants of the rebel wars had drifted southwards 
into Nigeria over the past decade. Operating in large bands of 30 to 50 armed men they 
engaged in banditry on highways in northeast and central Nigeria. They also were 
available to contestants in land disputes as m e r ~ e n a r i e s ~ ~ .  Many of the arms smuggling 
rings operated out of Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Cameroon. In the Niger Delta 
smugglers used speedboats to connect with ships on the high seas, and then ferried the 
arms back to shore. Niger shared borders with seven countries, including Algeria that had 
been battling Islamic insurgents and terrorists since disputed elections there in 1991. The 
Tuareg rebel Niger Movement for Justice formed in February 2007 was based in northern 
Niger near the Algerian border. 
Compounding the issue of poorly manned borders was the presence of corrupt 
customs, gendarmes and police personnel who sometimes abetted the criminal activities 
of smugglers for personal enrichment. Generally all West African countries suffered from 
a weak security infrastructure that disabled them from effectively policing their air space, 
land and sea borders. In an indictment of Sub-Saharan Africa's surveillance capacity of 
its air space, Wood and Peleman (2000) observed that: 
Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, lacks sufficient skilled air traffic controllers, 
24 Integrated Regional Information Networks, Guns Out oJContro1 The Continuing Threat of 
Small Arms, IRlN IN-DEPTH (May 2006), 18 
radar equipment and trained personnel to monitor the vast air space between the 
southern border of Egypt and the northern borders of South Africa.. . Sub-Saharan 
air traffic control has been highly dependent on the selective intelligence and 
satellite capacity of the former colonial and major world powers and on the 
alertness of thinly spread airport inspectors and customs agents. In such an 
atmosphere arms smuggling thrives.25 
Weak Regulatory Framework 
In all West African countries there were, on paper, strict laws governing gun 
ownership, a legacy of colonial rule. Colonial authorities were strict on gun ownership 
mainly for self-serving reasons; the laws were designed to preempt native challenge to 
colonial rule. However, the enforcement of these laws was negligent or discriminatory.. In 
Burkina Faso, by Decree 2001, a civilian could possess a gun only with authorization by 
the sector Minister after the civilian's character had been vetted. Even if the vetting did 
not reveal any problem, the Minister might use his discretionary powers to deny 
authorization. This also applied to the manufacture of firearms and ammunition 
irrespective of whether they were imported or made in the country. Many people, 
especially politicians, used their personal influence to obtain authorizations for their 
supporters once the application had been deposited.26 Combined with poor record 
keeping this was a recipe for illegal diffusion of weapons. 
In Nigeria, the Firearms Act, enacted in 1959 and reviewed in 1995, regulated the 
production, import and export of small arms and light weapons. The Act prohibited the 
possession or control of firearms of certain categories except through a license granted by 
the President. Only registered firearms dealers could deal in arms or ammunition. The 
25 Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, "Making the Deal and Moving the Goods: The Role of 
Brokers and Shippers," in Runnlng Guns The Global Market m Small Arms, ed Lora Lumpe (London: Zed 
Books, 2000), 14 1 .  
26 Foundation for Security and Development in Africa, "Burkina Faso Small Arms Legislation: 
Overview of'Existing Legislation," FOCUS no 9 (May 2006): 12. 
importation or exportation of firearms or ammunition other than through prescribed 
seaports and airports was also unlawful. The manufacture, assembly or repair of firearms 
and ammunition could be undertaken only at a public armory or at arsenals of the 
military. The stringent control measures remained an aspiration because guns were 
available to all kinds of persons and from all manner of sources.27 
Apart from the immense challenges to the arms control regime from porous 
borders, smugglers, armed groups and international brokers, the Nigerian law itself had a 
number of inadequacies. There was no restriction on the quantity of weapons that could 
be held by a person or on the amount of ammunition that could be held at any one time. 
There also were no restrictions on how, where and when a firearm could be used, and 
there was no competency testing. No controls over brokers existed, and finally penalties 
for unlawful possession of firearms were not severely deterrent enough.28 
In Sierra Leone, the legal statute for the control over the production, import, 
export, transit and transfer of Small Arms and Light Weapons, that is, the Arms and 
Ammunition Ordnance of 1955, was outdated and did not meet contemporary security 
challenges, a fact acknowledged by the government.29 Sierra Leone's licensing procedure 
was highly centralized and protracted, leaving a lot of room for evasion, and the outdated 
*' Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers, "Nigerian Export Laws and Policies " (No date) 
http://www.nisat.or~/database info/countrv laws.asp?Kev=128 (accessed on August 19, 2007) 
*' Foundation for Security & Development in Afiica, "Nigeria: Overview of Arms and 
Ammunition Law," FOCUS no 10 (January 2007): 10 
29 Government ofthe Republic of Sierra Leone, National Report ofthe Republic ojSierra Leone 
on the Implementation ofthe UN Programme ofAction on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Lzght Weapons 
In All Its Aspects, (June 2005) http:lldisar~n1an1ent2.un.or~/cab/natio~1alrepo~s/2OO5/Sier~a%2OLeone.pdf 
(accessed August 22, 2007). 
penalties did not serve as a serious deterrent.30 
Senegal had a much more restrictive policy on weapon possession by civilians. 
Firearm possession was regulated by law 66-03 1966. According to Agboton-Johnson, et 
a1 (2004), the legislation prohibited production, import and export, trade, stockpiling, 
acquiring, possessing and transporting SALW, their ammunition and other separate parts, 
as well as any kind of specialized material that could be used to produce SALW, and 
established sanctions in the event of a b r e a ~ h . ~ '  Approval of licenses to possess a weapon 
was a protracted process. The license was valid for 3 years, after which the authorities 
could renew or withdraw the license. On average, a total of 120 licenses were granted per 
year.32 An unintended consequence of the restrictive nature of the legislation was that 
people turned to the black market to purchase SALW. The border with Guinea-Bissau 
and other neighboring countries and local markets was a ready source of supply of illicit 
weapons. Like all of West Africa, porous borders facilitated weapon infiltration. State 
organs dealing with SALW control were under-resourced financially and technically, 
while poorly compensated police and gendarmes did not effectively enforce the law.33 
Ghana's major legislation governing arms was the Arms and Ammunition Act, 
1962 (Act 1 18). According to Aning, it comprehensively regulated the possession and use 
of arms and ammunition in Ghana. The National Redemption Council Decree (NRCD 9) 
of 1972 improved the registration process but continued to prohibit the local manufacture 
30 United Nations Development Programme, Arms fir Development, Draft Annual Report 2004 
http:llwww.smallarmsnet.o1~/issues/regions/AFD2004sl.pdf (accessed August 22, 2007) 
3 1 Christiane Agboton-Johnson, Adedeji Ebo, and Laura Mazal, "Small Arms Control in Ghana, 
Nigeria and Senegal " htt~:/lwww.international-alert.org/publications/~etdata.~hp?doc~=Pdf&id=46 
(accessed August 23,2007) 
32 Ibid 
'' Ibid 
of arms. The law allowed blacksmiths to repair imported guns that were damaged in 
Ghana; however, the same law forbid them to manufacture weapons.34 Furthermore, 
Aning (2005) stated: 
The legislative regime allows two categories of arms importers in Ghana: those 
described as individual first class arms and ammunition dealers who import 
between 1,000 and 2,000 shotguns a year, and second-class importers who bring 
in fewer than 1,000 units a year. Annual shotgun imports in Ghana average 
20,000 units and are dominated by five major arms importers: Game Marketing 
Limited; Yadco Enterprise; Globart Teslria Enterprise; Bradco Trading & 
Associates; and Ampoma Ahwene Enterprise (GoG, 1999, p. 3). In 2003, new 
gun registrations fetched the Ghana Police Service 1.4 billion Cedis (USD 
155,000). At 250,000 Cedis per gun registration, this implies that only about 
5,600 guns are registered annually, which raises questions about the final 
destination of other imported guns. According to the Arms and Ammunitions 
report of 1999 (GoG, 1999), a disturbing number of guns imported into Ghana are 
then smuggled into other West African states.35 
Some licensed dealers or importers of shotguns were another source of weapon leakage 
into undesirable hands,. Licensed dealers under-reported stocks of weapons, both as a way 
of avoiding the taxman and the scrutiny of the police. The police in line with procedure 
were expected to witness the receipt of the arms imports, accompany the dealer to the 
designated warehouse and confirm the quantities received. The police were also expected 
to provide a lock for the warehouse and give a copy of the key to the arms dealer. These 
procedures had broken down, and most of the dealers did their transactions without the 
oversight of the police." Hopefully, with the passage of the Ghana National Commission 
on Small Arms and Light Weapons Act (Act 736) in May 2007, the Commission (a body 
34 Emmanuel Aning, "Home Made and Imported Guns," West AfYica (7th-13th July 2003): 18. 
35 Emmanuel Aning, "The Anatomy of Ghana's Secret Arms Industry," in Armed and Aimless 
Armed Groups, Guns andHuman Security In the ECOWAS Region, ed Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman 
(Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 95. 
36 Interview with a senior police officer of the Ghana Police Service, April 1 1, 2007 
to advise on the issue and possession of SALW) would move to lobby for the 
enforcement of the oversight function of the police. 
CHAPTER 6 
SOURCES OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS SUPPLY IN WEST 
AFRICA 
Before discussing the specific sources of SALW in West Africa, it is important to 
trace how SALW came to be so widespread and available. It was generally acknowledged 
that the Cold War unleashed SALW uncontrollably into many parts of the world, 
especially Africa, and into the hands of rogue states, warlords, rebels and human rights 
abusers. Africa, especially southern Africa, had been one of the fiercest battlefields of the 
proxy wars of the 1970s and 1980s. Both the West (USA and Europe) and the East (led 
by the ex-Soviet Union) supported client states (and factions) and armed them to the teeth 
in an attempt to carve out and maintain spheres of influence. 
The Cold War ended in 1989 with the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 
implosion of the Warsaw Pact that grouped together Eastern European countries in a 
military alliance. The countries and constituent republics of the Soviet Union that became 
independent found themselves with huge stocks of arms - both nuclear and conventional 
- and a weak capacity to manage the stockpile. Additionally, starved of cash because of 
the withdrawal of support from the Soviet Union, some of these former Warsaw Pact 
countries and ex-constituent republics began to dispose of surplus stocks of arms. 
During the Soviet era, the Ukraine was a key plank in the Soviet Union's defense strategy 
against a western North Atlantic Treaty Organization WATO) attack. Ukraine was 
equipped to maintain a standing army of 800,000, almost three times the size of Ukraine's 
military in 2005. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Ukraine inherited the Soviet 
stockpiles of military hardware intended for a military far larger than ~kraine 's . '  Like 
vultures flocking on a carcass, freelance arms merchants in partnership with army 
officers plundered the vast surplus stocks and sold them to whoever was willing to buy - 
including national armies and rebel armies in the hotspots of West and Central Africa. 
Leonid Minin, a notorious Ukrainian arms dealer, was the major arms supplier to 
Charles Taylor in the 1990s. Charles Taylor's rebellion against the Doe regime (began in 
1989) in Liberia opened the sluice gates of the arms dam in West Africa, thanks to his 
relationship with illegal arms brokers like Minin, Guus Kouwenhoven and the 
governments of Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. 
The State as a Maior Source of Weapons Supply 
The state in the West African context was a major source of supply or diffusion of 
weapons. It was the largest purchaser of legal weapons and the source of legal and illegal 
transfers. Armories of the state also held the largest stockpiles of arms. However, the 
state did not always live up to its responsibilities to keep weapons out of the reach of 
unauthorized users. Armories, especially police armories, were poorly guarded and 
inventories not properly maintained. Sometimes bandits raided the armories and stole 
weapons, and some rogue or corrupt security officials stole or rented state arms to 
criminals. 2 
One of the major sources of SALW proliferation in West Africa since the 1980s 
was the various coups and counter coups in West Africa (Ghana: 1966, 1967, 1972, 1979, 
I Public Broadcasting Service, "Sierra Leone-Gun Runners " Pbs org, May 2002, 
http://w~ww.phs.o~ ~f~ontlineworItl/~to~ies/~ierral~'ouc/n~inin.html (accessed August 29, 2007) 
2 Ahamefula Ogbu, "Robbers Raid Police Station, Cart away salaries," Th~sdayonllne corn , 
November 13,2006, httu://u ww.thisdayonline.cc~mlnview.phD?id=632OR (accessed August 29, 2007) 
1981; Nigeria: 1996, civil war of 1967- 1970, 1975, 1983, 1985; Mali: 1968, 1991 ; Niger: 
1974, 1996; Togo: 1965;-sierra Leone: 1967, 1968, 1992, 1996, 1997; Liberia: 1980, 
1990; Guinea: 1984; Guinea-Bissau: 1980, 1999, 2003; Ivory Coast: 1999, 2001; Benin: 
1963, 1965, 1967, 1972; The Gambia: 1980, 1994; Burkina Faso: 1966, 1980, 1982, 
The familiar routine involved dissident soldiers breaking into state armories and 
distributing weapons to their supporters and co-conspirators to strengthen their hand in 
the fighting. Armory guards were inevitably the first casualties. No matter the result of 
the fighting, a lot of' weapons fell into the wrong hands and were hardly ever recovered or 
accounted for. Defeated soldiers abandoned their weapons in order to flee faster, and 
rogue elements also sold some. During the ensuing power vacuum in the immediate coup 
period, inventory management was poor and weapons leaked into the larger society. 
A peculiar feature of the coups in West Africa, especially in the 1980s, was that 
junior officers led them. This was true in Ghana, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Liberia and 
Burkina Faso. These regimes, initially very populist, also helped to diffuse arms into 
civilian hands by arming their civilian supporters. Musah (2004) argued that "the advent 
of junior officers coups further exacerbated arms diffusion, introduced arms possession to 
the civilian youth - radical students, workers' leaders and the marginalized sections of the 
urban population - and increased gun-related civilian casualty  rate^."^ 
In Ghana, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) government (1982- 
1992) armed some members of the Committees for the Defence of' the Revolution 
(CDRs) and the Civil Defence Organization (popularly called Peoples Militia) to counter 
"del-~atau Musah, "Africa: The Political Economy of Small Arms and Conflicts " (no date) 
http://unpan I .un.ol r/intradoc/tr1oups/p~1blic/documcnts/idt.p/uti~~a11003406 p(if (accessed on August 29, 
2007) 
the activities of smugglers, dissident soldiers and other "counter-revolutionary  force^".^ 
No records were kept or, even if they were kept, they were done improperly. Interviews 
by the author with officials of the Ghana Army and Police revealed that stockpile 
management in the early years of the PNDC was poor.5 The same strategy was pursued in 
Burkina Faso under Captain Thomas Sankara and Blaise Compaore between 1983 and 
1987 when they also armed members of their defense committees. 
Returning peacekeepers were known to smuggle weapons back to their home 
countries and sell them. According to Florquin and Berman, poorly paid Nigerian soldiers 
who had served in peacekeeping missions in other African countries, such as Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, often returned home and sold their weapons to combatants or gun  dealer^.^ 
Sometimes they sold them back in the conflict zone. 
External Government Support to Rebel Factions 
Another source of weapons supply in West Africa was state supply of weapons to 
factions engaged in internal conflict, particularly in neighboring countries. This was 
clearly evident in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. 
Guinea was a supporter of the rebel Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Development (LURD) since 1999. In 2002, the Charles Taylor government conducted 
investigations after. it captured 81mm mortar rounds from LURD rebels in Lofa County. 
The investigation traced the rounds to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE, upon 
Personal knowledge The author was the regional coordinator of the Committees for the Defence 
of the Revolution in the Upper East Region of Ghana from 1983- 1990. 
Colonel J B.E Guyiri. "The Menace of Armed Robbery in Ghana: A Case study of Ghana" 
(Post-Graduate Diploma thesis, Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, Accra, 2005), 
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Eric Berman and Nicolas Florquin, .'Armed Groups and Small Arms in ECOWAS Member 
States (1 998-2004)," in Armed and Almless Armed Groups, Guns and Human Security in the ECOWAS 
Region, ed Nicolas Florquin and Eric Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 341 
inquiry from Liberia, acknowledged that they were part of a military assistance package 
to Guinea in 1998.~ It should be noted that the government of Guinea had signed the 
ECOWAS Moratorium on the exportation, importation and manufacture of SALW in 
1998 at the same time Guinea was busy arming the LURD rebels. In late 2003 Guinea 
supplied more weapons to the (LURD) in their second attempt to enter Monrovia and 
oust Charles Taylor. The Guinean Ministry of Defense imported weapons (including 
bullets, rocket-propelled grenades and mortar rounds) from Iran in mid-2003 and 
arranged for these to be forwarded to the LURD rebels. Ivory Coast also recruited 
mercenaries and supported the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel 
The Liberian government itself was the beneficiary of' weapons airlifts from Libya 
via Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast beginning from 1989. The government of Guinea was 
faced with Liberian-sponsored incursions by RUF rebels, dissident soldiers and Liberian 
soldiers in 2000-2001. Because of'the inability of the regular army to contain the Liberian 
incursions, the government of Guinea mobilized and armed an estimated 30,000 Guinean 
youth known as the Young ~o lun t ee r s .~  Though not all the Young Volunteers were 
armed, not all those who were armed returned their weapons after the invaders were 
repulsed. Furthermore, according to Milner, besides looting from the state armory, the 
second most significant source of small arms illegally circulating in Guinea were those 
arms that were officially issued by the Guinean military but never returned at the end of 
' Human Rights Watch, "Weapons, Sanctions, Military Supplies and Human Suffering: Illegal 
Arms Flows to Liberia and the June-July 2003 Shelling of Monrovia," Human Rights Watch Briefing 
Paper, (November 3,2003), 12-32 
James Milner, "The Militarization and Demilitarization of Refugee Camps in Guinea," in Armed 
nrzd Awnless Armed Groups, Guns and Human Security in the ECOWAS Reglon, ed Nicolas Florquin and 
Eric Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 167 
military service. Guinean law did not always require retiring police or army officers to 
return their service weapon upon retirement. Those weapons routinely leaked to criminal 
elements. 9 
The government of Guinea-Bissau had been suspected fbr a long time of 
providing arms to the separatist Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance 
(MFDC) operating in the Casamance region of southern Senegal. On June 5,  1998, 
President Joao Bernardo Vieira fired the head of'the armed forces, General Ansumane 
Mane, accusing him of allowing arms to be smuggled to rebels in the southern 
Senegalese province of Casamance. In the factional fighting that ensued, the MFDC 
helped Mane's forces fight President Joao Bernardo Vieira, while Vieira's forces were 
supported by Senegalese and Guinean troops. 
At the time of this research, Guinea-Bissau was the weakest link in the fight to 
stem SALW proliferation and the drug (cocaine) trade. The country had a major SALW 
problem owing to its long and bitter armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism. After 
the departure of the colonialists, Guinea-Bissau (like post-Soviet Ukraine) was saddled 
with more arms than it needed for its security needs. A lot of those weapons found their 
way out and oiled the SALW supply route to the Cassamance rebels in Senegal. The 
country of Guinea-Bissau was mired in chronic poverty and political instability. Its 
coastline was full of uninhabited islands, creeks and swamps, thereby providing perfect 
cover for drug smugglers and gunrunners. Lamentably, the Guinea-Bissau police did not 
have vehicles, patrol boats, computers, or even handcuffs. 
James Milner, "The Militarization and Demilitarization of Refugee Camps in Guinea," in Armed 
and Aimless, Armed Grozips, Guns and Human Security in the ECO WAS Region, ed. Nicolas Florquin and 
Eric Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 167. 
According to the UN Panel of Experts on Ivory Coast, militants of the rebel 
Forces Nouvelle of the Ivory Coast were accused of selling weapons to people in the 
Ghanaian border village of Saru in order to purchase food, cars and other consumer items 
in 2005. The Malian authorities also accused the Forces Nouvelle of also being 
responsible for smuggling SALW to Mali on motorcycles using unapproved ro~l tes . '~  
Governments in the subregion often supported coupists in neighboring countries. 
It was a truism in international relations that every government wanted a friendly 
government in the neighboring country. Liberia under Charles Taylor (under the bidding 
of Libya's Gaddafi) supported a coup in the Gambia in 1990 and later armed and 
financed the murderous Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. The Sierra Leonean 
government, itself besieged by rebels, organized and armed traditional hunters of the 
Mende ethnic group known as the Kamajors into what became known as the Civil 
Defence Force. After the conclusion of the civil war, it was common knowledge that not 
all Kamajors returned their weapons. 
Ghana under the PNDC was said to have supplied weapons (donated by Libya) to 
Thomas Sankara and Blaise Cornpaore of Burkina (then known as Upper Volta) to 
overthrow the government of Jean-Baptiste Ouedraogo in 1983.'' l 2  The PNDC had geo- 
strategic reasons for supporting the coup in Upper Volta. The incipient PNDC 
government was hemmed in on all its three land borders (Upper Volta to the north, Ivory 
'O United Nations, Panel oj Experts Report on Cote d'lvoire Sl20051699 (November 7, 2005), 
paragraphs 76-77 
" Napoleon Abdi~lai, Introdc~ction to Small Arms (Accra: Foundation for Security and 
Development in Africa), 29. 
l 2  Abdel-Fatau Musah, "Small Arms and Conflict Transformation in West Afiica," in Over a 
Barrel Light Weapons and Human Rights in the Commonwealth, ed Abdel-Fatau Musah and Niobe 
Thompson (London: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 1999), 1 17 
Coast to the west and Togo to the east) by hostile governments who offered sanctuary to 
dissident soldiers of the regime. Therefore, it needed breathing space on its northern 
border by having a friendly government. After the success of the coup in Upper Volta, 
dissident Ghanaian soldiers and anti-PNDC elements based there relocated elsewhere. 
According to the Small Arms Survey, the "ant trade" complemented regional 
leaders' supply of weapons to various armed groups. The "ant trade" referred to the 
steady trickle of weapons from one destination to another - arms bought legally in one 
country then smuggled in bits to another. It was a significant source of SALW and was 
sometimes linked with larger-scale trafficking. Warri, the capital of Delta State, was a 
notorious center of such trade, supplying smugglers from Guinea-Bissau, Gabon and 
Cameroon. ' ? 
Arms Brokers and Dealers 
Working hand-in-hand with states, warlords and rebel leaders was the critical link 
in the illicit traffic in the SALW trade - brokers. These were middlemen who organized 
arms transactions between two or more parties - bringing together, "buyers, sellers, 
transporters, financiers and insurers to make a deal, particularly where the parties are 
divided by culture, politics and o r ~ ~ e o ~ r a ~ h ~ . " ' ~  Brokering was a profit-driven industry; 
it was not politically or ideologically driven. Brokers profited from both buyers and 
purchasers. Very few countries had legal instruments to regulate these brokers, partly 
because they were not arms traders in the strict sense of the description. Often they were 
- - -  - - 
l 3  Graduate Institute of International Studies, Small Arms Survey 2006 Unfin~shed Business 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 222 
l4 Brian Wood and Johan Peleman. "Making the Deal and Moving the Goods - the role of broke~s 
and shippers" in Running Guns, the Global Market in Small Arms, ed Lora Lumpe (London: Zed Books, 
2000). 129. 
not defined as a specific category under national arms export laws of states.I5 Not all 
brokers were engaged in i-llegal or dubious activities. According to Wood and Peleman, 
generally those brokers who were operating outside their home countries on behalf of 
dubious clients tried to locate cheap supplies of arms in states that lacked the capacity to 
properly control stocks and arms exports. Alternatively, they tried to operate where 
"governance is so weak that there is no manifest political will to exercise proper 
contr01.'"~ 
The United States had the toughest, most comprehensive and far-reaching 
legislation on arms brokers at the time of this research. The U.S. law regulated arms 
brokering activity by any U.S. citizen (whether in the US or abroad) or person otherwise 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction, engaging in brokering activities at home or abroad, and also 
of foreigners located in the United States who conducted arms brokering activities. The 
brokers were required both to register as arms brokers and to apply for a license fbr each 
brokering activity. The law also provided severe penalties for default. 
Brokers had a sordid record in busting arms embargoes and delivering their 
dead1 y merchandise to the killing fields of West Africa. Using fbrged or false documents 
(for example end-user certificates), front companies enlisted the help of corn~pt officials. 
Exploiting weak controls, the brokers were adept at avoiding scrutiny. In Africa, they 
often used aircraft and the air cargo industry, filing false flight plans, submitting 
l5  Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, "Making the Deal and Moving the Goods: The Role of 
Brokers and Shippers," in Runn~ng Gilns. The Global Market In Small Arms, ed Lora Lumpe (London: Zed 
Books, 2000), 129. 
l 6  Ibid 
fraudulent documents, and flying improperly registered aircraft to execute their deals. 
Arms were found described in air freight documents as agricultural equipment, spare 
parts, fish, tents and second-hand clothing.18 
False end-user certificates were a major weapon in their arsenal. An end user- 
certificate, vital as a license for the sale of military equipment, indicated that the recipient 
was the authorized beneficiary ofthe shipment and undertook not to resell, export or 
transfer to any other party or state, without the seller's permission. Vines (2005) 
indicated that, investigations by UN panels and investigative journalists since 2000 had 
found the following examples of end-user certificates being used in attempts to procure 
weapons: 
1. An end-user certificate was issued in Burkina Faso that authorized a brokering 
company registered in Gibraltar, Engineering and Technical Company Ltd. to 
obtain arms. The certificate was used to obtain authorization for the shipment of 
68 tons of defense equipment and ammunition to Burkina Faso in March 1999. 
The arms shipment ended up in Liberia. 
2. A series of end-user certificates for PECOS Company, registered in Guinea, were 
used to obtain military equipment for Liberia in a series of shipments from 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Slovakia in 2000 and 200 1. 
3. An end-user certificate from CSte d'Ivoire enabled a Moscow company, 
Aviatrend, to ship five million cartridges from the Ukraine. These were diverted 
to Liberia in July 2000. 
4. Two fake end-user certificates from Nigeria were used as the basis for shipments 
of 200 tons of weapons from Zastava in Serbia to Liberia via the broker Temex in 
2002. 
5. Two Ukrainians and a Russian national registered two companies in Ghana: Life 
and Technologies Ghana Ltd and Yuri-M, a plastics company in Accra. Through 
this network they organized the production of false letterhead and fake official 
17 Human Rights Watch. "No Questions Asked: The Eastern Europe Arms Pipeline to Liberia," 
(November 15,2001) Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, 
'' Brian Wood and Johan Peleman, "Making the Deal and Moving the Goods: The Role of 
Srokers and Shippers," in Running Guns. The Global Market in Small Arms, ed. Lora Lumpe (London: Zed 
Books, 2000), 140 
stamps of the Ghanaian defense and foreign ministries in order to create a fake 
end-user certificate to sell arms from Russia and Ukraine to Pakistan in 2003.19 
The brokers were of varying nationalities -- the former Eastern Europe (Ukraine, 
Armenia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia), Belgium, The Netherlands, Lebanon and the United 
Kingdom) -- and backgrounds: ex-military officers, intelligence officers and 
businessmen. The most notorious of them in the West African context included Victor 
Bout, Leonid Minin, Guus Kouwenhoven and Sanjivan Ruprah. 
Victor Bout 
Victor Bout, a Ukrainian known as "Africa's Merchant of Death," was a former 
KGB (ex-Soviet Secret Service) officer and arms broker. He used at least five aliases and 
different versions of' his last name (Butt, Bont, Buttee, Boutov). Bout's operations first 
gained suspicion when his Liberian-registered aircraft were based at Ostend airport in 
Belgium in 1995. He left Ostend in 1997 after a UN and Belgian investigation into 
allegations that a number of aging Russian planes were supplying arms to the Hutu 
extremists responsible for the Rwandan genocide. Bout's intricate and elusive network 
was identified as supplying arms to Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. Since the early 1990s, according to a UN Report, Bout "oversees a 
complex network of over 50 planes, tens of' airline companies, cargo charter companies 
and freight-forwarding companies, many of' which are involved in shipping illicit 
cargo."20 Bout's fleet of ex-Soviet planes, registered as Air Cess, was used to deliver 
attack helicopters, armored vehicles and anti-tank mines to Liberia, which supported the 
l 9  Alex Vines, "Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa," International Affairs 81, 
no 2 (March 2005), 346. 
'O United Nations, Report ojthe Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, S/2000/1 195 (Dec 2000), 
paragraph 229 
RUF rebels in neighboring Sierra ~ e o n e . ~ '  Refer~ing to Bout, Peter Hain, a minister at 
the British Foreign Office, remarked: 
Bout is the leading merchant of death who is the principal conduit for planes and 
supply routes that take arms, including heavy military equipment, from east 
Europe, principally Bulgaria, Moldova, and Ukraine, to Liberia and Angola. The 
UN has exposed Bout as the centre of a spider's web of shady arms dealers, 
diamond brokers, and other operatives, sustaining the wars. Without someone like 
him we would be much, much, closer to ending the conflicts.22 
Now based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Bout successfully eluded prosecution for 
arms trafficking, partly because of the inadequacy of most national laws that regulated 
arms brokering and arms transporting a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~ ~  
Leonid Minin 
In the 1990s, the Ukrainian-Israeli Leonid Minin was the major broker of arms to 
Liberia. Minin was named in various UN reports on Liberia and Sierra Leone for selling 
arms to Charles Taylor and the RUF in violation of UN embargoes. As documented by 
the UN Panel of Experts in March 1999, a shipment of 68 tons of Ukrainian weapons, 
including 715 boxes of weapons and cartridges, 408 boxes of' cartridge powder anti-tank 
weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and rocket propelled grenades and their launchers, were 
sent to Burkina Faso using false end-user certificates operated by a British company, Air 
Foyle, under a contract organized by a company registered in Gibraltar. The weapons in 
question, however, were not retained in Burkina Faso. They were temporarily off-loaded 
in Ouagadougou, and some were trucked to Bobo Dioulasso. The bulk of them were 
The Guardian, "Africa's Merchant of Death," (December 23, 2000) 
h t t~ : / /~vww.euurd ja~~.co .~~k/ in tc~  national/>to~ p/O2.3 15 125.00.htn1l (accessed September 4, 2007). 
22 Ibid 
23 Control Arms, "UN Arms Embargoes: An Overview of the Last Ten Years," Control Arm5 
Briefing Note, ( 16 March 2006), 4 
shipped within a matter of days to Liberia in an aircraft owned by   in in.^^ 
In August 2000,  ini in was arrested in Italy. In June 2001, he was charged with 
arms trafficking and the illegal possession of diamonds. He was found with contracts, 
faxes documenting arms deals, weapons catalogues, and forged end-user certificates. 
According to Kruger, the documents revealed that Minin facilitated a shipment of arms in 
June 2000 at the request of' General Robert Guei, the then leader of the Ivory Coast. Some 
of the weapons were meant for Ivory Coast, but the bulk of the shipment was to be passed 
on to Liberia, which was then under an international arms embargo. Guei had signed an 
end-user certificate, authenticating the transnational shipments of goods. The following 
week, Minin arranged a million-dollar purchase AK-47 rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, 
night-vision goggles and other equipment, as well as five million rounds of ammunition. 
One hundred and thirteen tons (1 13) tons of weapons - only a part of the total package - 
were loaded and ferried to the Ivory Coast. While records showed that Guei kept some of 
the weapons, the remainder was transported to Liberia by a smaller aircraft, leased 
through another set of rnidd~emen.~' 
Minin's arrest halted the transfer of the remaining weapons. He was later released 
on the grounds that the prosecution lacked jurisdiction on his arms trafficking activities 
because the arms transfers did not pass through Italy. 
24 United Nations, Report of the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone S/2000/1 195, (December 2000), 
paragraphs 203-207 
25 John Kruger, "Merchants of- Death: In a Booming Business, Small-arms Brokers Make a 
Killing," International Economy Publications, (St~mmer 2002) 
http:l/findal ticles.coin/~~/articIcs/~ni ni2633/is 3 16/ai 898 It5300 (accessed September 5, 2007) 
Guus Kouwenhoven 
Described by the UN Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone as a member of President 
Taylor's inner circle, Guus Kouwenhoven was "responsible for the logistical aspects of 
many of the arms deals."26 1n his position as Director of Operations of the Oriental 
Timber Company (OTC), a Malaysian lumber company, Kouwenhoven managed the 
biggest timber operations in Liberia; it was said to control up to 40 percent of the 
country's valuable hardwood rainforests. Through the OTC, he was alleged to have run a 
private militia of 2,500 men and boys. Kouwenhoven's company used a fleet of ships to 
export tons of tropical hardwoods to Greece, France and China. His ships would come 
late at night into the port of Buchanan, offload Serbian and Chinese arms, bought via a 
Russian arms dealer and regular at Kouwenhoven's Hotel Africa, and then reload in the 
morning with freshly-felled rainforest timber.27 Then he organized the transfer of 
weaponry by truck from Monrovia into Sierra Leone. 
Based on its investigations, the United Nations issued an order in 2001 banning 
Kouwenhoven from traveling, designating him as an arms trafficker in breach of 
Resolution 1343 of the Security Council and a major supporter of ex-President Taylor's 
efforts to destabilize Sierra Leone in order to gain illegal access to its diamondse2* 
Guus Kouwenhoven was arrested in the Netherlands on 18 March 2005 and 
sentenced by a Dutch court on June 7,2006, to 8 years for violating the arms embargoes 
on Liberia and Sierra Leone. As of the time of this research, he was the only covert arms 
- - -  
" United Nations, Report oj the Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, S/2000/1195, (December 
2000), paragraph 2 15 
27 Daniel Howden, "Charles Taylor's Financier in the Dock," (May 28, 2006) 
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" Trial Watch, "Guus Van Kouwenhoven," (no date). httn:llt+w\v.trial-ch.org/e~l/tri~~i- 
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dealerbroker who had been successfully prosecuted. 
Sanjivan Ruprah 
Sanjivan Ruprah, a Kenyan national of Indian descent, was another of Africa's 
notorious arms brokers. He was named in the UN Report on Sierra Leone as illegally 
supplying weapons to the brutal rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of' Sierra Leone 
in clear breach of international sanctions, especially UN Security Council Resolution 
1343 of 2001. In the Sierra Leonean civil war, the RUF gained notoriety for mass 
killings, hacking of limbs, rape, and torture. According to the UN, Ruprah introduced the 
private military company, Executive Outcomes, to the Sierra Leonean government then 
led by Captain Valentine Strasser. From May to December 1995, Executive Outcomes (in 
reality a mercenary outfit) helped the Sierra Leonean government fight the RUF for a 
contract fee of $13.5 million. This contract was renewed in April 1996 for twenty more 
months at a cost of $35.2 million.29 Ruprah was hunting with the hounds and running 
with the hare, that is, supporting both the rebel RUF and the government at the same time 
with weapons, thereby making his cut, mostly from diamonds, at both ends. 
According to the UN, he worked closely with "Africa's merchant of death," 
Victor Bout, who supplied weapons from Eastern Europe to the rebels in exchange for 
diamonds. A confidante of Charles Taylor, Ruprah traveled using a Liberian diplomatic 
passport in the name of Samir M. Nasr that identified him as Liberia's Deputy 
Commissioner for Maritime ~ f f a i r s . ~ '  The passport made it easier for him to avoid the 
29 Abdel-Fatau Musah, "Small Arms and Conflict Transfitrmation in West Afiica," in Over a 
Barrel. Light Weapon5 and Hitman Rlghts in the Cornrnonwealth, ed. Abdel-Fatau Musah and Niobe 
Thompson (London: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 1999), 126. 
30 United Nations, Report Of The Panel Of Experts on Slerrn Leone S/2000/1 195 (December 
2000), paragraph 226 
travel ban imposed by the United Nations. 
In February 2002, Ruprah, was arrested and charged in Brussels with criminal 
association and traveling on a false British passport. He had also attracted the attention of 
the United States in its global "war on tenor." According to The East African, a Kenyan 
online news medium, the arrest was untimely for the United States since Ruprah was in 
frequent contact with US authorities with whom he was trying to negotiate a deal to talk 
about past weapons deliveries to the Taliban and possibly Al-Qaeda. 
Ruprah was later released and jumped bail in Belgium. He was arrested again in 
northern Italy on August 2,2002, and investigated on the same charges as in Belgium. 
Italian authorities deemed him a flight risk and moved him to a high-security prison near 
Milan. However, the Italian authorities indicated that Ruprah was likely to be released 
since the charges were not serious enough to keep him incarcerated. In September 2002, 
Ruprah was released from jail.?' 
With the exception of Kouwenhoven who was incarcerated, all the other big-time 
illegal arms dealers and brokers were free and able to ply their deadly merchandise. As 
long as they remained free, West Africa continued to provide a market for them. Indeed, 
the Niger Delta was a fertile market for them. 
Local Craft Industries 
West Africa had a thriving craft blacksmithing industry going back hundreds of 
years. These blacksmiths were primarily manuf'acturers of agricultural equipment (hoes, 
cutlasses, and ploughs) and guns. Guns were used for both hunting and for ceremonial 
purposes. In more bygone times the blacksmiths also manufactured weapons for their 
3' East African, "How the Slippery Victor Bout Baffled SA Authorities," (January 6, 2003) 
I-lttn://www.r~ationaudio.com/NrwsEast1Aliicnnl1 30 1200'1Featu1es/Mapa~ine060 I2003 14.html (accessed 
on September 5,2007) 
kingdoms. Guns were crucial to the creation and consolidation of many centralized West 
African kingdoms (e.g., the Hausa States, Oyo Benin, Dahomey, Ashanti, Akyem, 
Yoruba, Gonja, Dagbon, and Mandingo) thanks to blacksmiths and other ironworkers. 
The fabrication of iron tools and weapons facilitated the development of systematized 
agriculture, efficient hunting, and successful warfare necessary to sustain large urban 
centers. 32 
West African blacksmiths' ability to replicate foreign manufactured weapons goes 
back at least a century. Their current reputation for replication should therefore be no 
surprise. According to Gueye, up to 1876 Samory Toure (founder of the Malinke Empire 
of Ouassoulou, which spread from Guinea to Niger) armed his troops with guns, which 
the local blacksmiths could repair themselves. However, from 1876 onwards, he began to 
order more modern European weapons, mainly from Sierra Leone, and carefully studied 
them to find those that were most suitable for his area. From 1885, he replaced the 
Chassepot rifles, whose big cartridges soon rotted in the humidity of the area, with the 
lighter Gras and Kropatscheks rifles. These two types of rifle remained the backbone of 
his arsenal until the 1880s because he was able to train a group of' blacksmiths who could 
effectively copy those rifles.33 
In rural West Africa, blacksmiths were a respected category because of'their role 
in the rural economy. Those blacksmiths recently attracted additional scrutiny because of 
their ability to manufacture SALW, sometimes with remarkable sophistication, which 
supplied the arsenals of land guards, criminals and bandits and even law-abiding citizens 
32 Emma George Ross, "The Age of Iron in West Africa," (October 2002) 
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(accessed September 6 ,  2007). 
who wanted to protect themselves. Their trade was male-dominated and largely secretive. 
Ghana, Mali and Nigeria were home to some of these accomplished craftsmen. 
According to Aning, Ghana particularly deserved scrutiny because of its "long- 
standing and socially-embedded tradition" of gun manufacturing. His 2004 study of the 
craft industry in Ghana revealed the following: 
1. All ten regions in Ghana were home to workshops with gun- 
manufacturing capability. 
2. On average, each of these had the capacity to produce approximately 80 
guns annually - although production varied greatly depending on demand. 
3. Guns were manufactured in conformity with imported ammunition 
available on the open market. 
4. Gunsmiths were also engaged in the production of a variety of other, 
mainly agricultural products, which provided opportunities for 
technological reconversion. Gun production, however, clearly constituted 
their most profitable activity. 
5. A thriving group of middlemen exported craft guns to other countries in 
the region. The destinations included Nigeria, CSte d'Ivoire, and Togo. 
This trade appeared to be limited to individuals, and there was no evidence 
that armed groups elsewhere in the region actively sought to obtain 
Ghanaian craft weapons. 
6. Craft guns were used by some of Ghana's vigilante groups, landguards, 
and criminals. 
7. In Ghana, the prohibition of craft gun production had not prevented the 
industry from growing. Rather, it had forced gunsmiths to organize into 
sophisticated and secretive  network^.?^ 
The availability of locally manufactured guns led to calls by some people that the 
industry be legalized so that government could monitor their operations. Legalizing the 
craft industry to manufacture guns was a dangerous proposition, more so as there was no 
method of marking and tracing currently in place. Legalization would only lead to more 
crime. 
According to the Africa Security Dialogue and Research, even though 
34 Emmanuel Aning, "The Anatomy of Ghana's Secret Arms Industry," in Armed and Aimless 
Armed Groups, Guns and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, ed Nicholas Florquin and Eric Berman 
(Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 80 
ammunition for craft guns was available locally, most of it was imported. Local gun 
manufacturers commonly manufactured guns based on the type of ammunition provided 
by the customer. The most popular and easily available types of ammunition were the 12- 
bore cartridge and 410 caliber cartridges for shotguns.35 
The Ghana-Togo-Benin-Nigeria border route was a notorious route for SALW 
trafficking. The Ivory Coast, which was embroiled in civil conflict since 2001, was 
another destination of locally manufactured guns. To outwit border agents, smugglers 
chose to smuggle parts of a gun in bits or by different persons. Another strategy was for 
clients of a noted local manufacturer to invite the gunsmith (or manufacturer) to the 
client's town outside Ghana for him to manufacture the guns in  sit^.^^ 
Recycled Weapons 
Recycled weapons from conflict areas remained a major source of supply of 
SALW. This was a testament to the incompleteness or inadequacies of' disarmament 
programs, the durability of SALW and the mercenary character of' some rebels or (more 
appropriately) career fighters. Liberia again provided a laboratory for demonstrating the 
veracity of this assertion. Liberian fighters were known to have fought in the Sierra 
Leonean civil war, and some later moved to Ivory Coast when the civil war broke out 
there in 2001. 
Refugees 
In September 2004, Ghanaian security officials acting on reports raided the 
Liberian refugee camp at Buduburam (home to 42,000 refugees) near Accra and 
conducted a search for weapons and "mercenary rebels bent on upsetting Ghana's 
35 Africa Security Dialogue & Research, Illicit Small Arms in Ghana: A Baseline Assessment 
(Accra: UNDP), 16. 
36 Authors field research interviews in Ghana. 
December general  election^."^^ No weapons were found. Whether this was paranoia or 
the government acting on questionable intelligence, it underscored the perception that 
refugees could play a role in supplying weapons, even though they themselves were 
victims of violence caused by SALW. 
Edward Mogire (2004) noted that "refugee militarization" - ~efugee camps and 
populations that were characterized by storage and trafficking of arms, the presence of 
active and ex-combatants, recruitment, military training and the use of camps as military 
bases - was neither new nor confined to a specific region. Militarization of refugees could 
occur among others, when the refugee flow was composed of civilians as well as active 
and ex-corn bat ant^.^' 
Refugees were not a significant source of SALW in West Africa. By 1999, 
Guinea was host to 450,000 refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone. When Charles 
Taylor sponsored armed inc~~rsions into Guinea, suspicion fell on some refugees as 
possible collaborators, thus provoking hostility from ordinary Guineans and the 
government. However, as Milner's 2005 study showed, refugees were not responsible for 
the huge SALW proliferation in Guinea. SALW proliferation was attributable to looting 
from the state armory and the Guinean practice of allowing retiring service personnel to 
retain their service weapons. Guinea hosted the largest number of Liberian and Sierra 
Leonean refugees, but the evidence did not show that refugees contributed to SALW 
37 Karen Palmer, "Fear and Loathing in Ghana," (19 September, 2004) 
~://~v~~~.ghan~~~~cb.com/C~hanaHomet-'are/NewsA~chiveia~ tikcl.phtp?II)=h6237 (accessed September 9. 
2007) 
38 Edward Mogire, A Prel~rnmary Exploration o j  the Linkages Between Rejilgee~ and Small Arms 
(Bonn: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2004), 19-22 
trafficking in Guinea. 39 
It became obvious from the research that the trade and trafficking in SALW was a 
complicated and shadowy business undertaken by unscrupulous persons. For brokers, the 
lives of people did not matter, only profits did. Illegal arms brokering involved multiple 
companies and individuals, and above all was transnational. National and international 
laws were inadequate to bring the merchants of death to justice. There was the need for a 
global consensus to curb their activities. 
Additionally, as long as there was a demand for SALW, there would always be 
people to supply them. West African governments needed to ensure through their 
governance processes that people did not feel too aggrieved to the point that they would 
take up arms to right a wrong, perceived or real. At the time of the research, Tuareg 
rebels were battling the governments of Niger and Mali. The government of Niger 
particularly did not want to negotiate with the rebels and instead referred to them as 
bandits, even though the rebels claimed that they were taking up arms because they had 
been excluded from participation in Niger's economic and political life. The lack of 
political space and exclusion were what encouraged frustrated groups and individuals to 
want to acquire SALW in order to secure a seat at the dinner table. It was in this light that 
all states were urged to give concrete expression to their adoption in December 2001 of 
the Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy that addressed the root 
causes of conflicts. 
39 James Milner, "The Militarization and Demilitarization of Refugee Camps in Guinea," in Armed 
and Aimless Armed Groups, Guns and Human Secur~ty in the ECO WAS Region, ed Nicolas Florquin and 
Eric Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2005), 170 
CHAPTER 7 
ECOWAS INITIATIVES IN COMBATING SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT 
WEAPONS 
West Africa had an estimated eight million illicit small arms in circulation. These 
illicit arms were in the possession of armed groups, ethnic militias, vigilantes, bandits, 
land guards, private security companies, m s  dealers and individuals wishing to protect 
themselves. This chapter examines how the subregion initially became flooded with 
SALW and the measures that ECOWAS developed - the 1998 Moratorium banning the 
import, export and manufacture of SALW, arms embargoes and disarmament - to check 
their proliferation. 
The civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Ivory Coast were all 
launched and sustained by small arms, leading to thousands of deaths, maiming, 
destruction of critical infrastructure, refugees and internally displaced persons. Indeed, 
the Liberian civil war launched in December 1989 by Charles Taylor opened the 
floodgates for SALW into West Africa. West Africa did not have a significant SALW 
problem before the Liberian civil war. Taylor prosecuted his war with arms consignments 
donated by Libya and delivered by President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso With his 
control of timber and access to Sierra Leonean diamonds Taylor bartered those natural 
resources for more arms. 
As if spreading havoc in Liberia was not enough, he sponsored, armed and 
financed the brutal RUF in Sierra Leone who proceeded to cause mayhem in Sierra 
Leone for nearly a decade. The RUF also conducted cross-border raids on refugee 
settlement camps in Guinea. Such was the gravity of the situation in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone that the United Nations placed them under arms embargoes in 1992 and 1997, 
respectively. Guinea also felt Taylor's wrath as he armed and financed dissidents to 
invade Guinea in 2000. This provoked counter military responses from Guinea through 
the provision of military hardware to the anti-Taylor rebel group, the Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). 
The 1998 ECOWAS Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Esportation and 
Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa 
The pacific moves by former Malian President and current African Union 
Commission Chairman, Alpha Konare, to deal with a Tuareg insurgency in Mali in 1994 
set the chain of events that culminated in the declaration of the Moratorium. Alpha 
Konare realized that the SALW problem in Mali was compounded by the free flow of 
SALW across the long porous borders with Algeria, Mauritania and Niger. This 
indicated that the problem was a transnational one and needed the cooperation of other 
countries and intergovernmental agencies. He sought the collaboration of the UN, which 
responded by establishing an advisory mission for SALW in the Sahel region. The 
mission visited Mali in 1994 and six other countries in 1995 - Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal. It concluded that "the control of small arms and 
light weapons was critical to ensuring peace and stability, defined in terms of political 
progress and economic and social development."' 
I Comfort Ero and Angela Ndinga-Muvumba, "Small Arms, Light Weapons," in West Africa's 
Security Challenges Building Peace in a Troubled Region, ed Adekeye Adebajo and Ismail Rashid 
(Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 2004), 229 
Chronology of Events Leading to the Moratorium 
This section drew from the work of Sverre ~ o d ~ a a r d . ~  Acknowledging that 
curbing SALW flow in each country and throughout the subregion was integral to 
development, a high-level meeting of the UN/UNDP and donor countries in New York 
on October 21, 1996, elaborated and, in principle, endorsed an integrated and 
proportional approach to security and development. Following on the heels of this 
meeting, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and UNDP 
convened a conference on conflict prevention, disarmament and development in West 
Africa in Bamako on November 25-29, 1996. Delegations from 12 West African 
countries explored options for future regional cooperation on these issues. The proposal 
for a moratorium on SALW generated particular interest during the conference. 
ECOWAS was an active participant in the discussions on the moratorium idea. 
Subsequently, the secretariat of the OAU was briefed on the proposal. 
In February 1997, Friends of the Chair of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and ~ e c h n o l o ~ i e s ~  (hereafter 
referred to as the Wassenaar Arrangement) - an arms export control forum based in 
Vienna - were also informed of the moratorium proposal and of ECOWAS' wish to 
conduct a dialogue on the matter. Participating states of the Wassenaar Arrangement 
"commit themselves to carrying out effective controls at the national level on transfers of 
2 Sverre Lodgaard, "Chronology of Events Relating to the ECOWAS Moratorium " 
http:iiwww.nisat.ore/west%20africalcronolo~ of events relating to .htm (accessed October 2, 2007) 
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Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States 
conventional arms and dual-use technology, to exchange information confidentially 
within the Arrangement on transfers of controlled items to non-members, and to report on 
denials of  license^."^ 
Another consultation of West African countries held in Bamako in March 1997 
was attended by a representative of the Chairman in Office of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement in an observer capacity. This meeting agreed a three-year trial of the 
moratorium. In December 1997, plenary representatives of the 33 countries participating 
in the Wassenaar Arrangement in a consensus welcomed and publicly encouraged the 
moratorium development. 
Meeting in Abidjan on March 12, 1998, ECOWAS foreign ministers in a 
communique instructed the ECOWAS secretariat to prepare a draft text for the 
declaration of the moratorium proposal with a view to its adoption and announcement at 
the ECOWAS summit scheduled for Abuja. At the twenty-first ordinary session of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS, summit in Abuja held on 
October 30-3 1, 1998, all 16 Heads of State of ECOWAS adopted the moratorium to last 
initially for three years. The Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS, in collaboration with the 
Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED), 
was requested to convene a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs to assess and evaluate 
the moratorium at the end of the initial three-year period. 
On December 3, 1998, the Participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement 
confirmed that they would undertake an appropriate collaborative role with ECOWAS 
4 
Staffan Sohlmans, Chairman, Wassenaar Arrangement, "The Wassenaar Arrangement and the 
Moratorium for West Africa" 
http://www.nisat.or~/west%20afiica/wassenaar arrangement and the mo.htm (accessed October 2,2007) 
117 
member states to respect tiie provisions of the moratorium and to be open to providing 
advisory andlor technical assistance in the implementation of the moratorium. 
The moratorium has three main instruments: 
1.  The Moratorium Declaration. 
2. The Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Programme for Coordination 
and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED) a UNDP-supported 
program, approved in March 1999. 
3. The Code of Conduct for The Implementation of the Moratorium (hereafter 
referred to as the Code of Conduct). 
In the Declaration, the 16 heads of state acknowledged the principles and 
objectives embodied in the revised ECOWAS Treaty, the Charter of the Organization of 
African Unity, the United Nations Charter, the repeated encouragement of the United 
Nations for disarmament in West Africa, and the unqualified approval of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement and other arms manufacturers for a moratorium on light weapons. The 
Declaration stated the heads of state: 
Hereby solemnly declare a moratorium on the importation, exportation and 
manufacture of light weapons in ECOWAS member states which shall take effect 
from the first day of November 1998 for a renewable period of three (3) years. 
The moratorium was renewed in 2001 and again in 2004. In June 2006, it was converted 
into a binding convention. 
PCASED was a five-year UNDP-assisted project operating within the framework 
of the United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, based in 
Lome, Togo. PCASED aimed at promoting the reduction and ultimate elimination of 
' Economic Community of West African States, Declaratzon O j A  Moratorzum On Importatzon, 
Exportatzon and Manufacture ojLight Weapons, (October, 1998), 3 
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excess weapons through comprehensive and voluntary weapons collection programs. In 
order to execute its activities, PCASED sought the active collaboration of 
intergovernmental organizations and civil society organizations, particularly women's 
organizations. Those and other formal organizations, such as the military, police and 
other security agencies, were to be engaged through seminars, workshops, roundtable 
discussions and the media. When PCASED was established in 1999, it had a start-up fund 
of $6.5 million and a clear mandate to fundraise $1 3 m i l l i ~ n , . ~  Over the five-year period 
(1 999-2004), PCASED had the following nine priority areas: 
1. Establish a culture of peace. 
2. Establish training programs for the military, security and police forces. 
3. Enhance weapons controls at the border posts. 
4. Establish a database and regional arms register. 
5. Collect and destroy surplus unauthorized weapons. 
6. Facilitate dialogue with producer/suppliers. 
7. Review and harmonize national legislation and administrative procedures. 
8. Mobilize resources for PECASED objectives and activities. 
9. Enlarge membership of the Moratorium. 
Resource constraints largely reduced the effectiveness of this program that carried 
so much potential. In April 2001, a review recommended a reduction of the priority areas 
from nine to seven by the Tripartite Review. The goals of enlarging membership of the 
Moratorium and dialogue with producer/suppliers were de-emphasized. This was an 
6 Abdel-Fatau Musah, The ECO WAS Moratorium on Lrght Weapons, Pztchrng Polrtrcal Will 
Against Realrty (Accra: FOSDA), 19 
7 Adedeji Ebo and Laura Mazal, Small Arms Control in West Africa, Monitoring the 
implementation ofSmall Arms Control (MlSAC) (London: International Alert), 23 
acknowledgement that PCASED had bitten off more than it could chew. 
To smoothen the work of PCASED, ECOWAS Heads of State and Government in 
a summit meeting on December 10,1999, in Lome, Togo, adopted the Code of Conduct 
for The Implementation of the Moratorium (hereafter referred to as Code of Conduct). 
The Code of Conduct was essentially a how-to guide on the implementation of the 
Moratorium. The Code of Conduct agreed on the following by member states: 
1 Establish National Commissions (NatComs) made up of representatives of the 
relevant authorities and civil society. 
2. Provide the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat with an annual report on the 
ordering or procurement of weapons, components and ammunition covered by 
the Moratorium, both from national and international sources. 
3. Harmonize and adopt regulatory and administrative measures necessary for 
exercising control of cross-border transactions with regard to light weapons, 
components and ammunition relating to them. 
4. Develop a regional arms register. 
5. Declare weapons and ammunition used for peacekeeping operations. 
6. Commit to arms collection and destruction. 
Member States could seek an exemption from the Moratorium in order to meet legitimate 
national security needs or international peace operations requirements. 
National Commissions 
Members of the NatComs were drawn from the five core ministries of foreign 
affairs, internal affairs and security, justice and civil society organizations. They were to 
perform the underlisted functions: 
1. Formulate strategies, policies and programs against the proliferation of small 
arms. 
2. Sensitize the public on the need to hand in illegally acquired weapons to the 
security agencies. 
3. Update arms register and transmit to ECOWAS Secretariat. 
4. Provide appropriate recommendations to ECOWAS Secretariat on exemptions 
to be granted to the Moratorium. 
5. Mobilize resources for program expenditures. 
6. Liaise on permanent basis with ECOWAS and PCASED Secretariats on issues 
relevant to the Moratorium as well as issues of the proliferation of small arms 
in general. 8 
Exemptions 
The collaboration with the Wassenaar Arrangement was key to giving substance 
to Article 9 of the Code of Conduct which dealt with exemptions to the Moratorium. This 
article was the pivot of the Moratorium. According to Article 9 of the Code of Conduct, 
member states could seek an exemption from the Moratorium in order to meet legitimate 
national security needs or international peace operations requirements. When a member 
state of ECOWAS applied for an exemption to the ECOWAS Secretariat, the request was 
circulated to other member states by the Secretariat. If there were no objections from 
member states, the Secretariat would then issue a certificate confirming each member's 
agreement. If a member state of ECOWAS decided to buy weapons from any of the 
8 PCASEDI ECOWAS Secretariat, Guidelines on the Establishment and Functronrng ofNationa1 
Comm~ssions Against the Proliferation ofSmall Arms (Bamako: PCASED, 2001), 4 
member states of the Wassenaar Arrangement without reference to ECOWAS, the 
Wassenaar Arrangement would forward the request back to ECOWAS for their necessary 
action. 
Before 2000, the record of' compliance was poor. However, after 2000 the 
compliance rate improved. ECOWAS issued 30 exemptions between 2001 and 2002. 
Within this period, nine of the fifteen members of ECOWAS applied for exemptions. The 
exceptions were Liberia, Mali, Togo, Guinea, Guinea-Bissa~~ and Cape Verde. Even the 
subregional giant, Nigeria, applied for exemptions. A copy of an application by Nigeria is 
provided in Appendix 4. Between 2001 and 2002 there was an increase in the number of 
applications for exemptions, even from the subregional giant, ~ i ~ e r i a . ~  
Table 2. Exemptions granted by ECOWAS under the Moratorium 
Country 2001 2002 Total 
Benin 5 5 
Ivory Coast 19 19 
Gambia 1 1 
Ghana 1 2 4 ? 
Niger 1 1 
Nigeria 4 3 7 
Senegal 2 1 3 
Sierra Leone 5 2 7 
Source: FOSDA, Focus, No 4, May 2003 
9 Interview with Afi Yakubu, Associate Director of Foundation for Security and Development in 
Africa (FOSDA) and Secretary of the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) on April 
4,2007 
However, not all arms exporting countries were members of the Wassenaar 
Arrangement. Significant arms exporters or sources such as China, India, Israel, Pakistan, 
Egypt, Brazil, Jordan, the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan were not members 
and did not have any export control arrangements with ECOWAS. 
It was intended as a confidence-building mechanism among states. Article 9 was a 
subregional attempt at transparency, aiming to remove the cloud of suspicion that 
attended weapons purchases or defense spending. Through the application and reporting 
mechanism, other states knew what weapons other states were importing. A state that was 
nervous about another state's application could raise an objection, which could stymie the 
requesting state's application. It must be remembered, however, that small arms were 
only one component of a country's defense requirements. 
Arms Collection and Destruction 
Article 13 of the Moratorium provided that member states should carry out the 
systematic collection, registration and destruction of all weapons and ammunition that 
fell under the following categories: 
I .  Weapons surplus to national security requirements. 
2. Weapons under illegal possession, 
3. Weapons collected following the conclusion of peace accords or upon the 
completion of international peace operations. 
According to Muruiri, research conducted by Small Arms Survey revealed that sixty 
percent (60%) of arms usually remained in the wrong hands after conflicts were over." 
Beginning from the famous "Flame of Peace" destruction of weapons handed in after the 
10 Stephen Muiruri, "Protocol on Small Arms Now Legally Binding," Horn ofA3ica Bulletin, 18 
no 3 (May-June 2006), 5 .  
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conclusion of a peace accord between Tuareg rebels and the Malian government in 1994, 
West African countries collected and destroyed thousands of weapons falling in the 
aforementioned categories. Complementing the efforts of ECOWAS was the declaration 
by the UN of' every July 9 as International Gun Destruction Day in May 2001. In Ghana 
after the New Patriotic Party took over the reins of government in 2001 from the 
PNDC/NDC regime, it undertook to collect all weapons that were in illegal possession. A 
two-week amnesty was declared for all people in illegal possession of SALW to turn 
them in. After the end of the amnesty period, swoops were conducted on those suspected 
to be in illegal possession of'weapons. 
Table 3. Ceremonial arms destruction in West Africa 
Country 1996-1999 2000 2001 2002 
- 
Ghana - 8000 
Liberia 19,000 - 
Mali 3,000 530 
Niger 1,243 200 500 
Nigeria 1,581 100 
Sierra Leone 
Togo 5 0 2,000 
- 
Source: PCASED Annual Programme Report, 200 1 -2002 
Note: Figures refer to number of arms destroyed 
Niger had a systematic and modestly successf~tl program. The "arms for 
development" program began in 2000 with support from the UNDP. Carried out in 
phases, it began with nearly a year of awareness raising followed by appeals for weapons 
to be turned over in exchange for community projects." The table below shows the fruits: 
Table 4. Ceremonial arms destruction in Niger 2000-2003 
Place Year Number of arms destroyed 
Agadez 2000 1,234 
Diff'a 
Agadez 
Agadez 2002 100 
N'guimi 2003 103 
Source: Napoleon Abdulai, IANSA News June 2003,4 
Arms Embargoes 
The UN imposed the first West African arms embargo on Liberia in 1992 
following a request from ECOWAS. In the case of the Sierra Leone arms embargo that 
was imposed in 1997 after the military coup, the UN gave ECOWAS a monitoring role. 
A UN embargo was also placed on Ivory Coast in 2004. The only arms embargo ever 
placed by ECOWAS on a member state was against Togo in February 2005. 
Table 5. Arms embargoes on ECOWAS member states 
Country Year imposed Imposing authority 





Togo 2005 ECOWAS 
" Interview with Napoleon Abdulai, a disarmament expert, 15 April, 2007 
Liberia 
As mentioned earlier, following a request from ECOWAS, the 1JN by Security 
Council Resolution 788, imposed its first arms embargo (and the first in West Africa) on 
Liberia in 1992 in response to the deteriorating situation in Liberia. The various factions 
had failed to abide by all the numerous peace accords they had signed, especially the 
Yamoussoukro Accord of October 1991. To add insult to injury, some of the factions, 
particularly the NPFL led by Charles Taylor, had been attacking ECOWAS peacekeeping 
forces. In the considered view of the Security Council the worsening situation in Liberia 
was a threat to international peace and security. The Security Council felt that the 
Yamoussoukro Accord of October 1991 offered the best possible framework for a 
peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary conditions 
conducive to the holding of free and fair elections. Accordingly, the Council decided 
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that: 
All States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Liberia, 
immediately implement a general and complete embargo on deliveries of weapons 
and military equipment to Liberia until the Security Council decides otherwise.12 
The embargo did not to apply to weapons and material meant for ECOWAS 
peacekeeping forces in Liberia. 
Noting that Resolution 788 was not being respected, the UN Security Council 
unanimously adopted Resolution 985 at its 35 17th meeting on 13 April 1995. That 
resolution urged: 
All States, and in particular all neighbouring States, to comply fully with the 
embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia imposed 
by resolution 788 (1 992), and to that end decides to establish, in accordance with 
12 United Nations, Unzted Natlons Securzty Council Resolution 788 SlRESl788, (19 November 
1992), paragraph 8 
rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council, 
consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following tasks and 
to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations: 
(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them 
concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 8 
of resolution 788 (1 992); 
(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning 
violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the 
Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo; 
(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo 
imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 788 (1992) and provide information on a 
regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States.I3 
The Committee established to monitor the arms embargo imposed in 1992 on the 
supply of weapons and military equipment to Liberia did not have any specific 
monitoring mechanism to ensure the effective implementation of the arms embargo. The 
UN relied on the good faith and voluntary cooperation of states and organizations in a 
position to provide the UN with pertinent information. Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and 
Libya, members of both ECOWAS and the UN, continued to violate the embargo. 
The embargo was tightened in March 2001 by Resolution 1334 with a travel ban 
on senior members of the Government of Liberia and their spouses, the Liberian armed 
forces, and any other individuals providing financial and military support to armed rebel 
groups in countries neighboring Liberia, in particular the RUF in Sierra Leone. Imports 
of diamonds from Liberia were also forbidden. All states in the region were requested to 
prevent armed groups and individuals from launching attacks on Liberia from their 
territory. The Resolution further requested all states to: 
Take the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply to Liberia, by their 
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms 
and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military 
l 3  United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 98.5, SlRESi985 (13 April 1995), 
paragraph 4 
vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts for the 
aforementioned, whether or not originating in their territories. l 4  
The Security Council created a committee to monitor the arms embargo three 
years after imposing sanctions on Liberia in 1992. There was no record of the Liberia 
sanctions committee carrying out a single investigation of a reported sanctions breach. 
The embargoes on Liberia were simply not implemented. Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast 
sustained the weapons pipeline to Charles Taylor. Taylor also continued to rely on his 
friends, the notorious arms brokers (Minin, Bout and Ruprah), to supply arms in 
exchange for timber and diamonds. 
Sierra Leone 
By United Nations Security Council Resolution 1 132 adopted on 8 October 1997, 
the Security Council imposed a regime of mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter against Sierra Leone. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this resolution prevented the sale 
or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum and petroleum products, arms and related materiel 
of all types as well as imposed restrictions on the travel of members of the military junta 
of Sierra Leone and adult members of their families. These measures were imposed in 
view of the Council's concerns over the continued violence following the military coup 
of May 25, 1997, which was deemed a threat to international peace and security in the 
region. 
Under paragraph 8 of Resolution 1 132 (1 997), the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, authorized or formally delegated: 
ECOWAS, cooperating with the democratically-elected Government of 
l 4  United Nations, Unrted Natlons Security Cotrncll Resolution 1343 S/RES/1343 (1 3 March 
200 I ) ,  paragraph 5 
Sierra Leone, to ensure strict implementation of the provisions of this resolution 
relating to the supply of petroleum and petroleum products, and arms and related 
materiel of all types, including, where necessary and in conformity with 
applicable international standards, by halting inward maritime shipping in order to 
inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations, and calls upon all States to 
cooperate with ECOWAS in this regard.I5 
By paragraph 9 of this resolution, ECOWAS was required to report to the Sanctions 
Committee every 30 days on all activities undertaken in that regard. The Sanctions 
Committee was mandated by paragraph 10(Q of resolution 1 132 to designate members of 
the military junta of Sierra Leone and adult members of their families whose entry or 
transit was to be prevented by all States 
Despite the embargo, the RUF continued to import weapons through neighboring 
states, including Liberia. The RUF also augmented its weapons supplies by seizing them 
from ECOWAS peacekeepers. According to Human Rights Watch, a February 2000 
report from the UN wire service (operated by the UN Foundation) indicated that rebels 
had stolen at least 500 automatic rifles, six heavy artillery pieces, anti-aircraft guns, three 
armored vehicles, and five trucks from Kenyan and Guinean troops. The RUF abducted 
and disarmed UN peacekeepers, reportedly yielding the RUF hundreds of guns and more 
than a dozen armored personnel carriers. l 6  
ECOWAS had little capacity to play its role in enforcing the sanctions. In an 
April 1999 press conference in Freetown, Sierra Leone, the commander of ECOMOG in 
Sierra Leone, Major-General Felix Mujakperuo, accused Liberia and Burkina Faso of 
shipping arms to the RUF. He alleged that on March 14, 1999, a Ukrainian-registered 
I s  United Nations, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1132, S/RES/l 1.32 (October 8, 
1997), paragraph 8 
16 Human Rights Watch. "Neglected Arms Embargo on Sier~a Leone Rebels," (May 15,2000), 
HR W Briefing Paper 1 .  http://www.krw.o~~/press/2000/05/slbackO5 IS .htm (accessed October 4,2007). 
cargo plane delivered sixty-eight tons of weapons and ammunition to Ouagadougou, the 
Burkinabe capital, for onward shipment to the RUF via Liberia. In Ouagadougou, he 
claimed, the plane parked in the airport's VIP terminal. The cargo was then transferred for 
shipment by smaller aircraft to Liberia. Once in Liberia, the weapons were transported 
onward by land to the RUF inside Sierra Leone. The ECOMOG Force Commander 
reported the incident to the United Nations.I7 
Togo 
On February 19,2005, ECOWAS for the first time in its history imposed an arms 
embargo against one of its members, Togo. In addition, a travel ban was placed on its 
leaders, and Togo was expelled from ECOWAS. ECOWAS imposed a complete arms 
embargo after Faure Gnassingbe, with the connivance of the Togolese armed forces, 
violated Togo's constitution by illegally assuming the presidency after the death of his 
father, Gnassingbe Eyadema, who had ruled Togo for 38 years, 
This attempt to subvert the Togolese constitution quickly crumbled owing to the 
ECOWAS arms embargo (as part of a regime of sanctions) and severe pressure from the 
international community. The AU decided to support the ECOWAS sanctions against 
Togo, including the arms embargo, and ratified the ECOWAS sanctions on February 25. 
On February 26,2005, Faure Gnassingbe stepped down, and preparations for presidential 
elections began. On the same day Faure stepped down, ECOWAS lifted the sanctions, 
including the embargo. After he was declared the winner of the May 27,2005, 
presidential elections, the AU also lifted the sanctions on Togo. 
I' Ibid 
Ivory Coast 
The UN Security Council slapped an arms embargo on Ivory Coast on November 
15, 2004, over the violation of the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (ceasefire 
agreement) between the Ivorian government and the New Forces rebels, who controlled 
the north of the country. The situation was deemed prejudicial to international peace and 
security, moreso as the warring parties had stepped up the carnage. The Security Council 
by virtue of Resolution 1.572 decided that: 
All States shall, for a period of thirteen months from the date of adoption of this 
resolution, take the necessary measures to prevent the direct or indirect supply, 
sale or transfer to C6te d'Ivoire, from their territories or by their nationals, or 
using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms or any related materiel, in particular 
military aircraft and equipment, whether or not originating in their territories, as 
well as the provision of any assistance, advice or training related to military 
activities. ' 
As was the case with Liberia and Sierra Leone, a committee was set up to monitor the 
sanctions. All states in the region were also required to report to the Council measures 
they had taken to enforce the sanctions. Mercenaries from the subregion, particularly 
Liberia, and from outside the region lent their deadly services to the factions. According 
to the UN, the number of Liberians fighting for the Government of Ivory Coast during the 
2002,-2003 conflict was estimated at between 1,500 and 2,500, while those fighting for 
the rebels were close to 1,000. A UN Panel of Experts report in 2005 observed that many 
states were complying with the provisions of the sanctions, even though some were 
frustrated by the lack of comprehensive information on the scope of the sanctions.lg 
l 8  United Nations, United Nations Secuv~ty Council Resolution 1572 SIRES11 572 (1 5 November 
2004), paragraph 7 
19 United Nations, Panel of Experts Report on Cote d'lvoire Sl20051699 (November 7, 2005), 
paragraph 178 
Disarmament 
After at least a dozen broken peace accords and agreements, the Abuja Agreement 
of August 19, 1995, got the factions in the Liberian conflict to agree again to disarm in 
order to create a conducive environment for holding elections. According to this 
agreement, the parties were to disarm under the supervision of ECOMOG and monitored 
and verified by a United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). The 
demobilization and disarmament program was implemented between November 22, 
1996, and February 9, 1997. The turning-in of weapons was the first step in the 
demobilization process. Fighters were given food rations and provided transportation to 
destinations of their choice in exchange for the surrender of a serviceable weapon or a 
hundred rounds of ammunition. By the end of the official demobilization process, 24,500 
of the estimated 33,000 fighters had been disarmed and demobilized. These included 
4,306 child soldiers and 250 adult female fighters. 20 
According to the Bonn International Center for Conversion, 7,797 serviceable 
weapons, 1,782 unserviceable weapons and 1.2 million rounds of ammunition were 
turned in. Another 458 weapons and 25,000 rounds of ammunition were later turned in at 
some demobilization sites that were still kept open, and approximately 3,759 weapons 
were surrendered to ECOMOG outside the official sites.21 ECOMOGYs cordon-and- 
search operations around Liberia yielded another 122, 162 pieces of ammunition and 917 
weapons. Most roadblocks were cleared and manned by ECOMOG soldiers. Elections 
were held on 19 July 1997 with ECOMOG providing security at all the 1,864 polling 
20 Adekeye Adebajo, Budding Peace In West Afr~ca L~bena,  Slerra Leone and Guinea-Bissau 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 63-64 
2 1 Bonn International Center. for Conversion, "Help Desk for Practical Disarmament, Liberia " (No 
date) http:l/www.bicc.de/helpdesk/stories/liberia.html (accessed October, 1 1 2007) 
stations, The successful holding of elections and the high voter turnout indicated that the 
immediate goal of the program had been achieved. 22 
Between 1997 and 2003, disarmament was carried out mainly by the United 
Nations outfits - UNOMIL and the United Nations Mission in Liberia. These activities 
were outside the scope of this research. 
Disarmament in Liberia was a very tortuous and frustrating project for ECOWAS 
and UNOMIL The various factions had little confidence in the fairness of the 
enforceability of the provisions. For some, "loss of weapons meant loss of power to 
protect their economic and ethnic survival, and possibly future legal re t r ib~t ion."~~ 
The disarmament process in Sierra Leone is summarized below. It was not 
pertinent to this research because it was not undertaken by ECOWAS. The same was true 
for the Ivory Coast. 
On July 7, 1999, following the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement between the 
government of Ahrned Tejan Kabbah and the RUF-AFRC rebels, Sierra Leone began the 
difficult journey to peace via disarmament. Nigeria, which was the pivot of ECOMOG 
operations in Sierra Leone, declared its intentions to withdraw by writing formally to the 
UN Secretary-General on August 19, 1999. The UN then established the United Nations 
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) on October 22, 1999 to oversee the peace process 
and disarmament. UNAMSIL's core contingents were drawn from Nigeria, Ghana, 
Guinea, Zambia, Kenya, India, Bangladesh and Jordan. In Sierra Leone, disarmament of 
22 Adekeye Adebajo, Budding Peace 1n West Afvica Llbeula, Sierra Leone and Gulnea-Bissau 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 63-64 
23 Michelle Pitts, "Sub-Regional Solutions for African Conflict: The ECOMOG Experiment" 
Journal of Conflict Studies (online) 
htlp:l/www.lib.unb.ca~Texts/JCS/bin~get4.c~i?director~=s1in~99/&filename=pitls.htm# 1 (accessed 
October 15,2007) 
combatants was undertaken by UNAMSIL and a government agency, the National 
Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration. Sierra Leone was 
declared "disarmed" and the war officially declared over in January 2002. 
Given the enormous challenges faced by ECOWAS in trying to pacify Liberia and 
Sierra Leone, its achievements in these countries were commendable. ECOWAS faced 
very serious resource (financial and logistical) challenges, an unconcerned international 
community and well-armed warlords whose primary occupation was looting and personal 
aggrandizement. As Christopher Tuck puts it, "Financial and material constraints left 
ECOMOG consistently short of the means necessary either to inflict a 'defeat' decisive 
enough to deliver lasting political gains or to implement the ambitious peace-making 
programmes."24 As of the time of this research, Liberia and Sierra Leone were on the 
paths to recovery, and the sounds of gunfire no more punctuated the night. 
Civil society organizations were largely responsible for holding states accountable 
for what they had agreed to do in the various agreements and protocols they signed 
Without civil society, the Moratorium would have remained a mere paper agreement. In 
this regard, the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa and WAANSA stood 
out as shining examples. The advocacy role of civil society organizations prodded the 
ECOWAS Secretariat to set up a small arms unit in the secretariat to advance the agenda 
of eliminating illicit SALW. 
Civil society organizations were aided greatly by the expanded role they were 
given to participate in the work of ECOWAS under the tenure of the ECOWAS 
24 Christopher Tuck, "Every Car Or Moving Object Gone: The ECOMOG Intervention in 
Liberia," Afrlcan Studies Quarterly (online journal for Afiican Studies) 
httr,:l/web.ahica.ufl.edu/asq/v4/~4i 1 a 1 .htm (accessed October 15,2007) 
Commission President at the time of this research, Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, an 
advocate of civil society participation in governance in West Africa. 
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this research was to analyze the progress and gains ECOWAS 
made in containing SALW between 1998 and 2005. Previous studies had looked at 
ECOWAS' initiatives separately, with the most attention being paid to the Moratorium. 
The significance of this study was that it was the first in-depth study of ECOWAS as a 
regional organization that looked at all of its initiatives (the 1998 Moratorium, arms 
embargoes and disarmament) in an integrated way. The research covered a seven-year 
period: 1998-2005. 
The uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons that fuelled 
conflicts in West Africa galvanized member states of ECOWAS to adopt measures to 
bring sanity to bear on the security situation in West Africa. This research delved into the 
sources of conflict in West Africa and the role SALW played in those conflicts. The 
research analyzed some of the factors that motivated people to acquire SALW and some 
of the sources of supply of weapons to West Africa. 
This research also traced the history, structure and evolution of ECOWAS. 
Originally formed to integrate West African economies, it broadened its mandate to 
include conflict resolution. This research also examined all the initiatives that ECOWAS 
deployed to combat SALW in West Africa - the Moratorium Declaration, arms 
embargoes, and arms collection and destruction. 
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The anti-proliferation efforts of ECOWAS may be said to have effectively begun 
in 1998 when the AHSG signed the Moratorium Declaration in Abija, Nigeria. A Code 
of Conduct was later signed to guide the implementation of the Moratorium. The 
unprecedented subregional move was endorsed by the United Nations and the Wassenaar 
Arrangement and hailed worldwide as a pragmatic move to bring stability into West 
Africa. 
The initiative of ECOWAS inspired the African Union to push for the adoption of' 
an anti-SALW proliferation agenda. It also inspired members of IGAD and the Great 
Lakes Region to address the illicit proliferation of small arms by signing in March 2000 
The Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of the Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. 
General Assessment 
This research was done using largely qualitative data. The results therefore are 
largely suggestive and tentative. A more objective yardstick for measuring progress or 
lack thereof would have been the use of quantitative data, fbr example, tonnage of' arms 
flows. This proved difficult for three reasons. First the arms trade and trafficking business 
is a clandestine, highly secretive and shady business. It thrives on this basis. Secondly, 
the porous nature of West Africa's borders, the virtually unpatrolled coastline and the 
lack of effective radar coverage of the airspace ensure that people tracking arms supply 
are unable to perform their duties effectively. Thirdly, government officials are very 
reluctant to share information on arms. One highly placed security official informed me 
during my research that even among the security agencies themselves, they are reluctant 
to share specific information on quantities of arms, 
The conflicts that plagued West Africa in the 1990s and well into 2005 validated 
the observations of Michael Klare; firstly, that the abundance of arms contributed to the 
severity, duration and geographic scope of' recent wars, making small arms proliferation a 
very significant factor in the dynamics of contemporary conflict. Secondly, the outbreak 
of ethnic and internal conflict in weak and divided societies often produced an "internal 
arms race" that further drove the acquisition of small arms and light weapons. This 
without any doubt validated the initiatives of ECOWAS in curbing SALW proliferation. 
The sources of conflict would have to be addressed to prevent grievances 
breaking out into violence. Once violence broke out there would be demand for SALW, 
and there would be suppliers. To prevent this, the quality of governance would have to be 
improved. 
The greatest challenge for ECOWAS in ridding the subregion of SALW between 
1998-2005 was securing the cooperation of states in shutting down the pipeline of 
weapons flow to factions involved in the various conflicts in the subregion. Burkina Faso, 
Ivory Coast and Guinea violated the ECOWAS Moratorium and even the UN arms 
embargoes.. Arms brokers and greedy warlords joined them in this illicit trade. 
A no less significant challenge was to effectively engage the West African public 
in the anti-SALW proliferation project. The public in the various states was largely 
unaware of what the subregion was doing officially to curb the scourge. 
The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their 
Ammunition and Other Related materials (signed on 14 June 2006), which occurred after 
the period of' this research, replaced the Moratorium as the major instrument to fight 
illicit weapons trafficking and proliferation. ECOWAS again had taken an unprecedented 
step, but it needed to incorporate the lessons learned from the working of the Moratorium 
and its other initiatives if the convention were to succeed. To enable the Convention to 
succeed, civil society would have to be encouraged to continue to play its advocacy and 
watchdog role. 
Conclusions 
Evaluation of the progress and gains ECOWAS made in containing the spread of 
SALW between 1998 and 2005 was placed in the context of what ECOWAS member 
states set out to do, as outlined in the Code of Conduct, and the practical things they did 
or did not do in that period. 
A successf~~l anti-proliferation drive depended on the realization of the following 
objectives outlined in the Code of Conduct: establishment of National Commissions 
(Article 4), development of an arms register (Article 6), harmonization of legislation and 
administrative measures (Article 7), seeking exemptions from the Moratorium (Article 9), 
and collection and destruction of surplus weapons (Article 13). In the absence of 
quantitative data on arms flows, the progress of ECOWAS's anti-illicit SALW 
proliferation efforts was evaluated against these agreed yardsticks. 
The nature of the Moratorium Declaration itself ensured that any gains that would 
be made would be contingent on the voluntary cooperation of states. The moratorium was 
not legally binding; it was only voluntary. However, even though voluntary, the conflicts 
and their unparalleled brutality dictated that the promises ought to be kept. Some states - 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and Liberia - were not willing to bring to fruition the 
document that they had signed. The absence of enforceable sanctions, not even naming 
and shaming, encouraged these states to further imperil the security situation in West 
Africa. 
National Commissions 
In spite of the enormous responsibility placed on NatComs and their centrality to 
implementing anti-SALW initiatives, they did not function properly due to several 
reasons. Members of the NatComs were drawn from five core sectors: representatives 
from the ministries of foreign affairs, internal affairs and security, justice and civil 
society organizations. Usually the officials from the government ministries serving on the 
NatComs were there on secondment from their mother organizations. Membership of 
NatComs was not their full-time job, and they could not give it their undivided attention. 
Besides, the NatColns weie poorly resourced arid dicl riot have incleperiderit budgets. 
More importantly, security in West Africa was still synonymous with the security 
of the government and not seen in the wider context of human security. Representatives 
of' the security sector tended to dominate those commissions, and turf' battles were not 
uncommon. In nearly all the Fierich-speaking states, as well as in Ghana, Nigeria alld 
Sierra Leone. the NatComs w c ~ e  headctl by military o l  police officcrs or locrtted within 
the rniliictly of deiense or iliterior. In Ghana's case, the deputy rriirlistel for the interioi 
headcd the Nat('om 
I7lequenl rehulfle of nlinistersldeputy rriinistels arlci tiarlsfers or ieas\ignments of 
pel-sonncl in thc security sector undclminecl thc smooth functioning of the NatClonx ant1 
created instability and discontinuity of programs. For these reasons, the request by civil 
society organizations that political appointees should not head the Nat~:orns' appcared 
reasonable. 
1 Interview with Ati Yakubu, Associate Director, Foundation for Seculity and Development in 
Africa, 1 1 April 2007 
140 
'rlie inability of some NatConls to function effectively undercut the irltent oi the 
Moiato~iuin. They functioned more like govern~ncrlt bureaucracies and became desk- 
bo~uncl. Aciocs the subregion, most NatComs tirned their acliv~ties to coincide with the 
[JN Small Arnms Dcst~vction Day that usually fell on July 9, It is not sulprising. therefore, 
that the Moratorium and if5 related instruments were not well known by the genein1 
public. Thosc who were familial with the Moratot ium wcrc the Nat('om members and 
other civtl society activists and organi~ations. 
Sornc NatComs, such as thc one in Ghana, triccl their best ~undc~ the severe 
constraints. It had diawn up an action plan for the year 200'1 and toured [lie ten legions of 
Ghana to scnsitize the general public about the scoufge of SA1.W and the uecd to tuin 
ovel illegally acquirecl small arms to the security agencies. 
Arms Register 
There was no evidence of the compilation of an arms register. This was not 
surprising because the NatComs that should have provided the inputs were not 
functioning properly. At the national level some countries, for example Ghana stored 
information on paper and filed in cabinets. Referencing and compiling data in such cases 
was difficult. At the time of the research the process of computerizing the records was 
starting, but it was easy to surmise that there would eventually be information gaps. Until 
recently, the ECOWAS Secretariat did not have a small arms department to that would 
have collated the data provided by the NatComs. 
Harmonization of Legislation and Administrative Measures 
This provision was not complied with. It would have been a miracle if it had been 
complied with simply because even within the member states the laws on SALW were 
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outdated and inadequate. Any attempt to harmonize the laws should have begun from 
within states. 
In Sierra Leone, the operative legal statute for the control of SALW was outdated 
and did not meet contemporary security challenges. The firearm legislations of Senegal 
and Ghana were similarly outdated. Nigeria's legislation was more recent; it was 
reviewed in 1995. Even then, it had a number of defects worth rectifying, as indicated in 
Chapter 5. 
For the better part of the period under review, Liberia and Sierra Leone were in a 
state of civil war and not in a position to update their laws. Guinea-Bissau went through 
the period unstable and on the brink of joining the list of failed states. 
Collection and Destruction of Surplus Weapons 
Article 13 of the Code of Conduct stipulated that member states of ECOWAS, in 
collaboration with the Executive Secretariat, PCASED and other relevant international 
organizations, would carry out systematic collection, registration and destruction of all 
weapons, ammunition and components that were "surplus" to national security 
requirements. Also included were weapons under illegal possession or those collected 
upon the conclusion of peace accords. 
The definition of surplus added to the difficulty of implementing the provision of 
the article. Who determined what was surplus relative to national security requirements? 
Obviously, it was the state concerned. With the exception of Nigeria, no other state in 
West Africa had a legal small arms manufacturing company. All states imported weapons 
with hard-earned cash from primary commodity exports. Every state wanted to keep 
whatever weapons it had until they were no longer useful. As demonstrated in the 
Liberian civil war, weapons not immediately needed by the state could be usef~11 later to a 
faction engaging in conflict in a neighboring state. 
The experience of arms collection and destruction also showed that it was largely 
ceremonial in character. Sometimes it was the unserviceable and less sophisticated 
weapons that were usually turned in voluntarily. 
Exemptions 
Article 9 of the Code of Conduct requested member states to apply for 
exemptions from the provisions of the Moratorium. The article requested member states 
to apply for exemptions from the Moratorium in order to meet legitimate national 
security needs. This emerged as the most complied with and the most successful 
provision. It had the potential to reduce nervousness among member states. 
Arms embargoes 
The arms embargoes placed on Liberia and Sierra Leone were not enforced or 
were unenforceable because of the lack of sanctions on embargo-busting states and 
individuals. ECOWAS did not have the logistical and intelligence capacity to enforce the 
sanctions. It was given a monitoring role in enforcing the sanctions against Sierra Leone. 
The RUF continued to import arms from Liberia and even seized weapons from 
ECOMOG forces. In the case of Liberia, both Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast ignored the 
legally binding sanctions and continued to sustain the arms pipelines to Charles Taylor. 
The arms brokers, Bout and Minin, continued through their elaborate and clandestine 
network to supply weapons to Taylor. 
According to the UN, the arms embargo on Ivory Coast in 2005 was largely 
complied with. The arms embargo on Togo was lifted after six days because the Togolese 
regime complied with the demands of' ECOWAS to respect the constitution. The embargo 
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was not in operation for long, and therefore ECOWAS' ability to enforce or police its 
own sanctions was not tested. 
ECOWAS made commendable efforts to control the proliferation of' illicit SALW 
between 1998 and 2005. However, the intent to achieve the goals was not matched by 
political will even from the heads of state who voluntarily appended their signatures to 
the Moratorium and other protocols. The infrastructure to effectively deal with the issues 
like fully functioning NatComs, an arms register, and harmonization of laws was not 
constructed. However, progress was made in the application for exemptions by member 
states; increasingly states begun to apply for exemptions to import arms for legitimate 
security needs. This was an effort at transparency and to calm nervous neighbors. 
ECOWAS' effort also encouraged civil society to intensify the beam on illicit SALW. 
Finally, the modest efforts of ECOWAS encouraged other regional organizations like the 
SADC and those of' the Great Lakes Region and IGAD to coordinate efforts in fighting 
SALW through regional agreements. 
APPENDIX 1 
Human Development lndex-ranking for West African States 
The human development index (HDI) is a composite index that measures the average 
achievements in a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long and 
healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured by the adult 
literacy rate and the combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary 
schools; and a decent standard of living, as measured by GDP per capita in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) US dollars. Countries are classified into three categories: high, 
medium and low human development index. 
Country HDI rank Life Adult literacy GDP 
expectancy at rate (% ages 15 per capita 
birth and above) (PPP US$) 
(2003) 2003 2003 
Benin 162 54.0 33.6 1,115 
Burkina Faso 175 47.5 12.8 1,174 
Cape Verde 105 70.4 75.7 5,214 
Gambia 155 55.7 37.8 1,859 
Ghana 138 56.8 54.1 2,238 
Guinea 156 53.7 4 1 .O 2,097 
Guinea-Bissau 172 44.7 39.6 711 
Ivory Coast 163 45.9 48.1 1,476 
Mali 174 47.9 19.0 994 
Niger 177 44.4 14.4 835 
Nigeria 158 43.4 66.8 1,050 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 176 40.8 29.6 548 
Togo 143 54.3 53.0 1,696 
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, 2 19-222 
Notes: There is no data for Liberia in the HDI ranking 
The 2005 HDI rankings begin at I (tirst) and end at 177 (bottom) 
APPENDIX 2 
Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations, 1999-2006 











11 Belanls 1,100 
Source: United States Congressional Research Service, 2007 
APPENDIX 3 
Production of major modern military automatic rifles 
Type and variants 
AK-47 
SKS 
I I Turkev I 

























124 million -156 
million 





















Request by Nigeria for exemption 
1'ir,iNIST 2Y OF CO-OPERATION 8 INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 
THE: PRESIDENCY 
P!or 496, IPCR Building, 
Abogo Lxgerna Sires.. 
Off Consrimtion Avenue, 
Aiipon Road. C e n d  Dismct. 
Abu!a 
MCLr/CDS/G2S./Voi ,1175 
The if~ecl~tivf C : ~ ~ t z i r y  .,. . 
60 Cikubu Grirrcn Way, 
Asok,;ro, 
A h 1 2  
BARSEDOS VENTURES LIMITED 
Tn!s s :a n o w  the Execubve Ss-etzry that &e Federal Government of 
Il!,c+~ a has av,rzrd& a contract to Barbedos Venture Limited Kaduna - 
Nigeria to i r rp~ r t ,~20 ,000  rounds of .9mm Parabejlum Ammunition for 
LHie k;uwsc?  cf anticrime operations with a view to enhancinguternal 
Security:of tkr Country 
2 .  me Niceria National C o m m i e  on the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small 
Arms and ijgtii Weapons has received an application for Waivers in order to 
enabr? the Ni<:ma Police purchase these items for ~e purposes mentioned 
here111 (copy of the request by the Inspector-General of Police 
No.CB2323/'Bf ~ept/FHQ/AB3/VoI.l/119 dated March 13, 2003 is 
herehy attached for ease of referenp) 
3 Please, accept your E~cellency, the assurances of my highest 
consi(!eratian 
AMBASIADO~-ER~WNSON DEDE 
I , $  . f$$ DIRECTOR-GENERAL - -  - 2- 
APPENDIX 5 
CONSENT FORM 
THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) 
AND THE CONTROL OF ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS 
IN WEST AFRICA (1998-2005) 
Principal Investigator: Mba Atinrza Phone: (404) 753-8844 
Principle Advisor: Dr. Art Hansen Phone: (404) 880 6666 
Meeting Date: 
You are invited to participate in this Ph.D. dissertation research, which seeks to examine 
the initiatives that ECOWAS used between 1998 and 2005 to curb the proliferation of 
illicit small arms and light weapons in the subregion. 
Small arms and light weapons have been the scourge of the subregion with devastating 
consequences. The main objectives of the research are to assess the progress or gains 
ECOWAS made in curbing the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons in 
West Africa between 1998 and 2005. 
You were selected to participate in this study and provide your opinion on the subject 
because of' your profile. 
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you are 
free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time without any 
consequences to you. Your signature indicates that you have read and understood the 
above information, that you have discussed this study with the person obtaining the 
consent, and that you have decided to participate based on the information provided. 
-- 
Signature of participant Date 
Signature of Authorized Representative Date 
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